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A Journal of World Affairs

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THE MANY FACES OF NUCLEAR POLICY

(See Contents)

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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE GROUP
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

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reflections
ON THE QUARTER

THE MANY FACES OF NUCLEAR POLICY

America's nuclear policies toward its allies have been the source of many diplomatic traumas in recent times. The American inability to deal with the many policy implications of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons appears to cause growing tensions with traditional friends. What makes this a time of such tension over nuclear issues? What has brought this mixed technological blessing to the fore with such passion, with the power to topple governments (as in Sweden) and to provoke diplomatic confrontations of the most serious order? In part, we must look at objective changes in the role of the atom in our lives; at the same time, new perceptions of the "nuclear problem" have quietly taken hold to invest the nuclear issues of America's alliances with intense emotion. Each aspect must be understood.

The core of many U.S. postwar alliances was the concept of the "nuclear umbrella." While that umbrella has been successful in its primary task — preventing the military overthrow of our formal allies by the Soviet Union — it has been unable to secure the political and strategic tranquillity that some, perhaps foolishly, have expected from it. Thus, Western Europe has not been invaded, but its political climate has shifted leftward; Pakistan was not conquered by India, but it was dismembered; Greece and Turkey were not invaded by non-NATO forces, but themselves came to a war-fighting pitch over Cyprus. It has thus been an ironic blow to American geopoliticians that the "nuclear umbrella" remains largely unquestioned, while the alliances have been fragmenting over other aspects of cooperation. Inevitably, the politics of nuclear cooperation have also been poisoned within the various alliances, and weakening alliance structures have contributed to the emerging salience of nuclear issues.

Throughout the world, nuclear weapons are playing a much wider role in national defense. Nations in the second tier of the global order are reaching the nuclear threshold (in the case of India, that threshold has been crossed), and where traditional friends and allies have chosen to develop an independent deterrent, the

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United States has resisted providing help. Where the original Nuclear Club thought they had "contained" the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly through the use of nuclear guarantees of protection, such initiatives to develop nuclear weapons signify failure. As shown by Lewis Dunn and William Overholt in the Summer 1976 ORBIS, the examination of "chains of proliferation" raises the spectre of uncontrollable spread — indeed, that the old goal of containment may need to be translated into a new purpose: the creation of international rules whereby *everybody* is expected to live with nuclear weapons. The latter question challenges many of the basic intellectual assumptions of the United States in the twentieth century. President Carter, in his efforts to ban nuclear weapons from the panoply of warfare, may be expressing a popular urge to remove the shadow of nuclear weapons; but he is also finding himself in opposition to those powerful nationalist sentiments in many parts of the world that have given the impetus to nuclear weapons proliferation in the first place.

The efforts of American administrations to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons has recently affected the use of nuclear energy in allied nations, as well. In a number of countries, the United States once encouraged industrialization and the accompanying growth of energy consumption. Washington now finds itself in conflict with those countries over the expansion of nuclear technological capabilities. The importance of nuclear power to industrial infrastructures was publicly underestimated until the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, when public awareness of impending fossil-fuel shortages heightened rapidly. Many of the countries industrializing most rapidly, such as Brazil, decided to go the nuclear route. As they began to seek the various technologies and supplies essential to a nuclear base, the American government increasingly began to resist granting guarantees of uranium supplies and reprocessing technology.

The public mood in the United States and in a number of friendly nations has clearly been at variance. The strength of the antinuclear lobbies in the United States has been growing, particularly with certain key appointments by President Carter. Other nations wanted their nuclear industries to grow, not only to supply energy (and perhaps, covertly, to manufacture nuclear weapons), but also to bolster a growing sense of nationalism.

The political ramifications of U.S. decisions on exports of nuclear technology have been extraordinarily detrimental for traditional alliances. The efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union

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to form a "coincidence of interests" on nonproliferation matters has borne fruit only in the past few years, in SALT II and the IAEA. That pursuit of joint interests, characterized by innumerable confidential conferences, threatens the bonds of traditional alliances — whether NATO, CENTO or bilateral ties. Washington and Moscow took the lead in creating the London-based Suppliers' Group, while attempting to coerce greater compliance with their goals from the French and West Germans. As Brazilian resentment grew over American interference in Brazilian nuclear-policymaking and human rights, the military-aid agreements between Brazil and the United States were terminated. Inflexible negotiating positions on both sides, a frequent occurrence in nuclear issues, have led to many breaks.

There is, then, a primitive level of communication at work on nuclear matters: the deliberations of NATO members on new weapon systems illustrate the inherent problems. (In this issue of ORBIS, Kurt Birrenbach offers an explanation for some of this impaired communication.) Most important, however, there exists a difficult mix of moral and practical criteria on which to judge any nuclear system — and the Carter administration has not been reluctant to air all such criteria in public. Thus, the very practical selling point of enhanced-radiation weapons devised by the Pentagon — that the neutron warhead would "kill people, but not damage buildings" — took on an ominous tone when judged by prevailing moral standards. In the face of a Soviet propaganda campaign against the weapons and a misunderstanding between Washington and Bonn, the American president chose to postpone the new warhead indefinitely — thereby offending allies and retreating before the Soviet verbal offensive.

Sometimes forgotten in America's concern over the role of nuclear technology in its preferred vision of world order is the fact that many nations are now dealing with the same nuclear issues once settled unilaterally in the alliance framework by Washington. More than anything else, Americans must develop common perspectives with their counterparts in other countries, particularly with allies and traditional friends. A major misinterpretation by the Carter administration lies in its understanding of the need to exercise "leadership" in the nuclear field — interpreted far too often to mean unilateralism. For instance, the United States has chosen to flex its muscles (in regard to enriched uranium fuel) just when its near monopoly in fuel supply is ending.

It is true that the well-known dispute between nuclear-technology exporters, principally over transfer of reprocessing cen-

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ters to Korea, Pakistan and Brazil, has reached a temporary lull through an encouraging initiative by the Carter administration toward international communication: the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, due to run through 1979. But what remains damaging in the international dialogue is the tone of moral indignation that tends to creep into the current administration's verbal expressions on nuclear matters. Americans too often deprecate the development of nuclear weapons by our allies as the wasteful pursuit of nationalistic symbols. There is some truth in that view, but equally important perceptions have contributed: e.g., the political weakening of alliances and the demands of rapid economic growth. Nuclear technology is perceived to meet eminently practical needs: security against marauding neighbors, supply of an energy base-load for industrialization, or even irradiation of harmful bacteria in stored grain to prevent spoilage. Moral suasion will influence the nuclear policies of other nations only if moral premises are fully shared — not yet the case. The international dialogue over nuclear issues is just beginning.

Much that has been said by the Carter administration about the SALT negotiating process has dwelt on the need to establish a continuing dialogue with the Soviet Union concerning nuclear issues. Few will argue with that perspective. If that dialogue, however, appears to imperil established communication with allies on nuclear matters, it would seem to be time to calculate the gains and losses from the present American approach. One administration spokesman has said that present negotiations are part of the process of creating a "new architecture" of international relations. The greatest hazards of such new constructions lie in the transition; and extraordinary care is presumably being taken to ensure that the new edifice of the nuclear order is firmly built before we abandon that which we have.

RICHARD E. BISSELL
Managing Editor

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SALT AND THE STRATEGIC FUTURE*

by Harry G. Gelber

The prospective SALT II agreements have become the subject of an unusual, and unusually detailed, controversy long before the likely signature of the final documents. This controversy has been triggered by a series of leaks, apparently authoritative, suggesting that many of the major elements of an agreement are already settled, as well as by presidential statements indicating that Mr. Carter is committed to the early conclusion of SALT II. Much of the discussion, however, has taken place at a rather technical level, and it may be useful to suggest a somewhat broader framework within which to judge the final texts when they emerge.

I

The first and most obvious question to be asked in relation to the agreements is whether they provide for, or whether their terms will permit, the acquisition by either side of a significant measure of military advantage. The treaty is expected to limit strategic-nuclear launch vehicles to 2,400 on each side, probably subject to a reduction to approximately 2,200 by 1980 or 1982. There is to be a sublimit of 1,320 on launchers for MIRVed ICBMs, launchers for MIRVed SLBMs, and bombers carrying cruise missiles of intermediate range. Further sublimits are in prospect: 1,200 on MIRVed ICBM plus MIRVed SLBM launchers and 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers. The Soviet Backfire bomber is not to be counted as a strategic-nuclear launch vehicle. Under the three-year protocol, the development and deployment of cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2,500 kilometers (or perhaps some 3,000 kilometers according to more recent reports) is to be prohibited. The deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers is to be confined to heavy bombers. Sea- and land-based cruise missiles with such ranges may be developed but not deployed. A number of important questions on definitions, verification, technology

* The author thanks the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, at George Washington University, for its hospitality and support during the writing of this article.

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transfer to allies, and limitations on new missiles apparently remain to be settled.

The major criticisms of this package are well known. Critics say that, compared with the earlier U.S. position, too many concessions have been made too easily. The apparent numerical parities disguise profound differences in developmental potential. By 1985 not only will the Soviet Union have greatly increased its advantages in throw-weight, it will enjoy superiority in most of the major indicators: total strategic-nuclear delivery vehicles, counter-force potential and deliverable megatonnage. Given the Soviet throw-weight advantages, the sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers is more than enough for the construction of a serious threat to Minuteman. If the protocol leaves open interesting technological possibilities, it does so for both sides. The three-year protocol would expire in 1980-1981, when electoral pressures in the United States would combine with then-existing Soviet numerical advantages to urge an extension of its terms, in which case the United States might permanently forfeit the option of deploying some kinds of cruise missiles as well as new mobile missiles. The Soviet advantages under the treaty would be enhanced by a number of factors, including (a) the attrition rate which Soviet air defenses could impose on American bombers, compared to the free ride which Soviet aircraft would enjoy, (b) the substantial differences between U.S. and Soviet civil-defense preparations, and (c) the very substantial problems of verification. They might be still further enhanced by the conjunction of SALT II and a number of other measures. For example, a halt to the M-X program, if taken together with future flight-test limitations and a complete nuclear test ban, not only might hinder the development of more accurate warheads but could even lead to the dismantling of the relevant R&D structures in the United States, with consequent "break-out" advantages for the USSR. In sum, the treaty plus accompanying U.S. policies could make trends irreversible, at least in the short or medium term.

The administration's response is somewhat as follows. A failure to reach a SALT II agreement would start a large, expensive and unnecessary fresh round in the arms race. It would exacerbate mutual suspicions. By contrast, the SALT II provisions for parity in strategic-nuclear launch vehicles represent a significant advance over SALT I. To reach these totals will require reductions in Soviet forces but not in American ones. The treaty will slow down the Soviet force build-up in some sensitive areas, and the Soviets will have fewer MIRVed ICBMs by 1985 than they might otherwise have had.

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The Soviet threat to Minuteman will have appeared by 1985 anyway, and though SALT II will not stop that development, it will lessen the potential danger. In any case, neither the viability of U.S. forces nor the strategy of deterrence rests solely upon Minuteman. By the time the threat to Minuteman matures, not only will the United States have modernized its forces, it will have had an opportunity (following the expiry of the protocol) to deploy land- and sea-based as well as air-based cruise missiles. In the meantime, the protocol does not restrain the United States in any field except in M-X development, since most cruise missiles will in any case not be ready for deployment before 1980-1981. By that time, the U.S. position could be highly advantageous. The Russians will have had to wrestle with the cruise missile verification problem, while the United States will not. The United States will have a variety of cruise missiles and other systems ready for deployment while the Soviet Union will have no important new systems ready. This would give Washington enormous leverage against Moscow in negotiations on any extension or renegotiation of the protocol provisions.

What are we to make of this debate? It is perhaps premature to come to firm conclusions before the final texts of the agreements are available. But SALT II, even more than SALT I, seems likely to be a framework agreement. It cannot and will not determine the strategic balance. It will set up a framework of rules within which the arms competition will be conducted, and its significance will be dictated less by the agreed texts than by what each side does within its terms. Forecasts about the measure of Soviet advantage in delivery vehicles and counterforce potential, for example, or suggestions about the irreversibility of certain projected U.S. disadvantages, must depend upon the pattern of Soviet and U.S. behavior in relation to the treaty, rather than upon its formal limitations.

Here there seem to be a number of uncertainties. In 1978 it might be unwise to assume that the Russians will develop at their theoretical maximum speed. They might develop to expected levels, but more slowly. Or their estimate of optimal levels might differ from what Washington expects. On the American side, there are similar difficulties. It is not clear, for example, that the eight years of SALT II, and the remaining useful life of America's B-52 bombers, will be insufficient to allow the United States to develop cheaper "follow-on" aircraft than the B-1 would have been (many of the B-1's technological components are, after all, now available). Nor is it clear that the M-X need be considered the only, or the most cost-

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effective, mobile system that the United States might develop and deploy.

II

Another kind of difficulty concerns U.S. relations with NATO. The chief NATO concerns with the proposed SALT II texts appear to be three: (1) that the United States should retain the option of cruise missile ranges greater than 2,500 kilometers; (2) that "forward-based systems" deployed in Europe as GLCMs not be confined to ranges less than 600 kilometers or limited by a SALT agreement which leaves Soviet forward-based systems in Eastern Europe unaffected; and (3) that the agreements should not prevent the transfer of cruise missile technology to America's European partners. On the first point, European wishes may well be reflected in the final documents. On the second and third, the situation now (March 1978) is not clear. Although (in the absence of very rigorous language to prevent transfers) such problems have proved manageable in the past, an American failure to meet European wishes on either point might give the Russians the unnecessary benefit of a political dispute between the United States and its NATO allies.

If there is a key problem about SALT II, it is probably the protocol. In broad terms it seems likely that the treaty will provide for very substantial developmental advantages for the Soviet Union in such areas as RV yield, ICBM throw-weight and counterforce potential. Those technologies on which the United States would probably rely to counterbalance these advantages — notably cruise missiles and new, so far untested, land-mobile missiles — are limited under the protocol. Much therefore hinges on the extent to which any Soviet advantages are perpetuated or to which any U.S. possibilities for counterbalancing are foreclosed. If the protocol were simply to be extended beyond 1980-1981 so that, without any major new Soviet concessions, the United States were deprived both of cruise missile development and a new mobile ICBM, then SALT II would probably have been a very poor bargain.[1] If this is a serious prospect, the official assertion that SALT II is better than no SALT becomes doubtful. A good deal therefore hinges on one's expectations about

[1] It is conceivable that the protocol might be re-drafted before signature in such a way as to make its termination around 1980 unattractive to both sides. But the question is how to devise constraints upon Soviet developments which would be equivalent to the constraints upon the United States of continuing the protocol provisions beyond 1981 and yet acceptable to the Soviet Union at this late stage of the negotiations. In the plethora of leaks which have occurred to date, there has been no suggestion that such provisions have in fact been devised and are in the "negotiating pipeline."

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the public and congressional mood in America in 1978-1980. If that mood should prove to be such that the administration can use the Soviet wish for extended cruise missile and M-X limitations as serious bargaining leverage, then the U.S. position for the rest of the SALT II period and beyond looks quite promising. If, on the other hand, the prevailing view were to be that signature of the protocol had created a situation which ought to be continued in the absence of any obvious or sudden Soviet affront; if suggestions that the protocol should be allowed to terminate were greeted with renewed suspicion of the so-called military-industrial complex and with intense domestic dispute, then SALT II might prove to be very damaging. Perhaps it would be useful if American opinion became more accustomed to the idea that not every kind of SALT agreement is necessarily a good thing, and that situations might well occur in which no SALT might be better than any SALT.

A very different level of judgment is that of the diplomatic community and its professional estimate of which side has "won" or "lost." It seems fair to say that toward the end of 1977 there were some doubts in the minds of observers about the American negotiating record. One such had to do with the way in which the Carter administration, having staked out in March claims much more far-reaching than those of President Ford, had spent the following six or nine months retreating to the previous American position, if not something a little worse. Another stemmed from the view that, seen from the perspective of January 1977, a "no SALT" prospect should have been much more alarming for Moscow than for the Carter administration. Yet by the autumn, assisted by Mr. Carter's personal commitment to the early conclusion of a SALT II agreement, it began to seem as though the Russians had succeeded in placing the United States in the position of *demandeur*. A third doubt rests on the view that when he came to the White House, Carter had a public and congressional opinion which, skeptical about detente and wary of the Russians, seemed prepared for tough bargaining. Yet the maneuvers of mid-year may have confused that domestic opinion and dissipated the support for a strong stand. General impressions of this kind have not been reassurring.

Whether such doubts will greatly affect judgment of the final agreements is, however, a very different question. The two principal parties (Washington in particular) probably have substantial influence over how the matter is perceived abroad. America's major allies have usually assumed that on the broad outlines of such agreements, the U.S. administration of the day can be trusted to safeguard

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its own interests. Moreover, as Henry Kissinger explained on the morrow of SALT I with devastating frankness, there are not many nations with which the United States can engage in a useful dialogue about SALT because very few understand what is going on. This is a diplomatic asset of some consequence, subject to two qualifications. The *first* is that, notwithstanding the willingness of America's allies to accept the general framework of the U.S. SALT positions and decisions, the process of assessment abroad may be more detailed and frought with greater potential for political change than in former years. Consider, for example, Japan. Since 1971, Tokyo's close ties with the United States have been subjected to severe strains: the Nixon "shocks," various trading and payments disputes, the methodology of U.S. China policy, the U.S. exit from Vietnam, and the Carter shocks (notably concerning Korea). If the Japanese were to conclude that SALT II implies an American setback, or even that it overly institutionalizes Soviet-American cooperation, the consequences for Japan's foreign and economic policies could be profound.

The *second* qualification is that acceptance abroad may depend upon how the domestic politics of SALT are managed in the United States. If, for example, a set of agreements were to emerge with which both President Carter and Senator Jackson profess themselves highly satisfied, it would probably be widely accepted abroad. If, on the other hand, there were an intense and detailed debate, the adversary process would bring out alternative assessments which others could use not only to make more informed judgments but to defend interests and positions of their own.

III

The third, and in many ways the most important, level at which SALT II needs to be considered is in relation to SALT III and the general management not only of Soviet-American relations but of the global balance of power. From this point of view, the issues extend beyond the military balances established under the SALT II provisions (and their political consequences) to the forms which SALT might be expected to take in future and the changing technical and political circumstances in which future negotiations will take place. It is tempting, but too simple, to treat SALT III as simply a continuation in manner and substance of SALT II. For the SALT process has so far been subject to two kinds of limitation whose maintenance in their present form cannot be taken for granted. The

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first relates to the way in which its subject matter has been abstracted in space, time and politics from the more complicated realities of the statesman's world. In the past, SALT has not purported to cover the entire field even of strategic weapons, let alone the real-world continuum of strategic and theater weapons and conventional balances. It is probably safe to predict that SALT III will attempt to cope with the same kind of material as SALT II, in the ways suggested by the proposed SALT II statement of principles: lower launcher numbers, lower MLBM numbers, stronger verification provisions, some flight-test limitations. What is less clear is whether SALT III should avoid consideration of forward-based systems and theater weapons or even whether the time may not have come for more formal links between the SALT process and the interests of some third parties.

The *second* limitation relates to the technologies, and the rates of technical innovation, with which SALT has dealt. Judgments about SALT II depend critically upon estimates of "lead times" required for the appearance of system improvements and follow-on systems which, once deployed, will change the strategic value of the systems mentioned in the agreements. But this kind of judgment is likely to become much more complex and difficult as time goes by. For example, propositions about the threat to Minuteman beyond 1985, or about the balance of counterforce capabilities, depend upon how soon the accuracies of SLBM warheads can be expected to approach those of ICBMs which, in turn, might depend upon which test programs are permitted and which are banned. Or, there is the field of high-energy laser and particle-beam systems. Irrespective of whether one favors the deployment of such systems in an ABM mode or not, estimates of the significance of ICBM and MIRV balances beyond 1985 might depend crucially upon whether one believes such new systems are technically feasible by 1985 or not before 1995.

In fact, the uncertainties with which SALT III must deal as it considers the period beyond 1985 are much greater than these examples might suggest. The strategic and nonstrategic technologies of the great powers have during the past decade undergone changes which are nothing less than dramatic. These changes are continuing and are being refined. They have affected, and continue to affect, the entire spectrum of accuracy, mobility, the multiplicity and discrimination of available strike weapons, yields, surveillance, command, control, information and communications, as well as associated means for obtaining intelligence and for analysis and decision.

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Though there is debate about the precise extent and timing of changes in each of these areas, I suggest that the sheer variety and scale of technical changes have produced certain alterations in the entire conflict relationship between the superpowers. These changes have at least six broad characteristics:

(1) There has been a shift in strike and destruct systems, especially but not solely strategic ones: away from the few, the large, the static and the predictable toward the many, the small, the mobile and maneuverable.
(2) There has been a shift both at nuclear and nonnuclear levels to more discriminating, limited and precise methods of conflict management. This precision has several dimensions, ranging from precision of aim to precision in timing or in level of violence.
(3) There are changes in the importance of geography and the locus of conflict. On land, defense in depth means less in an age of intercontinental missiles and air-refuelable aircraft. But the center of gravity of great-power conflict may also be shifting from conflict on land, with ancillary activities at sea and in the air, to conflict under the oceans and in space.
(4) The high skills required to man the new systems, rising manpower costs and greater firepower per individual have emphasized the utility of technically specialist and numerically small battle groups, or of capital-intensive systems, rather than reliance for all purposes on nations in arms.
(5) Modern methods of surveillance and intelligence mean that intelligence now plays a more important role in great-power relations than at any earlier time in history. Intelligence constitutes a new arm of service. Moreover, the long lead times required for the deployment of advanced systems make a technical forecasting capacity a major component of a state's strategic inventory.
(6) The changes in strike systems, electronic warfare, surveillance, intelligence and command have not only blurred the traditionally ambiguous distinction between the strategic and nonstrategic fields but are beginning to blur some of the distinctions between military and nonmilitary activities.

There are a number of other changes, such as the proliferation of advanced (including nuclear) capacities, that are less relevant to the present discussion.

From the point of view of arms control, such developments may have at least three consequences of cardinal importance. *One* stems from the precision of strike methods, electronic warfare and the blurring of the boundaries between the strategic and nonstrategic fields. What we are seeing here is nothing less than a decoupling of two ideas which have been closely conjoined since 1945 and perhaps since 1861: the ideas of strategic warfare and of mass destruction. It is increasingly feasible to deploy mechanisms

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whose effects do not combine those two characteristics. A *second* consequence has to do with the political and military ambiguity of some postnuclear strategic systems. One thinks here of nuclear power-generation methods in orbit, or of the possible projection of high-energy laser beams from orbital platforms, or of some simple antisatellite methods, or of some surveillance mechanisms, or of ways to interfere with radio and television transmissions.

From a number of points of view, developments of this kind may cause alarm. The possibility of fighting a limited war with few casualties could make resort to war appear more feasible in times of crisis. Even worse, the prospect of limited casualties might prove to be an illusion if the conflict should spread, as it very likely would, to include the use of nuclear weapons held in reserve. The *third* major consequence, therefore, concerns the way in which important segments of the arms-control community have sought to deal with these possibilities. On the one hand, they have resisted the amelioration of the more horrendous aspects of nuclear war. They have eschewed active and passive defenses. They have resisted the development of low-yield "nuclears" likely to blur the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear explosives. They have resisted refinements in delivery accuracy. But they have also found that in current circumstances any plausible attempt to impose close, direct, verifiable numerical controls of even quite limited duration on the weapons competition requires increasingly complex structures of a bilateral sort. Technical logic has driven some of these analysts toward such recommendations as qualitative restraints on weapons developments, measures to reduce confidence in system performance, preannounced deployment and testing schedules, prior mutual information on all space efforts, test limitation, prohibition of satellite-killer mechanisms and on placing reactors into orbit, and political pressure on third parties such as China, France and India to follow suit.[2]

IV

Recommendations of the sort just mentioned, moreover, dovetail conceptually with a number of larger assumptions about the appropriate management of the global balance of power. These

[2] This is, of course, a serious oversimplification of a large and diverse body of writing. But for some suggestions along these lines, see Alton Frye, "Strategic Restraint, Mutual and Assured," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1977, pp. 2-24; Paul Doty, Albert Carnesale and Michael Nacht, "The Race to Control Nuclear Arms," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, pp. 119-132.

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assumptions include the notion that military power in general and strategic power in particular have become largely divorced from the everyday realities of politics and influence. The real game of world politics has shifted to complicated sets of considerations which have to do with economics, raw materials, technological matters and the problems of interdependence which each nation seeks to manipulate for its own ends. In this environment, it is often argued, nuclear weapons have virtually no rational purpose except perhaps to frighten people into not using them. All this is nowadays conventional wisdom, if not platitude, for many people.

What interdependence will mean in practice is a very different question. The concept has been hailed in various quarters as likely (a) to help erode the powers and functions of the nation-state; (b) to help produce, if not mutual understanding among states, at least a disposition to resolve disputes peacefully; and (c) to help produce genuine, as distinct from merely juridical, equality between states. All three expectations seem likely to be disappointed. There is very little sign that nation-states are declining in numbers, powers or detailed functions. The way in which the international community tackles its problems today does not rely less on national decision-making than at any time in the past. Nor is there much evidence for supposing that interdependence must lead to a sense of community and a decline in the number or severity of international disputes. It is now widely accepted that interdependence necessarily involves some measure of political, economic or cultural intervention. Though the process is in principle mutual, the mutual influence thus exercised is rarely equal. For this reason alone, interdependence is likely to lead to more, not less, friction. There is even less reason to suppose that disputes must remain muted. The pre-1914 literature about the compulsions of economic interdependence and the impossibility of war (at any rate, prolonged war) should make us wary of exaggerating the constraints which such interdependencies place upon national hostilities. On the contrary, in an economically and culturally interdependent era, the more the distinction between a government's foreign and domestic difficulties becomes blurred, the more that government will be tempted to blame outsiders for all of them. The more complicated the real issues, the more it will be tempted to simplify, either ideologically or by blaming abstractions or devil figures. The more effective the appeal to national sentiment, the more ruling elites may come to rely on it.

As for greater equality among states, the evidence so far suggests the opposite. The great industrial powers influence the lives

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of smaller and simpler societies at more, and more varied, points than the simpler societies influence them. The great powers are increasingly superior in weapons, intelligence-gathering and flexibility. They have superior economic and productive capacity, managerial expertise, and command of news and propaganda. Any single smaller state will depend upon a great power for important information more often than that power will depend on the small state. Economic and technical relations are more likely to be determined by countries that possess skilled and extensive civil, managerial and banking services than by those that do not. Even the "new international economic order," if established, looks likely to be designed and organized by the advanced industrial democracies rather than by the Third World or even OPEC. In none of these respects can the advantage which the industrially advanced powers enjoy be said to be diminishing, and in none can interdependence be said to be leading to greater equality. If anything, the character and multiplicity of technological innovations is enhancing rather than diminishing the advantages enjoyed by the industrial democracies.

V

Thus, there is no sign that the incidence of international dispute has lessened in recent years or that it is likely to do so in the near future. We are likely to see more emphasis on nationalism, more friction and, given the phenomenon of interdependence, more great-power involvement in the management of the global balance as well as in local and regional affairs. This in turn will create more, and more difficult, choices for the great powers in an era when even abstention will, more than ever before, be perceived by others as a political act requiring a response.

Nor can one see any sign that the use of force in world affairs has greatly diminished. On the contrary, the acquisition of more advanced weapons by more countries is extending the reach of many states far beyond their immediate neighborhoods. Here, too, it is not clear that the great powers will be able or willing to abstain from those political and technological innovations which might be required to control such a development or to insulate metropolitan territories from their effects. The more precise as well as the more ambiguous methods becoming available to the great powers, especially to the United States, will give them considerable scope in this regard. At the same time, the need to retain their technological advantages will severely limit the extent to which they are willing to

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abstain from technological innovation and development in the weapons area as well as in related fields.

War, then, *is* conceivable, and even the avoidance of nuclear war cannot be taken for granted. It is premature to say that the utility of military power has diminished, even if the modalities of its use have changed in some respects. Some years ago, Michael Howard speculated about a future in which there might be an end to strategy.[3] The new military and quasi-military technologies remove that hope even farther into the future and make Howard's forecast even more plausible: viz., a return to something analogous to eighteenth-century warfare in Europe — wars fought with limited forces, by limited means, for limited and principally diplomatic ends.

In these circumstances, there is likely to be a contradiction between the methods which would have to be adopted should arms-control approaches a la SALT II be applied and the political conditions in which these arms-control talks will be held. For the arms controllers are right to suggest that if we are to continue beyond the mid-1980s to seek agreements providing for clear and closely verifiable numbers for central strategic systems, this can only be done (if it can be done at all, which is far from certain) by fairly detailed bilateral controls and a considerable institutionalization of Soviet-American cooperation in these highly sensitive and technically advanced areas.

Yet, the obstacles in the way of such developments are formidable. To begin with, it is a matter of the greatest difficulty to design constraints on such high-technology areas which at one and the same time are effective but do no affect developments in adjacent areas of technology and knowledge. It may be even harder for either side to accept such constraints and still retain undiminished confidence in its ability to compete with the adversary. For both sides, these problems would be compounded by a reluctance to accept otherwise avoidable technical ignorance and by prudential calculations about how, and at what costs, it might be possible to design around such areas of ignorance and constraint. More generally, there would be the effect upon America's allies of any broad perception of an increasing institutionalization of Soviet-American cooperation in the strategic and technical fields. Surely it would be imprudent in the extreme to assume that those allies would not seek means to reinsure themselves should such institutionalization occur. Nor would America's position elsewhere in the world be improved

[3] Howard, "The Relevance of Traditional Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, pp. 253-266.

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by a process which would lend such color to the old Chinese charge about the Russians and the Americans seeking joint hegemony in the world. And even if such a process were begun, it is hard to believe that it would long endure, given the fundamental differences in outlook, philosophy and strategy between the two sides. We have the word of Mr. Brezhnev himself that the strategic purpose of peaceful coexistence is to "assure favorable conditions for the worldwide victory of socialism," whereas for the United States, the concept implies partnership in the search for continuing stability and a measure of continuing cooperation. In anything other than the shortest term, therefore, the hard facts of political reality seem bound to prevail. The vision of institutionalized cooperation — Is it mistaken to see the spirit of Woodrow Wilson not far behind? — will be frustrated.

VI

If my conclusion is sound, what follows for arms control and for SALT? There is one powerful view which says, in the words of Stanley Hoffmann, "A SALT agreement that is not perfect — complete, drastic or symmetrical — is far better than none at all." In epistemological precision, that is of course correct: no prospective agreement can be all those things. But the general tenor of Hoffmann's statement may be misleading. It is hard to believe that a SALT agreement which was notably incomplete, vague and asymmetrical can be very useful, and harder still to believe that Western opinion needs to be encouraged to suppose that any SALT agreement is likely to be desirable, at least in the sense that the burden of proof is always upon those who wish to argue that it is not.

SALT agreements are international bargains like any other: the fact that some bargains are good does not mean that there cannot be bad ones, which should be avoided. More important, perhaps, SALT agreements of the kind we have known may well, for the reasons sketched earlier, become less relevant both to the politico-strategic balance between the superpowers and to the balance between them and everyone else. We may see, instead, a move toward looser agreements not relying on close counting and verification. Both sides may come to rely more on systems of multiple indicators, no single one of which is (or is thought to be) entirely accurate but which, as a whole, convey a sense of the rival's force structures, dispositons and perhaps intentions. In addition, the SALT process may become, even more than it already is, a dialogue

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in which the process is the message: an element in a classic diplomatic process of adjusting interests and reconciling differences. If so, we might be wise to lower our expectations of SALT and to place less emphasis upon it as a component of Soviet-American relations.

It is not necessary, or even reasonable, to regard such conclusions as pessimistic. The diminution of SALT does not necessarily mean an increase in the possibility of a Soviet-American nuclear clash or even an end to arms control. War will continue to be restrained not only by the diplomatic process but by the enormous and increasing uncertainties confronting the leadership of both sides, uncertainties both political and relating to the performance of systems necessarily untested in action. The growing importance of nonnuclear technologies may be of at least equal importance in pushing nuclear weapons farther into the background. Moreover, accurate counting of opposing forces and agreed force limitations have been very much the exception rather than the rule in the history of dispute and conflict. If we have to return to older forms of international balance and to mutual restraints relying on principles of a more classic sort, this may be only another way of saying that there are not now, and will never be, once-and-for-all solutions to these difficulties.

There is no agreement which is both feasible and likely to banish the nuclear specter. In a world of sovereign states there are no institutional arrangements which can guarantee abstention from conflict or moderation within it. The desire to predict and manage the future has haunted the imagination of man throughout recorded history; it is a mirage, all the same. The enterprise of civilization has always been a fragile thing. Like justice, or peace, it has to be struggled for afresh every day and every year. Not even a nuclear peace can be assured for more than a few months at a time. We should not fall into the error of supposing that SALT can change those ancient rules.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY: NATO, SALT AND EQUILIBRIUM*

by Kurt Birrenbach

In a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee dated January 24, 1978, concerning NATO and the new Soviet threat, Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett described the NATO situation as critical and the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe as "dramatically changed." They expressed their concern, saying it was difficult for the alliance to maintain a credible deterrent against a Soviet attack. The continuing refusal by France to be a part of the integrated NATO command structure is, in their view, just as disquieting as the reduction of military units and the inadequate weapons reserves in several strategically located NATO countries, the limitation of NATO combat strength caused by the lack of standardization in weapons and infrastructure, the difficulties involved in bringing in reinforcements from overseas in an emergency and the threat to NATO on its flanks.

Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé, former American ambassador to NATO, refers in his article "NATO in Upheaval" (*NATO Letter* no. 5, 1977) to the threat to the heart of NATO in areas beyond actual NATO territory. According to him, this threat could have immediate consequences for the security of the central front. One need only consider the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Angola and South Africa. He feels that Soviet power is not merely a threat to the credibility of the NATO deterrent. Today, the alliance is global and no longer regional in nature. It is time we came to terms with this kind of challenge and reconsidered the role of NATO as the guardian of the collective security of the West. In his view, it is essential that the question be subjected to review as to whether the institutions which were created nearly thirty years ago are still sufficient today, and whether the concepts upon which NATO's present strategic position is based are still valid.

Senator Nunn clearly poses the question whether the entire nuclear weapon potential in Europe will remain credible if con-

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ventional capabilities are not fundamentally increased and, moreover, whether the expansion of conventional capabilities is not necessary in order to make the American strategic guarantee of Europe believable. General Haig expressed similar concern in his *Newsweek* interview.

In his annual report to Congress on February 2, American Secretary of Defense Brown warned of the consequences of the continued growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional armaments, even though he spoke in far more optimistic tones than had his predecessors Donald Rumsfeld and James Schlesinger. He still accepts as given an approximate overall strategic balance with the Soviet Union, although he admits that the conventional inferiority of the Western alliance is an object of special concern for him. In his speech of September 15, 1977, however, Brown stated that the threat from the Soviet Union must also be evaluated from a "global" point of view — that is, according to the general state of civilization and economics. In his discussion, Brown referred to "the rich and willing allies of the United States" — a claim that at present certainly does not sound altogether convincing. The American secretary of defense admits that the strategic superiority of the Soviet Union is estimated at between 20 and 40 per cent. Brown wants to meet this threat with an increase of the defense budget from $126 billion in 1979 to $172.7 billion over the course of the next five years ($140.3 billion at the current value). This corresponds to an annual increase of 2.7 per cent. The defense budget presently amounts to 5.1 per cent of the gross national product, and by 1983 it will fall to 4.8 per cent.

In contrast, the annual increase of the Soviet defense budget amounts to betwen 4 and 5 per cent, and the current expenditures come to a little over 10 per cent of the gross national product. American defense experts estimate the growth of Russian arms expenditures for the past fifteen years at 3 to 4 per cent in real terms, while American defense expenditures declined in real value during the same period. Even if the Soviets are not yet prepared to deal the initial blow, Secretary Brown, in the speech mentioned above, still does not rule out an attack by the Soviet Union. The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the question of the use of nuclear weapons is completely different from the American attitude, which aims basically at psychological deterrence — not, as with the Soviets, at the possibility of actual use. This attitude can be checked only if American nuclear potential is capable at all times of carrying out the doctrine of so-called assured destruction. The rate of growth of Soviet nuclear armament is inexplicable to Brown from

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a defensive policy perspective (Executive Summary for 1979). Thus, according to Secretary Brown, the United States simply cannot allow itself to remain behind the Soviets in weapons potential.

The U.S. budget allocations for ground forces and the air force do show a certain increase. The reduction of the figures for the naval budget are questionable in the face of Soviet naval development. Whether America's belief in the "sufficiency" of national military development, a carry-over from the McNamara doctrine, is adequate as a genuine, real, trustworthy deterrent and, still more, as a realistic defense, remains to be seen from a European point of view — especially since the Soviet threat is assuming increasingly acute forms outside the NATO treaty area, with immediate consequences for Europe, notably in Africa and the Near East.

There can be no getting around the fact that security is based on a military balance of power. That there is a clear conventional inferiority of NATO, both in manpower and in most types of weapons, is an unfortunate fact whose elimination at present, according to Secretary Brown, is regrettably not in sight. In spite of this, Brown maintains, conventional forces are the first element of deterrence. Nuclear decisions and particularly collective decisions are difficult and require time. Thus, a strong nonnuclear capacity is all the more important. The qualitative superiority of the USA in intercontinental nuclear weapons will exist only for a limited time in view of extraordinary Soviet progress in the areas of throw-weight, explosive power and, now, also the deployment of multiple warheads and increasing accuracy. The quantitative Soviet predominance in nuclear weapons is already clear. Given the range and the extraordinary explosive power of tactical-nuclear weapons, Senator Nunn asks whether this does not deter the West more than it deters the East. The Soviet Union is in any case not directly endangered by these weapons because of their short range.

The both illogical and partly naive philosophizing about neutron weapons on the part of individual political personalities in some European countries, including the Federal Republic, overlooks not only the present inability of the West to overcome the extraordinary superiority of the Warsaw Pact's tank forces (19,000:7,000), but even more, the more destructive character of existing tactical-nuclear weapons in comparison to the so-called neutron weapons. In the interview cited above, General Haig said (just as Secretary Brown wrote in the annual report for Fiscal Year 1979) that it is simply not true that the deployment of neutron bombs would lower the nuclear threshold. The decision to use radiation weapons is no

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easier than that to employ other nuclear weapons. Defense would merely be more credible and more effective with less overall destruction.

The deterrent power of these weapons against a large-scale tank attack would become more credible. If, in view of the partially obsolete stocks of tactical-nuclear weapons, the central link in the chain of escalation within the defense triad dropped out, the European front could hardly be held without the modernization of precisely these weapons, given the present constellation of conventional forces. With the central link of the escalation chain missing, an uncoupling of the strategic intercontinental weapons would also be more conceivable. Thus, strategic deterrence, by far the most important weapon of the West, would be lost with unforeseeable consequences. Deterrence, however, presupposes the readiness to use all weapons that are designed for deterrence. The United States has already become directly vulnerable, especially on the East Coast, which is much more densely populated than any area of the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of Europe is incomparably greater. Considering this development, in recent years in the USA more and more importance has been attached to counterforce strategy, which aims at military installations. But it is astonishing that nothing is said any longer about the Schlesinger strategy of selective strikes. The annual report for 1979 is concerned almost exclusively with military discussions about "the military situation on the European battlefield."

On numerous occasions, highly placed Americans continue to stress that, in spite of the enormous Soviet development of nuclear weapons, the use of intercontinental nuclear weapons is unthinkable and improbable, and that, therefore, one should completely eliminate nuclear weapons, if necessary in stages. American statements of this kind, but also comparable European statements, could induce the Soviet Union to believe that the USA would use its nuclear capabilities only if, as is often said, American territory were threatened. On the other hand, the American administration repeatedly assures its European allies that the protection of Europe enjoys the highest priority.

I recall the attitude of the American administration at the NATO conference in London in December 1976, the statements of the American president during his visits to London in May 1977 and to Brussels in January 1978, and the declaration by Secretary Brown in the annual report for Fiscal Year 1979. Unmistakably there are contradictions present here, perhaps unintentionally, which could

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have dangerous consequences. Not only could the Soviets be deceived about the readiness of the Americans to use these weapons, but the European population might begin to think the American deterrent would not even work or, conversely, that given the presence of American destructive capabilities, they do not need to mobilize their defensive efforts fully. There are many countries within NATO which have reduced the size of their armies or shortened the terms of active duty, and thus impaired the quality and combat strength of their armed forces. Thus, any lack of European solidarity implies a dangerous reduction of deterrence because of its possible impact on the American posture. This is especially true because the Soviet Union has its military power concentrated primarily on Europe, and its policy is not limited to deterrence alone.

II

A very important, even decisive, question for Europeans in this connection is the course of the SALT negotiations. Considering the unusual growth of Soviet armaments in recent years during the period of so-called detente, it was difficult for those who understood the situation to understand why the Americans renounced the building of the B-1 bomber at the beginning of the SALT II negotiations without reciprocal Soviet concessions. The B-52 is no equivalent substitute. It is even doubtful whether it can penetrate the critical Soviet defense zones where the low-flying B-1 bomber would succeed. At the SALT negotiations the Soviet wish is to permit the United States to replace the B-1 bomber with only 120 B-52s carrying cruise missiles with a range limited to 1,500 miles. This is only half the number which the Soviets themselves demanded according to a plan for mutual renunciation of the development of the same kind of sea- or land-based weapons with greater range. This is not a valid substitute for the B-1. Besides, these cruise missiles will be charged against the ceiling of 1,320 MIRV missiles. Moreover, the postwar years have shown that the Russians usually react to prior concessions in a way which is hardly reassuring. This is confirmed by the fact that in recent weeks the Soviet Union unexpectedly deployed the SA-10 ground-to-air missile having a velocity of five times the speed of sound which, with long-range capability, could possibly block the effectiveness of cruise missiles.

This problem will become all the more acute for Europe if, as the Soviets plan, Europeans are excluded from the general

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development of all cruise missiles. This Soviet objective became evident in the SALT negotiations. It is also clearly recognizable in the Soviet circumvention clause. In any case, it is an item in the three-year protocol. In theory, an option on these weapons remains open to Americans and Europeans after three years — but this is a highly doubtful prospect. The production of the important American surface-to-surface missile (SSM), Minuteman III, has been completed, but the Russians wish to prevent the construction of MK-12-A warheads for these missiles. According to a Soviet-American negotiation scheme that is included in a protocol, an eight-year treaty and a declaration of principles, the development and use of weapons as yet untested are not permitted. After the termination of the time limit of the protocol in the mid-1980s, new surface-to-surface missiles could no longer be built. Would a Soviet first-strike then be possible? The planned American deployment of the mobile SSM M-X appears, in view of the extraordinary small fiscal allotment provided for this missile type, to be seen more as a negotiation position than the beginning of an effective weaponry development.

These three facts — the discontinuation of the Minuteman III missile, doubtfulness concerning future deployment of the M-X missile, and the renunciation of the B-1 bomber — appear highly dubious to many European and American defense experts. When one compares the payload of Minuteman III and all the rest of the American SSMs with that of the Russian SSMs, the Soviets have a clear advantage. This superiority is balanced to a certain degree by the superior accuracy of the American missiles. In pure numbers of missiles, the Soviet Union has a one-third superiority (1,527:1,054) over the United States. These missiles are, in part, approaching the accuracy of their American counterparts as a result of consistent modernization. Especially prominent among these, besides the SS-20, are the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. The latter three missiles together have nearly six times the payload of the corresponding American Minuteman II and Minuteman III missiles and are now being equipped with multiple warheads.

The most dangerous Soviet weapon in this group is still the SS-18, which has a payload of 16,000 pounds and can also be equipped with multiple warheads. By 1985, the total payload of this SSM will be about 8 million pounds, or three times the American payload. The U.S. attempt in the SALT negotiations to induce the Soviet Union to reduce by one-half the 302 deployed SS-18s appears to have failed. The achievement of equality in the field of intercon-

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tinental SSMs appears questionable in any case, in light of the fact that the Soviet Union continues to develop new SSM types.

At sea, there are 656 American SLBMs on 31 nuclear-powered submarines, while 10 diesel-powered submarines are armed only with obsolete Polaris missiles. In contrast, the Soviets have more than 848 SLBMs on 78 submarines, of which, however, only 43 are nuclear-powered. Twenty-five of the nuclear-powered Soviet submarines were built in the past five years. The other submarines have a shorter range. Russian plans aim at producing 950 SLBM missiles. Here, also, there is a discernible Soviet numerical superiority. When the United States develops the first series of 10 Trident-class submarines, each of which will carry 24 missiles with a range of 4,600 miles, Soviet superiority at sea will be balanced. This development, however, may not be completed until the mid-1980s.

The Americans possess a clear superiority in heavy bombers with a ratio of 453:138. This is balanced to a degree on the Soviet side by the highly developed Soviet air-defense system which consists of 2,650 interceptors and more than 1,000 SAM sites. If one limits the concept "strategic" to only the possibility of striking the territory of the other superpower, one arrives at a false conclusion. The Soviet Union has 600 MRBMs, of which about 500-520 are directed toward Western Europe, and 650 medium bombers, to which is now added the modern Backfire bomber. In the SALT negotiations — at least in the three-year protocol — the Americans apparently permitted the Soviets to maintain the present production volume of about two of these bombers per month, so long as their range is not extended to become intercontinental. To this medium-range strike potential of the Warsaw Pact are added the SS-4, the SS-5 and the SS-20, the last of which can be converted into a medium-range strike missile by removing the last stage, and also the Blinder (TU-22) and the Badger (TU-16). The West has no equivalent for these weapons. On the American side, construction of the Pershing II to replace the Pershing I is being planned for tactical and possibly medium-range deployment and has a range of up to 500 nautical miles. Construction of the new XM-1 tank, the planned anti-tank guided missile, and artillery with greater range will probably require a number of years.

Added to these are the carrier-based A-4, A-6, A-7 and F-4 aircraft, as well as the land-based types such as the FB-111, F-105, F-4 and another model of the A-7. Besides these U.S. planes, there are also the aircraft of the other allied NATO countries, such as the Mirage IV and the Jaguar from France or the British-built Vulcan,

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Buccaneer and Jaguar, although the Vulcan and Buccaneer must be considered obsolete. The Soviets attach importance to excluding these weapon systems from the realm of arms-control limitations. This, however, does not stop them from limiting the deployment of these weapons (forward-based systems, French and British nuclear potential, and cruise missiles) with the aid of the concept of "strategic weapons" that was employed in the course of the SALT negotiations. The United States has a certain superiority over the Soviet Union in tactical-nuclear weapons. The American tactical-nuclear weapons are, however, somewhat obsolete and have a shorter range coupled, in some cases, with extraordinary destructive force. The Soviets operate with the Scud A, Scud B, SS-12, Frog 3-7 and 203-mm artillery, while NATO has 155-mm and 203-mm artillery and the old Honest John and Sergeant rockets, insofar as they have not yet been eliminated. They are being replaced today by Lance, with a range of 112 kilometers, and the French Pluton, with a range of 120 kilometers.

It can be said in summary that the United States still has qualitative superiority in intercontinental missiles, but this is outweighed in part by the numerical superiority and large payload of the Soviet missiles. In medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union has clear superiority, while in smaller, tactical-nuclear weapons the Americans have a certain superiority, which the Soviet Union is anxious to limit. If the Soviets want to prevent deployment of the neutron bomb (purely a radiation weapon) at all costs, it must be seriously asked how the West is supposed to defend itself against the Warsaw Pact's extraordinary superiority in armored weapons. This point is of course not mentioned in Brezhnev's most recent statements. Use of the neutron bomb, as well as one's attitude toward this weapon, as an object of negotiation may indeed be debatable. But what price should, or would, the Soviet Union be willing to pay the U.S. for renunciation of the neutron bomb? A Soviet renunciation of the development of the neutron bomb would be irrelevant, since its armored superiority would remain unchanged. A renunciation of the SS-20 would be difficult to verify. Moreover, it is as yet unclear how the United States, if it does not succeed in obtaining for the Europeans the option to develop and deploy cruise missiles, will later be able to withdraw from the temporary obligations of the three-year protocol, without making serious and probably unacceptable concessions.

That is the situation up to now. In the SALT II negotiations now in progress, the United States is trying to reach agreement on a

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three-year protocol. The American plan for the proposed eight-year treaty calls for a 25 per cent decrease in the upper limit for intercontinental missiles that was fixed in the Vladivostok Agreement, while Soviet proposals foresee a 10 per cent decrease, a difference which certainly will not be decisive. The upper limit for MIRVs, as the lower ceiling of 2,400 missiles accepted at Vladivostok, would be decreased from 1,320 to 1,200; of these, however, 800 would be land-based. The number of land-based Soviet intercontinental missiles with MIRVs would likewise be reduced. The Soviet Union would then see itself compelled to transfer its share of MIRVs to SLBMs, which are less vulnerable. However, this would be extremely difficult to verify.

In both agreements, the proposed protocol and the eight-year treaty, it is conspicuous that the American and Soviet interests are concentrated, as already indicated, primarily on those weapons which would directly reach the territory of the other superpower. Herein lies the serious danger of an uncoupling of intercontinental nuclear weapons and the tendency in a crisis toward a "theater war." In this connection, even the question of tactical-nuclear weapons and, with it, the continued existence of the whole triad could become uncertain.

In the MBFR negotiations, the Americans proposed pulling back 1,000 nuclear warheads in return for the Soviet withdrawal of their armored divisions from Eastern Europe. If Soviet superiority in conventional weapons were preserved, the purpose of the MBFR negotiations would not be achieved. Still more serious is the fact that the cruise missile, which is relatively easy to handle and highly effective, but which cannot be launched from aircraft — meaning that it would be land- or sea-based — is to be allowed, according to the protocol, a range of only 327 miles. The protocol forbids the testing or deployment of these missiles during the three-year period, but permits the Soviets to continue production of the Backfire bomber. But what is perhaps even more serious is the fact that in the three-year protocol the technology of the cruise missiles is to be denied to the European powers and, moreover, that these missiles, except for those with a range of less than 327 miles, are not to be stationed on European soil. Also, inclusion of these weapons in the MBFR negotiations is unacceptable to the [Atlantic] Alliance. A possibility of improving the unfavorable situation in which NATO finds itself in the medium-range nuclear field and an oportunity to let the Europeans take over their own security functions are em-

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bodied in the large-scale deployment of cruise missiles by the West, i.e., including the Europeans.

In any case, two conclusions emerge from the present state of the negotiations, insofar as they are known to the outside world:

1. Until recently, at least, the United States seems to have gone too far in giving in to the wishes of the Soviet Union in the area of intercontinental weapons in order to achieve any kind of settlement at SALT II. The American reaction to the Soviet-Cuban military intervention on the Horn of Africa appears to indicate the first modification of U.S. policy on the SALT question, which show[ed] up again in the speech of the American president at Wake Forest University on March 17 [1978] and which has elicited a noticeably positive reaction in public opinion.
2. Too little attention is given to the critical [gray] area between intercontinental weapons and conventional weapons capabilities.

There is a growing consciousness in America that the "generation of peace," of which Nixon spoke after his visit to Moscow in 1972, is not a reality and that intellectually and politically strong groups in the Senate and throughout the country are strongly opposed to the conclusion of a SALT settlement that could endanger the security of America or Europe. Thus, it will be difficult for the U.S. administration to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary in the ratification process. To avert this danger, the Soviet Union threatened, in the February 11, 1978, edition of *Pravda,* to make a basic change in its policy.

III

The big picture is all the more serious, since many European states have reduced their armament efforts, either because they underestimate the Soviet danger or blindly trust the military commitment of the United States. In addition, there is an immensely difficult domestic political situation in a number of European countries. If popular fronts are formed, noteworthy defense readiness cannot be counted on in the countries in question. The European states must clearly recognize that the United States will itself remain prepared, in the fullest sense, only if this is also true of its European allies.

The answer to whether European nuclear powers could replace American nuclear potential is clearly negative. They have no second-strike capability. Europeans must make use of all technical innovations in the field of conventional arms in order to make their defensive strength more effective. This implies an increase in num-

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bers of tanks, the introduction of precision weapons, as well as equalization in other areas of conventional weapons. The weaker the European states are internally, whether for political or economic reasons, the more unsatisfactory the result of these efforts will be. Even though it was decided at the last NATO conference to increase defense budgets by 3 per cent, several European countries cannot be counted on to carry out this requirement. In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, the United States, too, no longer demonstrates the same readiness for global initiative (e.g., the Middle East, Angola, the Horn of Africa) as in the period when it still behaved as an "imperial power." The picture of Western defense today is thus less convincing than it was in the past. This fact is simply concealed from its citizens by many governments, because they are caught up in a welfare-state philosophy and their priorities are not oriented primarily toward security. In the United States today, this fact is noted with great bitterness in high places.

The military imbalance on the European continent cannot be removed by the deployment of additional American troops on the northern part of the middle sector of the central front in Europe, as commendable as that might be. The lack of balance offers the Soviet Union opportunities for exerting political influence on the decisions of European nations. One need think only of the intervention of the Soviet Union against the neutron bomb or of the use of German troops in maneuvers on the already weakened northern flank of NATO. The clearer this development is, the greater the influence of Soviet power on the weakened European NATO partners will be. This would be especially true should Communist representatives be included in the government or should a number of countries be involved in mutual conflict, as in the case of Turkey and Greece. Even if one allows that the Warsaw Pact itself has serious problems, this fact reduces preparedness of a totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union less than it reduces that of a democracy. On the contrary, as Secretary Brown himself stresses, these difficulties will not necessarily prevent the Soviet Union from undermining confidence in the defensive and deterrent power of the West with a blitz operation, offering peace immediately after an insignificant victory on the ground.

The Soviet Union, however, can also represent a grave threat to Europe outside the NATO area, as has been shown in the past few years. This is especially true now that the Soviet navy is the second strongest in the world, having some classes of ships that are the most modern and best equipped in the world. The activity of the

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Soviet Union — either directly or through a third power — in Angola, on the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East threatens the security of Europe indirectly and seeks to promote the economic weakness that has gripped Europe for years, as [has been] the case in the Middle East conflict.

The whole political concept of NATO must therefore be reconsidered if Europe (but also, indirectly, the United States) does not want to see itself one day unexpectedly confronted with a development that is already ominously present today in the form of Soviet influence on European politics. Then, direct Soviet military action would not even be necessary for the Soviet Union to impose its will on many European nations, either indirectly or directly. Were these countries' own existence to be at stake, the consequences for the continuance of NATO and the American commitment would be grave, indeed, especially if politically unsafe regimes or popular-front governments [came to be] formed in Europe. Fortunately, the [1978] French elections brought the forces of Eurocommunism a serious setback.

As a very highly placed American personality explained to me last year in a private conversation about American nuclear policy, Europeans (she excluded the Federal Republic) are content "to let foreign workers do their dirty work and to leave their defense to the United States." With respect to Europe the United States might sooner or later ask, as France did in 1939, *"Pourquoi mourir pour Danzig?"* Therefore, the question of the security of this continent, including the credibility of the American deterrent, is essentially a European problem. Without an adequate European defense contribution and balanced internal order on the Continent, the American deterrent, and thus defense, cannot and will not be credible.

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CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT: A THEATER-NUCLEAR FORCE FOR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE*

by G. Philip Hughes

For more than twenty years, the United States has deployed a varied array of theater-nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Europe. Systems for short-range nuclear delivery, such as nuclear-capable artillery and short-range surface-to-surface missiles (currently Lance and Honest John), are intended to defeat enemy forces on the battlefield. Systems for longer-range nuclear delivery, such as land- and carrier-based nuclear-capable tactical aircraft, Pershing short-range ballistic missiles, and Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), are intended to destroy military objectives deep in Warsaw Pact territory. In addition, nuclear-armed Nike-Hercules air-defense weapons are intended to thwart massed Soviet air raids, while atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) are to be emplaced as mines to create obstacles to enemy troop movements.

Despite these varied capabilities, there have been persistent criticisms that the United States and its allies have had no coherent doctrine for the use of these weapons. It has been objected that this incoherent, incrementally accumulated force structure was not well suited to support any particular doctrine.

Recently, there has been renewed interest in developing a coherent NATO theater-nuclear doctrine, and a number of new weapons-development programs are under way to support the emerging doctrine. Before these efforts progress too far, the premises on which they are based should be critically examined to determine if this is the way U.S. theater-nuclear forces should be developed for the future. If not, then an alternative course should be chosen.

The Gordian Knot: Two Missions for Theater-Nuclear Forces

One of the most fundamental problems of West European security in the postwar period has been to find a way of successfully

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defending against numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces without sustaining commensurately large Western forces in peacetime. This problem forms the basis for the U.S. policy of maintaining theater-nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons were first deployed overseas in the mid-1950s, at a time when the Soviet Union lacked both an effective strategic-nuclear force for use against the United States and comparable tactical-nuclear weapons for use in Europe. The original purpose of these weapons was to compensate for inadequate Western conventional forces by serving as a substitute for them. The weapons were intended to supplement U.S. strategic-nuclear forces in delivering the nuclear retaliatory blow, which was the threatened response to any Soviet aggression under the "massive retaliation" doctrine. The unprecedented devastation resulting from such an attack would presumably deter the Soviets from aggression. Moreover, the United States could credibly threaten such a response with impunity, since the Soviets lacked effective nuclear retaliatory forces. Under this doctrine, the U.S. nuclear strikes would determine the outcome of the conflict. Since the role of conventional forces would be relatively unimportant, and certainly not decisive, large conventional forces would not have to be maintained.

Soviet acquisition of strategic-nuclear capabilities in the late fifties and early sixties made the massive retaliaton doctrine incredible. The United States could no longer threaten to respond immediately to any Soviet aggression with strategic and tactical-nuclear strikes without risking large-scale destruction to U.S. territory. Since nuclear weapons could no longer substitute almost completely for conventional forces, efforts were made to strengthen NATO conventional capabilities in order to deal with Soviet non-nuclear aggression under the doctrine of "flexible response." However, since NATO was either unwilling or unable to neutralize Soviet conventional-force advantages through these efforts, theater-nuclear weapons retained the role of compensating for conventional-force deficiencies. Instead of providing a "cheap" substitute for conventional forces, theater-nuclear weapons were now intended to provide an ultimate back-up for conventional defense. A Soviet conventional attack would be met initially with a NATO conventional defense. Should the Soviet attack prove to be overwhelming and threaten the defeat of NATO, however, theater-nuclear weapons would be used to provide massive firepower in support of conventional defenses. These weapons would destroy attacking Soviet forces and important rear-area targets, and it was expected that this

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would halt and defeat the Soviet attack. Since the use of theater-nuclear forces could ultimately be relied upon to destroy an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack, NATO had little reason to provide extensive conventional forces adequate to deal with this threat independently.

Soviet deployment of nuclear-armed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (M/IRBMs) as well as shorter-range tactical-nuclear missiles in the late fifties and early sixties led to the addition of a second mission for U.S. theater-nuclear forces. These forces became increasingly important for deterring a Soviet nuclear attack against NATO Europe. It was felt that the threat to retaliate initially with theater-nuclear forces would be more credible than with strategic forces. Their limited capabilities would not threaten the total destruction of the Soviet Union, and their use would not require launching strikes from U.S. territory, thus exposing the United States to nuclear retaliation.

These two missions of theater-nuclear forces — compensating for NATO conventional force inadequacies and deterring a Soviet nuclear attack — raise three problems for the United States and its allies. *First,* why are NATO theater-nuclear forces assumed to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, but Soviet nuclear forces do not deter NATO theater-nuclear use in support of faltering conventional defenses? *Second,* since theater-nuclear weapons would probably be used only late in the war, after Soviet troops had penetrated Western Europe, many of these weapons would have to be used on NATO territory. How, then, could NATO credibly threaten the use of such destructive weapons, knowing that to carry out the threat would be to destroy much of the territory being defended? If NATO refrained from using short-range nuclear weapons on its territory, and sought instead to halt an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack with nuclear strikes on Warsaw Pact rear-area targets, a *third* problem would be faced. How would the destruction of these distant, rear-area targets relieve the military pressure on NATO troops faced with the imminent collapse of their defenses? These three problems — engendered by the dual mission of NATO's theater-nuclear forces — have constituted a Gordian Knot that NATO has been attempting to unravel for many years.

Trying to Untie the Knot: A New Theater-Nuclear Doctrine

The existence of the three problems just described has forced the United States and NATO to search for a theater-nuclear

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employment doctrine with three important features: (1) immediate military relief for threatened NATO defenses without endangering the safety of NATO troops; (2) minimal levels of unintended damage to civilian facilities, so that NATO will not be inhibited from using tactical-nuclear weapons for fear of destroying its own territory; and (3) minimal likelihood of Soviet nuclear retaliation, also so that NATO will not be deterred from using these weapons.

In recent years, the U.S. Army has attempted to develop a new employment doctrine for tactical-nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery shells and short-range missiles) embodying the above characteristics. This doctrine emphasizes the delivery of pre-planned "packages" of nuclear weapons in previously identified areas of probable enemy advance or operations. The numbers and types of weapons and the aim-points in each package would be designed to maximize the lethal nuclear effects over the area without causing unintended damage to nearby civilian concentrations. The delivery of these packages would be specifically ordered or approved by the president. Several of these packages, each including perhaps 150 nuclear weapons,[1] would be delivered suddenly in a short period of time, either in small areas or across the front of operations, to destroy large numbers of attacking Soviet forces very rapidly. It is hoped that the stunning effect of such a strike would halt the Soviet advance and induce the Soviets to cease hostilities or enter into negotiations.

Recently, the U.S. Air Force has begun to study new employment concepts, which would be consonant with the new Army planning, for air-delivered theater-nuclear weapons. The Air Force concepts would emphasize the delivery of nuclear weapons against identified targets in the Warsaw Pact's tactical rear area, between the forward edge of the battle area and the troop-assembly areas. These plans, then, would maximize the prompt military effects of air-delivered nuclear strikes, which would presumably be carried out in such a way as to minimize collateral damage to nearby civilian facilities.

The current inventory of theater-nuclear weapons, most of which were developed between the mid-fifties and the mid-sixties, would be unsuitable for the new Army and Air Force plans. They are said to have high or inappropriate yields, excessive delivery inaccuracies, and other operational limitations. The requirements of new

[1] *Conventional-Nuclear Operations,* U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Reference Book 100-30, August 6, 1976, vol. 1, p. 21.

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employment policies, combined with concern about the operational deficiencies and technological obsolescence of some of these weapons, have led the United States to develop and/or deploy new nuclear warheads and improved delivery systems. Thus, one sees new 8-inch and 155-mm nuclear-artillery-shell development programs, development of a new warhead for Lance tactical missiles, and development of accuracy improvements and a new warhead for the Pershing short-range ballistic missile (under the Pershing II program). There are also proposals to develop and deploy highly accurate, nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which could be launched from ships, submarines or land vehicles, as theater weapons. All of these programs will result in weapons having three or more of the following characteristics: (1) lower or more useful nuclear yields than those of currently deployed weapons; (2) enhanced radiation effects; (3) more precise delivery accuracy; and (4) improved peacetime security features.

At first glance, the characteristics of these new weapons, together with the new Army and Air Force theater-nuclear employment concepts, appear to resolve successfully the three logical problems engendered by the dual missions of NATO's theater-nuclear forces. First, by facilitating the delivery of nuclear strikes directly against attacking forces, the new weapons and employment concepts would relieve the immediate pressure on NATO defenses. Second, by pre-planning strikes to maximize nuclear damage over "unpopulated" avenues of attack while minimizing unintended collateral damage with enhanced-radiation weapons, the new plans and weapons would negate any appearance that NATO might be self-deterred from using theater-nuclear weapons for fear of destroying its own territory or troops. This would improve the credibility of the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons first if confronted with an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack. Third, by planning for a sudden and stunning delivery of the nuclear strike, with clear spatial and temporal limitations and with refined nuclear effects, these plans seek to minimize the risk of Soviet nuclear retaliation. This expectation may be based upon a presumed absence of comparable Soviet weapons or employment plans, or upon a presumed Soviet desire to emulate U.S. restraint. In either event, minimization of the risk of Soviet retaliation both reduces the deterrent effect of Soviet nuclear forces and enhances the credibility of the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons first in support of faltering conventional defenses.

The recent revelation that the United States is preparing to

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produce a new generation of enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons [2] —the so-called neutron bombs — has evoked widespread controversy. "Neutron bombs" release a larger fraction of their energy in the form of radiation, permitting a large reduction in weapon yield while maintaining an area of lethal radiation effects equal to the area of lethal blast effects for comparable, present-day weapons. Thus, the radiation effects can kill or incapacitate personnel, while the reduced weapon yield reduces the potential collateral damage to structures. This feature of the enhanced-radiation weapons has been widely deplored for its supposed barbarity. Indignation here may be of limited merit, however, since all nuclear weapons — regardless of design — kill, and probably with equal efficiency. If there are valid objections to these weapons, then, they would seem to stem from assumptions about the circumstances and consequences of their use and the priorities of theater-nuclear planning which underlie them.

Cutting the Knot: A Single Mission for Theater-Nuclear Forces

The new theater-nuclear employment concepts and enhanced-radiation developments appear to focus largely on the question of how NATO can avoid being deterred, or self-deterred, from using nuclear weapons in support of deficient conventional forces. The implicit assumption that seems to underlie the current policy approach is this: if the obstacles in the way of using these weapons to compensate for conventional force inadequacies can be removed, the second theater-nuclear mission (deterring a Soviet nuclear attack) will take care of itself. Thus, the new doctrinal and weapons developments for U.S. theater-nuclear forces seem to concentrate more heavily on improving U.S. capabilities to use nuclear weapons first, in support of faltering conventional defenses, than on deterring a Soviet nuclear attack against NATO.

There are reasons, however, to doubt that the current emphasis is well placed. First, it is not clear that the new, more discriminate U.S. theater-nuclear weapons will help deter a Soviet attack. Since they are supposedly more readily usable in combat, it is doubtful that U.S. reliance on the threat of nuclear escalation to back up deficient conventional forces will decrease; if anything, this reliance on nuclear weapons will probably increase. Consequently, it will be even more important for the Soviets to pre-emptively

[2] "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget," *Washington* Post, June 6, 1977; "Pentagon Pushes Neutron Shell for Artillery Forces," *ibid.*, June 24, 1977.

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eliminate NATO's theater-nuclear capability if any offensive in Europe is to have much prospect of success. Carrying out such a pre-emptive strike will not be made much more difficult if the United States places these new weapons in already existing nuclear-weapons storage sites in Europe, which are highly vulnerable to a Soviet attack (as discussed below). It is difficult to believe that the Soviets, with their larger-yield, blast-type weapons (delivered by numerous Frog, Scud and Scaleboard tactical missiles, medium-range bombers and M/IRBMs), will be more effectively deterred from carrying out such a strike by a NATO threat to retaliate in a selective, discriminate way with weapons that minimize structural damage and produce personnel casualties at close ranges. Moreover, should NATO's deterrent fail, should the Soviets strike pre-emptively against NATO's nuclear arsenal, it is difficult to see, in view of the destruction already wrought by the Soviet attack, the significance of the contribution any surviving enhanced-radiation weapons might make in minimizing damage to friendly territory.

In the second place, it seems doubtful that the new U.S. theater-nuclear weapons and doctrinal developments will appreciably reduce the likelihood of Soviet nuclear retaliation against a NATO first-use in support of conventional defenses, either in the immediate or the distant future. For the time being, the Soviets may lack enhanced-radiation theater weapons and employment plans comparable to those of the United States. But they certainly have the means — albeit less refined than those of the United States — and the disposition to retaliate against a NATO use of theater-nuclear weapons. Is it believable, then, that the Soviets would accept the coordinated delivery of several packages of nuclear weapons against their forces (each probably including more than 100 weapons, however carefully delivered and with whatever refined effects) and not retaliate against NATO with their current panoply of "unrefined" nuclear weapons? It sems unlikely.

Even if it were believable, would this situation remain indefinitely? Could the Soviets be expected to concede to NATO a permanent, one-sided capability to use tactical-nuclear weapons without fear of Soviet retaliation? This, too, seems unlikely. Rather, if enhanced-radiation weapons, numerous nuclear-capable artillery and highly accurate tactical missiles conferred such an advantage on NATO, it is to be expected that the Soviets would move to deploy comparable or offsetting capabilities. It has already been suggested that the Soviets are developing nuclear-capable artillery,[3] heretofore

[3] *The Department of Defense Program of Research, Development, Test and*

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an area of exclusive NATO advantage. Moreover, some analysts are already contending, admittedly more on the basis of assertion than of evidence, that the Soviets are just as interested as is the United States in discriminate, theater-nuclear capabilities.[4] What will happen if the Soviets acquire such capabilities? Will NATO retain the advantage the United States has been seeking in this area? Again, it seems doubtful.

Thus, it would seem that the prospect of developing a U.S. capability to use nuclear weapons to compensate for inadequate conventional forces, without fear of Soviet retaliation, is illusory. If this conclusion is correct, it suggests that the new U.S. theater-nuclear employment concepts and exotic nuclear-weapons designs have not resolved the basic question engendered by the dual mission of U.S. theater-nuclear forces: Why do our weapons deter them, but theirs do not deter us? If these new doctrinal and weapons developments cannot resolve this problem — if they cannot reconcile the mission of deterring a Soviet nuclear attack with the mission of supporting deficient conventional forces — then it seems that nothing can. Something has got to give. If the United States is to have a consistent and effective theater-nuclear doctrine, one or the other of these missions will have to be given clear predominance in U.S. planning. To decide which of the two missions should receive priority involves recognition of an inherent difference between them.

The deterrent mission of theater-nuclear forces came to be assigned as a result of circumstances beyond the control of the United States or NATO. The Soviet deployment of M/IRBMs and, later, of tactical-nuclear missile systems — whether in response to NATO capabilities or for independent motives — probably could not have been prevented by any NATO action. If the United States and NATO could not have prevented these deployments, they had no choice but to deter their use against Western Europe. NATO, for the reasons mentioned earlier, could not rely exclusively on U.S. strategic-nuclear forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on Europe. Thus, NATO was forced to rely primarily on U.S. theater-nuclear weapons, supplemented by European national nuclear forces, for this deterrence. The point, then, is clear. The deterrent mission of theater-nuclear forces is indispensable and paramount.

Evaluation: FY 1977, pp. IV-101-102; Phillip A. Karber, *The Tactical Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washintgon: The BDM Corporation, 1977), pp. 71-73.

[4] S. T. Cohen and W. R. Van Cleave, "Western European Collateral Damage from Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *R.U.S.I., Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1976, pp. 34-37.

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Theater-nuclear forces are not similarly indispensable in compensating for conventional force deficiencies, however. It is true that NATO cannot control or even significantly affect the number and quality of the conventional forces maintained by the Warsaw Pact. However, means other than theater-nuclear weapons are available to offset Soviet conventional force advantages. These could include numerically larger NATO conventional forces or new technological or tactical developments for conventional forces that might counter Soviet numerical advantages. Since it is theoretically possible for NATO to offset Soviet conventional force advantages with improvements in its own conventional forces, the following conclusion emerges. If only one of the two current missions of NATO's theater-nuclear forces can logically be fulfilled, and if the deterrence mission is indispensable while the mission of supporting conventional forces is not, then the deterrence mission should receive priority. Other means should be sought to reduce the deficiencies of NATO's conventional forces. The ultimate reliance of these forces on the use of theater-nuclear weapons to save them from an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack must be substantially reduced. Stronger and more costly conventional forces may be the price NATO must pay for a credible and effective theater-nuclear deterrent.

Even if increased emphasis is placed on the NATO theater-nuclear mission of deterring a Soviet nuclear strike against Western Europe, current and planned forces are not adequate for this role. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to explore some of the features of the current force structure.

Limitations of Current Forces as a Deterrent

It has long been recognized that for a nuclear deterrent force to be effective, it must be able to survive an enemy attempt to destroy it and then be able to carry out the threatened response. In addition, some theorists contend that the deterrent force should be capable of delivering a variety of retaliatory responses proportional to the provocation. Should the force be capable of only one response, there is the danger that the adversary might launch some provocation in which the consequences of carrying out the response would be worse than doing nothing. In this situation, the evident probability that the threatened response would not be carried out weakens the credibility of the deterrent. These, then, are the general requirements for a nuclear deterrent force. In the NATO context,

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however, additional, political requirements intrude. The first is that the allies be able to participate in the allied nuclear deterrent by having a role in the delivery of nuclear strikes. This ensures that their status in the alliance will not be so obviously inferior to that of the United States, and that they will have some voice in the momentous decisions about the use of nuclear weapons in their defense. A second political requirement is that the weapons stored in Europe be safe and secure in peacetime. It is here that our discussion of the shortcomings of the current force as a deterrent must begin.

In deploying theater-nuclear weapons to Europe, the United States has long faced two important constraints: not only must the weapons be safe and secure from theft, sabotage or unauthorized use in peacetime, they must also be ready for use and as invulnerable as possible to attack in time of war. This last constraint implies the dispersal of weapons over a large number of locations, the periodic movement of weapons from place to place, and concealment of the weapons — all of which would make it more difficult for an enemy to locate and destroy them. The first, however, implies the concentration of weapons at fixed locations, under heavy guard and with numerous, observable physical-security precautions, since it is obviously far easier and cheaper to maintain the physical security of weapons under such conditions. Because the problem of maintaining the peacetime security of the weapons is of greater immediate concern to NATO governments than is the problem of wartime readiness — peace being the expected day-to-day condition — NATO's nuclear-weapons deployment policies reflect this concern. The 7,000 or so theater-nuclear weapons in Europe are stored in a rather small number of storage facilities under continuous guard and are protected by fences, sensors, floodlights and other devices which contribute to their peacetime security. These security precautions are even being increased in response to the growing incidence of international terrorism in recent years. All of these measures, however, make the nuclear-storage sites obvious, readily identifiable targets for a Soviet attack.

Given the dominating NATO concern with the peacetime security of these weapons, NATO's approach to the problem of maintaining the wartime readiness of its weapons has been twofold. First, some U.S. and allied nuclear-armed tactical aircraft and Pershing short-range ballistic missiles are maintained on peacetime "quick-reaction alert" (QRA), capable of being launched against enemy targets on short notice. QRA supposedly enhances the sur-

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vivability of these forces against a surprise conventional or nuclear attack and threatens prompt retaliation. It also provides an important, visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and is an important means of European participation in the alliance nuclear deterrent.

A second NATO approach to wartime readiness is to disperse the weapons from the peacetime storage sites to the vicinity of the delivery units. This requires strong and persuasive warning of an attack and the theater commander's order to disperse. Although there is increasing evidence that available warning time may be less than previously anticipated,[5] this is the method by which the survivability of most of the theater-nuclear stockpile would be ensured.

However, concern over the security of these weapons in transit during peacetime probably inhibits NATO from carrying out their dispersal. NATO would probably be reluctant to disperse its theater-nuclear weapons until after the actual outbreak of war, for fear that the Soviets would interpret this extraordinary step as an indication of NATO preparations for nuclear use. This might trigger the pre-emptive Soviet nuclear strike which Soviet military doctrine emphasizes as the proper response.[6] If allowed to remain in their peacetime deployment, however, nearly all of NATO's theater-nuclear forces in Europe could be put out of action by a well-designed surprise nuclear attack. Such attacks are also emphasized by Soviet military doctrine.[7] These forces could also probably be seriously degraded by purely conventional attacks. The presence of NATO's QRA forces, poised to conduct nuclear strikes against the Warsaw Pact, probably increases the urgency for the Soviets to destroy these forces before they can be used. Such a surprise attack on these alert forces could probably destroy them on the ground, since warning would be very short, while the consultations and decision to launch QRA forces would be time-consuming.

Thus, in deciding whether to ready its theater-nuclear forces, NATO faces a dilemma. Recognition of this NATO vulnerability, and a desire to strengthen the linkage between theater- and strategic-nuclear forces, led to the assignment of some Polaris and, later, Poseidon SLBM warheads to the theater-nuclear forces. These warheads would provide a nuclear retaliatory capability with assured

[5] *NATO and the New Soviet Threat*, report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, pp. 1-4.

[6] N. A. Lomov, *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (A Soviet View)*, trans. by U.S. Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 147.

[7] V. Ye. Savkin, *Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View)*, trans. by U.S. Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 190-191, 235.

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survivability, which could be used to deter or respond to a Soviet nuclear strike on NATO's land-based nuclear forces.

There are, however, at least two problems with this survivable element of the theater-nuclear forces. First, it does not seem to be very useful for limited or flexible nuclear employment. Each Poseidon missile carries up to fourteen warheads, each with a yield measured in tens of kilotons and with substantial delivery inaccuracies. These features suggest that the Poseidon's assets would not be very useful for attacks requiring the use of a single weapon or of a few weapons against highly specific, widely separated targets and with little unintended damage to nearby civilian facilities. Moreover, the Soviets might not necessarily view the launch of one of these multiple-warhead missiles as a limited attack and might strike back on a larger scale, thus escalating the level of conflict.

A second problem with the Poseidon theater-nuclear weapons is that they are usually counted as part of the U.S. strategic-nuclear forces. In the event of a Soviet surprise nuclear attack on NATO theater-nuclear forces in Europe, the primary surviving retaliatory asset available to NATO would be the Poseidon warheads. The United States would seem to have no choice but to accept the loss of its theater-nuclear forces or to use Poseidon — an element of the United States' strategic retaliatory forces — and thus risk a Soviet strategic response.

There are, of course, those who claim that the magnitude of a Soviet strike against the theater-nuclear forces in Europe would require U.S. execution of the "single integrated operational plan" (SIOP) for strategic forces. However, it is difficult to see what could be thus gained in a situation where Europe has ben prostrated by a nuclear attack and where any NATO conventional defenses would probably be in chaos. It is easier to see the costs to the United States, in the form of Soviet strategic retaliation, which could arise from such a course of action. Given this disproportion between the potential costs and gains of invoking U.S. strategic forces in response to a Soviet attack on the theater-nuclear forces, it is difficult to believe that the United States would actually carry out such an escalatory threat. If this threat is not fully credible, moreover, it is doubtful that it would deter the Soviets from destroying the NATO nuclear forces which constitute an impediment to the success of any Soviet conventional offensive.

Thus, as currently configured, NATO's theater-nuclear forces seem to serve primarily as a "lightning rod," inviting and attracting a Soviet attack and hastening, rather than forestalling, the

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need for a U.S. decision on whether to use strategic-nuclear forces in defense of Europe. To improve this situation, it would seem that the theater-nuclear forces should be more survivable, that the Soviet Union should be unable to degrade or eliminate their retaliatory capability, and that a Soviet attack on any portion of these forces should leave the United States with options other than strategic retaliation.

This discussion of the limitations of current theater-nuclear forces as a deterrent has focused on the problems of survivability and limited retaliatory options. There are, of course, other operational limitations. First, the current long-range strike assets, including tactical aircraft, Pershing and Poseidon, may be confined by their retargeting limitations to strikes against fixed targets deep in Warsaw Pact territory. While efforts are under way to develop a means of using nuclear-armed aircraft more flexibly, in accord with the new Air Force employment concept discussed above, it remains to be seen if this can be done.

Second, NATO plans to place additional aircraft on QRA after the outbreak of a conflict in order to deter escalation have been criticized for exposing these aircraft to destruction at their bases. This also reduces NATO's conventional airpower, thus hastening the need to use nuclear weapons to forestall conventional defeat. This problem is being remedied somewhat by the assignment of more Poseidon warheads to the theater-nuclear forces in order to cover the targets of the additional QRA aircraft, freeing them for conventional missions. This solution, however, is not ideal because of the limitations of the Poseidon system already noted. It is also proposed that a ground-launched cruise missile be developed to replace, in whole or in part, the QRA aircraft. However, the ground-launched cruise missile, it would seem, is subject to the same vulnerability limitations as is Pershing. If it remains on alert, armed with a nuclear warhead, it will almost surely have to be based at a fixed, readily identifiable location under heavy guard to ensure its peacetime security. Alternatively, if the missiles are moved about, or are held in readiness for movement, their warheads will have to be stored separately, under guard in fixed storage sites, again to ensure their security. In either event, this system will be fully as vulnerable to surprise nuclear or conventional attack as is the current panoply of weapons in Europe.

Third, carrier-based, nuclear-capable tactical aircraft require that their aircraft carriers operate in confined ocean areas so that the aircraft can strike their targets. This increases the vulner-

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ability of the carriers to destruction by naval forces or land-based aircraft. For this and other reasons, nuclear-capable carrier aircraft have ceased to have a defined role in NATO theater-nuclear planning: they are now merely "committed forces." [8]

Finally, systems such as Pershing and Lance having excessively large-yield warheads and delivery inaccuracies would cause such great collateral damage that the United States might be inhibited from using them. As noted above, many new weapons developments will relieve these limitations, though it appears that they will contribute more strongly to a NATO policy of first-use than to deterrence of a Soviet attack. Despite these operational limitations, however, the systems based in Europe are more usable and provide wider employment options than do the survivable Poseidon missiles.

In summary, then, the current U.S. and NATO theater-nuclear forces are not an adequate deterrent to Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe. The forces based in Europe are the most flexible and usable systems, but they are not survivable. Rather, they seem to encourage a Soviet nuclear attack, especially when NATO relies on these weapons to preserve its conventional forces from defeat. On the other hand, the survivable, sea-based Poseidon is not flexible or credible as a retaliatory instrument. This suggests that if NATO desires a credible and effective theater-nuclear deterrent force, it must seek theater-nuclear forces which reduce Soviet incentives and opportunities to attack pre-emptively.

A Theater-Nuclear Force for Deterrence in Europe

An alternative theater-nuclear force configured expressly to deter a Soviet nuclear attack against Western Europe might be composed of two elements: (1) a force of long-range, sea-based cruise missiles to replace the current array of long-range NATO theater-nuclear assets and to deter the use of long-range Soviet nuclear forces against NATO; (2) at least one shorter-range tactical-nuclear system, based in numerous, hardened storage sites in Europe and planned and exercised for early dispersal in time of crisis in safe, secure vehicles, in order to deter Soviet tactical-nuclear strikes against NATO troops.

The Cruise Missile Component

The long-range, sea-based cruise missile component of this force would serve as the primary deterrent to a Soviet nuclear

[8] Uwe Nerlich, *The Alliance and Europe: Part V, Nuclear Weapons and East-West Negotiations* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 120, 1975/76), p. 24.

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strike against Western Europe in the earliest stages of any conflict, "covering" for the land-based forces until they could be dispersed and readied. It would also provide NATO with theater-nuclear retaliatory options, short of immediate resort to acknowledged strategic weapons, in the event that deterrence failed and the land-based forces were destroyed. The cruise missile force would be highly survivable — much more so than any theater-nuclear weapons in Europe today — as it would be virtually impossible for the Soviets to launch a successful simultaneous attack on all cruise-missile-carrying ships at sea. To enhance the survivability of this force, nuclear- and conventional-powered attack submarines would be the preferred carriers, surface ships being used only after the submarine-basing potential had been fully exploited.[9] Survivability would be further ensured by having these vessels patrol the oceans, performing their conventional-warfare missions and moving within range of targets ashore only when theater-nuclear strikes are ordered, instead of patrolling in confined ocean areas in order to be continuously within range of their targets.

This mode of operation, combined with the slowness of communication with submarines at sea, would confine these cruise missiles to strikes against fixed targets in the Warsaw Pact; they would have no capability to attack transient targets-of-opportunity near the battlefield. This more rapidly responsive capability would have to be provided by ground-based tactical-nuclear forces.

In addition to improved survivability over the current theater-nuclear forces in Europe, the proposed cruise missile component has several other advantages. The 2,000-mile range of the Tomahawk cruise missile being developed by the Navy is certainly adequate to strike all targets-of-interest in the European theater from ships operating in the North Atlantic or the Western Mediterranean. The Tomahawk's single nuclear warhead should make it better suited for very limited, selective nuclear strikes than the multiple-warhead Poseidon SLBM. In the event of a nuclear attack on NATO, it would provide the United States with nuclear-response options other than immediate resort to U.S. strategic forces, which is now the sole nuclear option.

Finally, a sea-based cruise missile force would permit con-

[9] Theoretically, it is possible to modify retired nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to carry sea-launched cruise missiles. However, as these vessels are old before they are retired, retaining them in the force to carry cruise missiles might be so difficult and expensive that the option would be made most unattractive. One presumes that if these submarines were really viable, they would have been retained for strategic-nuclear duties.

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tinued allied participation in the NATO nuclear deterrent, as these weapons could be placed aboard allied submarines and surface ships under the control of U.S. custodial teams, who would release the weapons for use when ordered.[10] The procedures for placing these weapons aboard allied ships would be essentially the same as those for providing nuclear weapons to allied ground forces. Such procedures, therefore, would neither place a burden on the allies, nor increase U.S. anxiety over the possibility of unauthorized use of the weapons.[11]

Despite these advantages of the sea-based theater-nuclear cruise missile concept, the following criticisms can be leveled against it:

(1) Shore-based communications with cruise missile ships would be vulnerable, inviting attack, and the entire force could be incapacitated if they were destroyed.

(2) Cruise missile ships cannot transmit strike confirmation without compromising their security and survivability.

(3) Cruise missiles launched from aircraft or the ground would do just as well as sea-based weapons.

(4) If U.S. deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles were prohibited by a SALT II agreement, a key element of the proposed force would be precluded and its viability would be called into question.

(5) The Soviets will never recognize a sea-based cruise missile as a nonstrategic weapon, distinct from Poseidon, and would respond to its use with their strategic forces.

The first three of these criticisms are rather easily answered. First, the communications on which the cruise missile forces

[10] Although any suggestion of placing U.S. nuclear weapons aboard vessels of the NATO allies inevitably raises memories of the ill-fated "multilateral force" proposal of the early 1960s, it is important to recognize that this proposal is different. It is not designed to head off the development of national nuclear forces; it carries no pretensions of multinational staffing or supranational nuclear control. It is merely a response to the political fact that the allies wish to participate in the NATO nuclear deterrent: it accommodates that fact by simply extending the regime of land-based theater-nuclear weapons to the sea.

[11] Placing these weapons on allied vessels would also require equipping them with "permissive action links" (coded switches which impede unauthorized use of the weapons) and installing communication gear capable of receiving U.S. transmissions. The presence of these weapons on allied ships would probably reduce, not increase, the chances of unauthorized use, since the most plausible scenario for such use is a situation where an allied army unit finds itself in a desperate situation which can only be redeemed by using nuclear weapons, but where it has not yet received authority to do so. See Barry R. Schneider, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Four Peacetime Security Dilemmas," in David T. Johnson and Barry R. Schneider, eds., *Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 197. It is extremely unlikely that a ship's crew would find itself in a situation where unauthorized use of its nuclear-armed cruise missiles would be its only hope to avert destruction.

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depend are components of the U.S. strategic forces, and some — such as the Seafarer very-low-frequency communications system — are, or will be, based on U.S. territory. To cripple the theater-nuclear forces through their communications, the Soviets would have to conduct a strategic attack on the United States and risk the consequences. Second, while it is true that the cruise missile force could not confirm the launch or success of its strike, this is also true of the SLBM force and all other strategic weapon systems. If this drawback is acceptable for strategic weapons, it should be no obstacle in the theater-nuclear sphere.

As to the air-launched cruise missile force, it suffers from two disadvantages: (1) it either fails to improve the survivability of the force over current aircraft if the planes are based in Europe, or it minimizes the chances of allied participation if the aircraft are based in the United States; (2) it is more easily confused with U.S. strategic forces if the aircraft operate from U.S. territory, thus raising the chances of escalation and making this option no better than the current Poseidon forces. In regard to the fourth objection, it is possible that sea-launched cruise missiles would be prohibited by a SALT II agreement, but recent evidence suggests that this is increasingly unlikely. The Soviets have reportedly become more flexible on permitting tests of long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles, presumably realizing that once they are tested, there is no way to verify that they are not deployed.[12] Moreover, the NATO allies have become more adamant that their access to long-range cruise missiles must not be bargained away in SALT, and the United States has apparently become more firmly committed to accommodating this European insistence in its negotiating position.[13]

The last of the above-noted criticisms is more difficult to answer, for it requires conjecture as to what the Soviets perceive or what they would do in the event of nuclear war. This criticism seems to resolve into two parts: Why believe that the Soviets will recognize any distinction between theater-nuclear and strategic-nuclear warfare, and even if the Soviets accept such a distinction, Why believe that they will regard the use of a sea-launched cruise missile as different from the use of a Poseidon SLBM? There are two answers to the former objection. First, recent Soviet military writings have drawn

[12] "Major Concessions on Cruise Missiles by Soviets Reported," *New York Times*, November 18, 1977.

[13] "NATO Allies Fear U.S. Concedes Too Much in Soviet Arms Talks," *ibid.*, December 7, 1977; "Arms Debate: Allies Ask Role," *ibid.*, December 9, 1977; "Pentagon Chief Acts to Calm NATO," *ibid.*, December 8, 1977; Vance Asks Backing in NATO on Arms Talks," *ibid.*, December 9, 1977.

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a conceptual distinction between theater-nuclear warfare and general strategic-nuclear war, and have acknowledged that the former can occur without the latter beginning simultaneously.[14] Second, in an actual war-fighting situation where the Soviets believe nuclear weapons must be used, it would always be in their interest to refrain from using strategic-nuclear forces in concert with lesser nuclear strikes unless the United States had already attacked the Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether the Soviets are initiating nuclear use or are responding to earlier U.S. strikes, if they are rational, they will recognize that the chances of containing the conflict before the Soviet Union is destroyed are greater if they withhold strategic-nuclear strikes than if they launch such strikes in conjunction with theater-nuclear attacks.

As to the latter objection, it can only be observed that the Soviets do distinguish within their own forces between central strategic systems and peripheral attack weapons, both organizationally and for arms-control purposes. They have also grudgingly consented to a similar distinction for U.S. forces, excluding from SALT some nuclear delivery systems which they considered threatening but which the United States insisted were nonstrategic. If the Soviets do distinguish in principle between theater-nuclear warfare and strategic warfare and between theater-nuclear weapons and strategic weapons, it seems plausible that the Soviets would recognize a sea-launched cruise missile force as theater-nuclear. It is certainly more believable that they would treat the sea-launched cruise missile as a theater-nuclear weapon than that the launching of a Poseidon SLBM would be considered a theater-nuclear strike, since Poseidon has long been counted as a component of U.S. strategic forces.

The recent decision by the Carter administration to cancel the B-1 bomber in favor of the deployment of air-launched cruise missiles as part of the U.S. strategic arsenal does little to clarify the status of the sea-launched cruise missile as an exclusively theater-nuclear weapon. Neither, however, does it make impossible a distinction between theater-nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and U.S. strategic forces. Its principal effect on this proposal is to make it more difficult to exclude the sea-based cruise missile force from being counted in SALT, since that force would be capable of reaching Soviet targets and since its clandestine diversion to strategic missions could not be detected. In a war situation, however, the

[14] On this point, see Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive* (Washington: GPO, 1976), pp. 104-111, esp. p. 110.

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Soviet reaction to such a force would depend on the nature of any U.S. strike and the identification of the launching vehicle. Both these indications should permit the Soviets to distinguish between theater-nuclear and strategic cruise missiles.

In summary, then, a force of sea-launched cruise missiles would be preferable to NATO's current long-range nuclear-strike force as a deterrent to a Soviet theater-nuclear attack. Such a cruise missile force would be more survivable than is the current array of long-range assets, could ensure continued allied participation in the alliance's nuclear deterrent and, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, could provide NATO with theater-nuclear retaliatory options short of resorting to U.S. strategic-nuclear forces. Thus, such a force could assume the long-range nuclear-strike missions of the Pershing, NATO-committed Poseidon warheads, and land- and carrier-based tactical aircraft, and would permit the removal of these weapons from Europe or their assignment to other missions. Adoption of this force would also permit cancellation of the ground-launched cruise missile program, since that weapon would be more vulnerable than are sea-based missiles and would merely duplicate their function.

The Tactical-Nuclear Force Component

The land-based tactical-nuclear component of the proposed force is intended to deter Soviet use of tactical-nuclear weapons against defending NATO troops, thus providing NATO with the capability of responding to such attacks in kind. This component would also provide NATO with a responsive capability to attack time-sensitive battlefield targets with nuclear weapons should a NATO first-use of theater-nuclear forces prove unavoidable. This tactical-nuclear component could be provided by some combination of three systems: nuclear-capable artillery (8-inch and/or 155-mm), Lance missiles or a mobile, truck-mounted version of the Nike-Hercules air-defense weapon modified to attack ground targets.[15] Which of these systems would be chosen for the tactical-nuclear deterrent role would depend upon the nature of the deterrent threat at the tactical level (e.g., destruction of enemy troops, destruction of enemy tactical-nuclear weapons), the number of delivered weapons required to carry out the threat, and the required level of system survivability in the field.

[15] The modified Nike-Hercules system has been proposed in an unpublished McDonnell-Douglas Aerospace Corporation study entitled *Nike 1980*.

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Any tactical-nuclear assets based in Europe would still have to be made secure in peacetime by storing them under guard away from the launching units. This would obviously make it more difficult to ensure their survivability against a surprise nuclear attack. Since the Soviets clearly have the means to destroy any European target they wish, the survivability criterion for land-based theater-nuclear forces should not be an absolute ability to survive any attack but, rather, an ability to force the Soviets to expend as many of their own weapons as the number of NATO weapons they destroy.

This might be achieved by storing small numbers of tactical-nuclear weapons (say, 3 to 5) in a fairly large number of widely separated, underground storage silos (say, 250). These silos could be hardened to withstand perhaps 500 psi of blast overpressure. This would require the Soviets to use many more than two warheads from either their older SS-4 and SS-5 M/IRBMs or their new SS-20 mobile IRBMs to destroy each silo.

Such a NATO tactical-nuclear peacetime deployment would reduce the currently large advantage accruing to the Soviets should they attack NATO forces in their peacetime posture. No longer would the USSR be able to neutralize a force of 7,000 nuclear weapons and many of their delivery vehicles with the expenditure of between 200 and 400 of its own weapons (a "force exchange ratio" which would be totally unacceptable at the strategic-nuclear level). Rather, the Soviets would have less incentive to conduct such an attack since they would destroy, at best, only a few more weapons than they would expend. Moreover, a secure cruise missile force at sea would give NATO credible options, short of using U.S. strategic-nuclear forces, in response to this attack.

Reduction of the Soviet incentive to strike at the tactical-nuclear systems in their peacetime deployment, and deterrence of such a strike by the threat of retaliation with the cruise missile force, would apparently be insufficient to ensure deterrence at the tactical-nuclear level. NATO's tactical-nuclear assets would also have to be dispersed and readied early in a period of crisis in order to deliver retaliatory strikes. The danger that this action might appear to the Soviets as an extraordinary preparation for nuclear use and trigger a Soviet pre-emptive strike might be reduced if the dispersal could be practiced periodically. Dispersal in time of crisis might then seem to be a more routine readiness procedure: NATO might be less inhibited from carrying it out, and the Soviets might find it less ominous than they would today.

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For the peacetime exercise of dispersal to be politically feasible, however, it would be necessary to provide significantly improved security for weapons in transit. This additional security could be provided by transporting the weapons in safe, secure containers attached to standard military trucks. These would be analogous to the vehicles used to transport nuclear weapons within the United States. Such containers can be designed to be completely impervious to seizure or sabotage of the contents within the time it might take NATO forces to react to such an attempt.[16] Moreover, in periods of tension, containers of this type might be useful for the secure dispersal, movement and storage of the weapons in the field with their delivery units.

Adoption of these measures, in order to improve the survivability of the tactical-nuclear force component in Europe and reduce Soviet incentives to conduct a nuclear strike against NATO, would be expensive, however. Substantial costs would be incurred for the development and construction of tactical-nuclear storage silos, for the acquisition or reopening of bases in Europe, and for the acquisition of secure transport vehicles. These costs could be offset somewhat if the increased survivability of individual weapons or the reassessment of force requirements would permit a reduction of tactical-nuclear deployments to Europe. Further savings might be effected by eliminating the air-defense mission of the nuclear Nike-Hercules and by withdrawing these weapons, along with ADMs, from Europe as the Defense Department apparently wishes. The effectiveness of the Nike-Hercules is said to have been superseded by newer and more capable conventionally armed systems, and neither weapon appears to contribute strongly toward deterring a Soviet nuclear attack against NATO.

Finally, to design the tactical-nuclear force component primarily as a deterrent against a Soviet nuclear strike could lead to a reassessment of the need for low-yield, enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons and for highly discriminate employment plans. If, as a consequence of this reassessment, such weapons and plans should turn out to be inappropriate, then these efforts should be canceled. Some of the money and resources now devoted to developing enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons might then be better spent on efforts to ensure the survivability of theater-nuclear forces under a policy emphasizing their deterrent function.

[16] Concepts for such transport containers and vehicles, as well as for underground nuclear-weapons storage silos, are being developed at Sandia Laboratories (Albuquerque, New Mexico) and elsewhere.

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Unresolved Questions

Two fundamental and related questions have been left unresolved: What must be threatened to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, and How large must the sea-based cruise missile and land-based tactical-nuclear force components be? As noted earlier, the size of the theater-nuclear forces, and the number and types of ships chosen to carry the cruise missile force component, depend upon the nature of the theater-nuclear deterrent threat. Should this threat require the delivery of, say, only 100 or 200 long-range nuclear weapons, then the required cruise missile forces could be achieved by deploying two or three cruise missiles on existing NATO attack submarines. This would probably not represent an unacceptably large diversion of conventional weapons spaces for theater-nuclear missions.

However, replacement of NATO's currently numerous long-range nuclear-strike forces with a deployed force of only 200 or so cruise missiles might be poitically unacceptable to NATO. Despite the expected dramatic improvement in the survivability of this small force, NATO might fear that the gross reduction of theater-nuclear forces would be seen as weakening, not strengthening, the theater-nuclear deterrent. Consequently, a larger cruise missile force may be required. Two means would be available to increase the size of the sea-based cruise missile force: (1) increase the number of cruise missiles deployed on each attack submarine to, say, eight, or (2) expand the sea-based cruise missile platforms to include surface ships. Each of these options has its drawbacks.

An increase in the number of cruise missiles on each NATO attack submarine to consume a third or more of the weapons spaces begins to significantly detract from the primary conventional capability of these ships. To offset this, additional attack submarines may have to be built. If there are already backlogs of construction orders for new submarines, this might take a while, and in any event, it would greatly increase the cost of the proposed theater-nuclear force improvements.

The disadvantage of adding to the sea-based cruise missile force by deploying these weapons on surface ships is that those ships are more vulnerable to Soviet detection and attack than are submarines. For this reason, the submarine-basing potential for cruise missiles probably should be fully exploited before deployment on surface ships is considered.

Since neither of the sea-based cruise missile deployment

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options is without its disadvantages, a productive focus for further study would be to determine the optimal combination of these options for the proposed deterrent force. If the primacy of the deterrence mission of theater-nuclear forces is accepted, this would seem to be a more fruitful area of study than the current search for a one-sided advantage in the use of nuclear weapons to support conventional forces. Of course, the optimal combination of theater-nuclear cruise missile deployment options, and the size of the cruise missile and tactical-nuclear force components, ultimately depend upon the second unresolved question: What must be threatened in order to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO?

Proposed answers to this question differ widely, depending on the perspective of the commentator. Some strategists believe that NATO must be able to destroy attacking enemy ground forces with nuclear weapons and deny the enemy his military objectives under all conditions. Others believe that NATO should threaten the destruction of rear-area targets in Warsaw Pact territory which would both disrupt the conduct of military operations against NATO and convey a political message to Soviet leaders influencing them to cease hostilities. Still others argue that Moscow would probably not be significantly influenced by the fate either of its troops in Europe or of Warsaw Pact territory, and that the Soviets can be deterred from nuclear warfare only by the threat of NATO theater-nuclear strikes on Soviet territory. This, however, carries the risk of obscuring whatever distinctions are possible between theater-nuclear and strategic-nuclear warfare, and thus reduces the chances of containing a war below the strategic-nuclear level. Finally, the most eclectic theorists maintain that, since we cannot know in advance what will deter a Soviet nuclear strike on NATO, the allies should be capable of conducting nuclear strikes on all of the above types of targets.[17]

These different viewpoints might be summarized as follows: NATO must be able to threaten targets of highest value to the Soviet Union, but the retaliatory destruction of those targets must not threaten to escalate the conflict. This principle implies a paradox for NATO: the targets of greatest value to the Soviet leaders are those on Soviet territory, but the destruction of those targets would probably widen the war. On the other hand, the military and political targets in Warsaw Pact territory, whose destruction would be less likely to escalate the conflict, might not be sufficiently valu-

[17] Examples of all of these points of view can be found in *LASL Panel on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Fifth Meeting*, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Informal Report LA-6908-MS, August 1977, pp. 9, 30-31, 57-58, 77.

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able to Soviet leaders; their threatened destruction may do little to deter a Soviet nuclear strike against NATO. This paradox highlights the need to formulate an effective retaliatory-employment doctrine for a theater-nuclear force intended to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. This is the principal outstanding problem in structuring a theater-nuclear deterrent force.

I have argued for the primacy of the nuclear deterrent mission of NATO's theater-nuclear forces. I have demonstrated that more-survivable forces are needed for this purpose than are provided by the current posture, and I have identified an alternative force structure to provide this increased survivability. It remains to formulate a credible retaliatory-employment doctrine for this force. This will require lengthy and detailed study; however, given the priority of the deterrent mission, analytical efforts to develop this doctrine would seem to be better placed than the current efforts to reconcile the dual purpose of theater-nuclear forces. Development of this employment doctrine would permit NATO to determine the appropriate size and optimal deployment of the sea-based cruise missile and land-based tactical-nuclear forces.

In summary, by improving NATO's conventional forces in order to reduce their reliance on the use of theater-nuclear weapons to prevent defeat, and by deploying a survivable force of long-range, sea-based cruise missiles and land-based tactical-nuclear systems configured to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, the basic problems of U.S. theater-nuclear policy, as described above, can be avoided, and the chances of nuclear warfare in Europe can be reduced.

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CARTER'S NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY: FUEL ASSURANCES AND ENERGY SECURITY*

by Michael Brenner

President Carter's move to stop the spread of nuclear materials having weapons potential is perhaps his administration's most venturesome foreign policy initiative. It is also proving to be singularly demanding — of political imagination, technical ingenuity, and Washington's diplomatic talent for pulling into unison the several strands of a complex policy. For its goal is a basic restructuring of the world's institutional framework for civilian nuclear power as well as a shift in its technical foundation. The American attempt to divert or at least slow the trend toward plutonium separation and recycling has revived sensitive questions about the terms of access to nuclear technology. By putting in doubt the assumed right of states (that adhere to safeguards) to market, purchase and operate reprocessing and fast-breeder facilities — technologies holding out the golden promise of energy self-sufficiency — the United States has sparked a general debate, at times both acrimonious and agonized, over what constitutes a nation's energy and security interests when nuclear arms capabilities become the global rule rather than the exception. It is a measure of the strategy's ambitiousness (some might say audacity) that success depends on governments making very unconventional judgments about the costs/benefits of self-reliant energy policies.

The Carter Strategy

The keystone of the Carter nonproliferation policy is the call for a worldwide moratorium on the commercialization of plutonium fuels. It has sought agreement on a "pause" in the recycling of plutonium — during which to rethink the economics of reprocess-

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ing (and the light-metal breeder reactor [LMBR]), to involve states having an interest in nuclear power in a deliberate review of alternatives to today's technology and operating techniques in the hope of finding more proliferation-resistant types, and to explore ways of extending the life of the current fuel cycle by assuring a reliable fuel supply for light-water reactors (LWRs) and convenient disposal of their radioactive wastes. Central to this approach was the administration's decision, announced in April 1977, to "defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling . . . of plutonium, and to cancel plans for the demonstration Clinch River breeder project." [1] These two steps were intended as strong talking points in what has been a lively campaign to dissuade other countries from going down the plutonium road. By guillotining the federally licensed and (partially) financed Barnwell reprocessing facility, as well as the plans for the Clinch River fast breeder, the United States was offering tangible evidence to support its contention that it "no longer regard[s] reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle." [2] Having boldly committed the United States to an indefinite postponement of recycling, Carter administration officials then faced the even more daunting challenge of persuading governments elsewhere to reverse their thinking about plutonium.

For a generation, reprocessing has been seen as the technically logical and economical way to close the backend of the fuel cycle. It would recover depleted uranium and by-product plutonium from the spent fuel of LWRs and, after recycling, leave a more manageable waste product. The American nuclear industry acted on the unquestioned belief that reprocessing would begin when there were sufficient light-water reactors to justify the large-scale facilities needed for economical operation, and that plutonium would be recycled in light-water reactors until fast-breeder reactors were introduced. Recycling of separated plutonium was seen as serving the triple end of extending the life of available fuel resources, mitigating the problem of waste disposal, and providing a useful link to breeder technology. The private nuclear industry imparted these assumptions to foreign manufacturers, utilities and atomic energy authorities. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its successor, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), encouraged and materially supported development of com-

[1] Statement by President Carter on nuclear power policy, April 7, 1977.
[2] Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Houston, Texas, June 30, 1977.

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mercial reprocessing.[3] At the same time, they neglected the study of techniques for spent fuel storage and disposal, while drafting agreements for cooperation which permitted, or did not require explicit sanction for, the separation of plutonium from U.S.-supplied low-enriched uranium (LEU).

The widespread belief in the practicality and desirability of plutonium recycling has thus been incorporated into the plans and programs of other countries (some of which have far greater incentive than does the United States to search out new energy sources). For the West Europeans and Japanese, perfection of reprocessing techniques was the logical next step in their growing reliance on nuclear power to meet civilian energy needs. For those states harboring an ulterior interest in weapons acquisition, reprocessing facilities could provide a screen for gaining access to plutonium on what would appear as acceptable commercial grounds. South Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan are three countries that have been quick to see technical and economic virtues in recycling plutonium fuels. As the preceding cases indicate, the U.S. government has in the past fostered a view of the nuclear fuel cycle that in effect provides a set of reasonable arguments for countries to go ahead and endow themselves with the wherewithal that brings them to the brink of nuclear armament. Any country with a reprocessing plant on its territory has direct access to the prime bomb-making material — plutonium — and hence is an incipient nuclear-armed state. (Pessimists would say this is true even with access to the mixed oxide [MOX] fuel assemblies into which reprocessed plutonium is fabricated — along with small amounts of LEU.) With preliminary engineering and ordnance work done in advance, as the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has warned, the lead time for bomb manufacture could shrink to weeks or even days.[4] This drastic compression of the time scale is why Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance Joseph Nye, Carter's chief official on nonproliferation, has anxiously argued that "the new plutonium technology threatens to empty safeguards of their central political meaning, which is time for diplomacy to work."[5] Yet, to accept the judgment that the commercial spread of reprocessing technology is tantamount to proliferation, is to acknowledge a case for restricting (or significantly modifying) the development of an

[3] See, for example, the review of past policy in *Science*, April 1, 1977: "Reprocessing: How Necessary Is It for the Near-Term?"

[4] ACDA, *Annual Report, 1976*.

[5] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 29, 1977.

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entire class of nuclear technologies — technologies that are honestly seen by many governments as crucial to their energy future and economic well-being.

This is the crux of Washington's current nonproliferation dilemma. Officials now confront four awkward problems: (1) how to make plausible to Japan and those governments in Western Europe that are programmatically and financially committed to reprocessing that it is in their interest to hold their plans for plutonium in abeyance, in order not to lend commercial credibility to civilian reprocessing in its present form; (2) failing to achieve a complete moratorium on reprocessing, how to avoid drawing a new line of discrimination on the civil side of nuclear power, between those nonweapons states (e.g., West Germany) that might reprocess and those (e.g., South Korea) that might be coerced into not doing so; (3) how to shape an incentive program of fuel assurances and spent-fuel disposal arrangements sufficiently attractive (to both classes of countries) as to remove any legitimate economic/energy security interest in reprocessing; (4) to determine the optimal mix of coercion and inducement in American policies directed at industrially advanced countries competent in reprocessing technologies (which countries are also potential suppliers of sensitive technologies), on the one hand, and, on the other, consumer countries dependent on external supply of reactors and fuels, whose access to plutonium fuels would also arouse acute proliferation worries.

The goal is to fashion a set of agreements that are at once sensitive to the specific interests, opportunities and vulnerabilities created by particular national circumstances and, yet, sufficiently uniform and consistent to constitute a viable institutional framework for international nuclear transactions. The diplomatic agenda is a long one; the list of U.S. objectives, formidable. To accomplish them, Washington must manage to realign diverse national programs with reformed international fuel-cycle arrangements in order to make both broadly congruent with U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

The Diplomatic Agenda

Before we look at how the Carter administration has navigated this adventuresome diplomatic course, it should be helpful to lay out just what the United States would like to achieve, together with its expectations from each of the national clusters with which it is dealing:

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A. *From the "Suppliers' Club"*
   1. An unequivocal commitment to withhold all sensitive facilities, including reprocessing, from the world market.
   2. A joint requirement for strict full-cycle safeguards as a condition for reactor and fuel exports to consumer countries.
   3. Participation in a fuel-assurance program which guarantees a reliable supply of LEU fuels for those consumers that accept restrictions on sensitive fuel-fabrication facilities and meet safeguards conditions.
   4. Earnest participation in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation program (INFCE) for reviewing and evaluating near- and long-term alternative techniques and technologies with a view to identifying those which are advantageous from a nonproliferation standpoint and which are economically viable.[6]

B. *From the Japanese and West Europeans Having Plans for Commercial Reprocessing*
   1. The deferral of commercial separation and recycling of plutonium in mixed oxide form in LWRs.
   2. Slowing of LMBR development, pending the outcome of the INFCE review.
   3. As a second-best, fallback position (failing deferral of reprocessing and the LMBR), acceptance of technical modifications — e.g., the co-processing technique recently agreed to by Japan for its Tokai-maru plant — that are preferable models from a proliferation standpoint.[7] (In co-processing, the plu-

[6] The INFCE, whose organizing conference was held in Washington in October 1977, has taken the form of a set of coordinated research and study programs loosely coordinated under IAEA auspices. One facet of the program will consider fuel assurances and spent-fuel management; the other will assess fuel-cycle alternatives. In the latter sphere, most of the attention has focused on strikingly new alternatives: the thorium cycle, the tandem cycle, and others. The more practical and politically significant part of the review is concerned with possible variations of the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle, which entails the recycling of plutonium separated from the spent fuel of LWRs (for use in LWRs and as start-up fuel for breeder reactors). This part of the exercise will examine such techniques as co-processing of plutonium and uranium separated from spent fuel, the "spiking" of the resulting MOX fuels to avoid the accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium in fuel assemblies, and various means of operating breeder reactors in order to avoid making plutonium available in a readily accessible form.

[7] The agreement with Tokyo, signed in September 1977 after trying negotiations, allows the Japanese to open their plant on an experimental basis for two years. Only a limited amount of plutonium will be produced in nitrate form; its conversion to fuel will be postponed while joint studies are made of co-processing and related techniques that avoid the production of pure plutonium. The accord was an ambiguous achievement for the Carter administration. While it postponed commercial reprocessing, pending technical modifications, in recognition of the proliferation danger, it did sanction recycling on a limited scale. The lack of Japanese enthusiasm for a plutonium moratorium was evinced in May 1978 by Tokyo's decision to enter into long-term

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tonium and uranium streams are mingled, making extraction of the plutonium dependent on more complicated, and more readily detectable, separation processes). And/or, to consider embedding any reprocessing facilities in multinational arrangements, thereby avoiding the precedent of a purely national closure of the fuel cycle.

C. *From the Suppliers of Natural Uranium (Principally Australia, Canada and South Africa)*
   1. Broad agreement on export conditions in line with the U.S. goal of consumer acceptance of complete system safeguards and a veto over national reprocessing (but *not* rigid, inflexible rules that cannot be adapted to individual national circumstances).
   2. An undertaking to earmark some portion of their supply for a strategic reserve, which would stand as a physical guarantee of assured natural uranium, protected against politically motivated interruption (i.e., for reasons other than those specified by the NPT and bilateral agreements of cooperation).

D. *From Consumers Not Having Proficiency in Sensitive Technologies*
   1. Agreement not to purchase or develop reprocessing facilities or to use plutonium fuels, pending the outcome of the INFCE.
   2. Participation in a multilateral program to provide an assured supply of LEU fuels on a reliable, economical basis (along with safe disposal of spent-fuel loads).
   3. Acceptance of complete fuel-cycle safeguards and an American veto over the reprocessing of U.S.-supplied LEU fuels as a condition for sale of power plants and fuels.

Three immediate conclusions can be drawn from this catalogue of diplomatic objectives. *First,* the simple distinction commonly made between nuclear "suppliers" and "consumers" is not very informative and is certainly inadequate to describe the complex of relationships based on differential access to natural uranium, reactors and fuel-fabrication technologies, as well as on weapons status.[8] All states (outside the Soviet bloc) using nuclear materials to

contracts with the United Kingdom and France, which are to take spent Japanese fuel and reprocess its plutonium. The agreement is coupled with Japan's commitment of $1 billion to finance development of the Windscale and La Hague facilities. Clearly, the Japanese retain a belief in the need and appropriateness of plutonium recycling. See the *New York Times,* September 1, 1977, and the *Washington Post,* May 20, 1978.

[8] Equal diversity is found in the magnitude and seriousness of the various countries' waste-disposal problems. The most acute pressures to resolve the problem of disposal, through external storage and/or reprocessing, exist in those countries with

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generate electricity have relied on American enrichment services for their LEU, and this situation will not change until the European Eurodiff and Urenco plants begin commercial operation in the early 1980s. Only a few countries with nuclear programs have indigenous natural uranium available to them. Among the technically proficient industrial states, France alone (aside from the North Americans) has secure access to reserves adequate to meet its needs. Others obtain the bulk of their natural uranium feed from four principal suppliers: the United States, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Among these suppliers, the first three share strong anxieties about the dangers of proliferation, especially in regard to the widespread availability of plutonium as an outgrowth of commercial reprocessing. They are now consulting informally on possible fuel-assurance guarantees and on setting common export criteria — an effort that has run up against marked political differences, of a domestic as well as a foreign policy nature.

Yet, three recent or prospective proliferators — India, Brazil and South Africa — possess enough natural uranium to gain some measure of protection against this additional, potentially constraining external influence on their national programs. South Africa's position is the most anomalous and diplomatically disruptive. Pretoria might well be inclined to join in a de facto natural-uranium suppliers' cartel, while still taking advantage of its resources to develop enrichment facilities and acquire the wherewithal for bomb manufacture. To complicate the picture further, nuclear-weapons states (the United States, France, Britain) and nonweapons states (West Germany, Canada, Japan) are numbered among those having knowledge of, and the ability to supply, sensitive technologies. The nonproliferation argument against reprocessing plutonium cannot fail to lose cogency when some nonweapons states are already endowed with the technical and material means for bomb manufacture, however probable the chances of surreptitious activity being discovered.[9]

(a) substantial numbers of civilian reactors and (b) legal, political or geological difficulties that accentuate the need for more secure disposal than is provided by the conventional, above-ground storage basin. West Germany and Japan face this situation. (Some governments, keen to credit their interest in the purchase of reprocessing facilities—e.g., Islamabad—have been all too ready to exaggerate future operating capacity and prospective waste-management problems.)

[9] To salvage the administration's position on reprocessing, should the West Europeans and/or Japanese move ahead with the recycling of plutonium fuels, Washington could attempt to tie the plutonium moratorium to its fuel-assurance and waste-management incentive program. In the event reprocessing had become an established fact of life, the United States might accept (or even encourage) a fuel exchange between "secure" countries, doing the reprocessing, and "less secure" countries. The

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The *second* feature highlighted by a survey of the diplomatic field of action is that the United States has few coercive instruments at hand, and those available are ill-suited to the delicate task at hand. In theory, Washington could bludgeon the Europeans and Japanese into putting off indefinitely their reprocessing and breeder-reactor plans by threatening to withhold future delivery of LEU. It could also bluntly inform less technically proficient consumers that no more fuel will be forthcoming unless they (a) sign a revised agreement of cooperation that renounces reprocessing, (b) adhere to the NPT and (c) open all their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.

As a practical matter, the Carter administration has had good reasons for keeping the sword of an enrichment embargo out of sight. Above all, Washington simply is not prepared to risk a break with its allies over differences of approach to the proliferation problem. However acute the president's concern about the spread of nuclear materials, on the priority lists of those responsible for U.S. foreign policy, the problem still ranks below allied cooperation and maintenance of Western political solidarity. As to neutrals and less industrially advanced friends, there is a deep reluctance to alienate governments by imposing restrictions through diktat. In those few cases where a country feels genuine security anxieties, estrangement would only exacerbate the political problem of reducing incentives for weapons acquisition. More broadly speaking, the legitimate interest of many in developing new energy sources has a better chance of being satisfied in benign ways in an atmosphere unclouded by arbitrary American actions and rancorous exchanges. Administration officials do not see U.S. nonproliferation objectives being achieved in a world populated by a host of discontented, small states nurturing a grievance and desperate for a "quick fix" for their energy/security needs. With the end of an effective American monopoly over critical technologies and services, "pushers" would not be hard to find.

The Carter administration's dilemma is inescapable: without European and Japanese forbearance on reprocessing, its nonproliferation strategy is launched with a badly damaged hull; yet,

latter would be asked to relinquish their spent fuel for recycling, in return for LEU of equivalent value. The difficulty of devising a formula to measure the commercial value of the residual uranium and by-product plutonium against the cost of the LEU substitute admittedly poses a practical complication. Obviously, though, the more important obstacle is the reluctance of governments to be labeled "less secure" (i.e., less trustworthy) and to be denied access to reprocessing technology and plutonium fuels on those grounds.

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excessive arm-twisting could extract so high a price in withheld support for joint export restrictions, and for participation in the crucial incentives policy, as to doom it to failure. (Indeed, the United States might wind up even worse off than when it started, once the Europeans break their dependence on U.S. enrichment services.)[10]

By implication, a *third* truth to be extracted from this melange of nuclear interactions is that the Carter policy's fate lies with the attractiveness of the inducements it offers, and with the persuasiveness of its appeals for others to accept the American vision of a militarily neutral, economically beneficial nuclear future. The bold scope of its ends and the dearth of usable leverage points allow for no other conclusion. Education and the proffering of incentives go hand in hand. One listens more attentively when there is something on the table, while the instructor-host impresses on the subject just how valuable that something is. In this case, the United States is hosting three seances simultaneously. In communion with the technically proficient, it espouses the cause of self-restraint in regard to plutonium, while urging their active collaboration in a program of fuel assurances which is the centerpiece of the incentive package being presented to consumers.[11] At another level, Washington has initiated informal talks among the main suppliers of natural uranium, seeking a consensus on export ground rules and agreement on a general program for assured supply. Finally, there is a battery of bilateral discussions and multilateral meetings, in the INFCE and other forums, with technically nonproficient nuclear consumers dependent on external fuel sources.

The U.S. Lesson Book

Three principal themes make up the American position on nuclear power, weapons proliferation and related subjects:

[10] The threat to withhold enrichment services also involves the abrogation of contracts — not a desirable precedent when one is stressing the serious consequences of a prospective proliferator's violation of *its* pledge. Specifically, an American failure to honor its commitment to supply enriched uranium, or a unilateral U.S. imposition of new contractual conditions, would gravely weaken the United States' credibility as a reliable source of enrichment services at a time when Washington is striving to repair the damage done by the sudden, disconcerting closure of the order books in August 1974 — an action that has been widely identified as the factor precipitating (or at least providing a ready excuse for) the consumer countries' quest for national fuel-fabrication facilities.

[11] The "sweeteners" are (a) the prospects of acquiring, at no cost, some useful technical know-how through the INFCE; (b) American help in getting them off political/legal hooks having to do with waste disposal by offering disposal sites in the United States; and (c) promises of natural-uranium supplies.

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A. *Entry now into a plutonium economy is premature.* Uncertainties in the cost estimates for plutonium recycling suggest no obvious savings over continued reliance on LEU fuels, including cost for storage of spent reactor fuel without reprocessing. There will be ample supplies of natural uranium available to provide fuel loads, at reasonable prices, for all the world's LWRs, as now projected, for thirty years; and a surfeit of enrichment capacity by the mid-1980s. As summed up by Joseph Nye: "The widespread commercialization of plutonium is at least 10 years away. We may well enter into the plutonium economy some day, but I think we had better improve our institutional framework before we do so." [12]

B. *Nations have a proper, often necessary, interest in expanding the use of nuclear energy as a civilian power source.* Their concern about dependence on external sources of fuel for LWRs is understandable. Therefore, the United States is actively exploring bilateral and multilateral arrangements that will guarantee the "supply of enrichment services for non-sensitive nuclear fuels on a timely, adequate, reliable and economic basis." [13] It is also aware of the waste-management problem confronting many governments and is taking initiatives "to ensure there is sufficient spent fuel and nuclear waste storage capacity at the back end of the fuel cycle." [14] These measures should provide incentives for countries not to seek national closure of the fuel cycle through reprocessing.

C. *International stability is enhanced, and the security of each nation strengthened, by maintaining a safe distance between the commercial fuel cycle and the military uses of nuclear energy.* Present reprocessing techniques carry a severe proliferation risk. To permit their widespread dissemination is to put temptation in the way of potential proliferators and to heighten security anxieties all around by greatly diminishing the available time for detecting, and moving to counteract, a violation of safeguards arrangements.

Taken together, then, the risks to peace and security that are inherent in reprocessing, its uncertain economic benefits, and the availability of the resources to extend the life of the current nu-

[12] See fn. 5, above.
[13] *Ibid.* (Reiterated by President Carter in October 1977 before the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference.)
[14] *Ibid*

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clear fuel cycle — all point to the reasonable conclusion that national decisions to enter the plutonium economy now are unwarranted and unwise.

Energy Security and National Security

If the Carter administration's nonproliferation policymakers sometimes seem like the fabled Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, it is because the tides of technology and the quest for energy security are running strongly against them. In the industrial countries, several plants for the commercial separation of plutonium already have been built and are near operation: at La Hague, where the French government has contracted for reprocessing services;[15] at the Mol (Belgium) facility owned by the Eurochemic multinational consortium; at the British Windscale facility; and at the Japanese Tokai site, where agreement was reached (in 1977) on an interim test period. Several others are in advanced stages of planning. In addition, the first sale of a reprocessing plant has now been reaffirmed by France and Pakistan, thus straining the suppliers' agreement to embargo sensitive technologies. As to the fast breeder, interest is undiminished. France has yet to indicate any readiness to slow development of its technically successful Phénix breeder, and R&D programs continue elsewhere in Europe. Although agreeing to join in the international fuel cycle review, Western governments barely disguise their skepticism of alternatives to the uranium-plutonium breeder and demonstrate equivocal interest in technical variations.

The European and Japanese attitude is a reflection of their vulnerable energy position and of their lack of technological flexibility. Their reprocessing and, in the case of France, fast-breeder programs, which the United States would like to see postponed, represent a substantial investment of technical, organizational and, in some instances, political resources. The Carter administration's self-denying injunction on plutonium fuels was meant as dramatic testimony to the plutonium danger, but other governments have been inclined to read the testimony differently — as evidence of the United States' superior overall energy position, of its uniquely rich technological endowment, and of its financial strength (as well as revealing a residual strain of political Don Quixotism). No other Western country has the resources, self-assurance or political lati-

[15] France, despite its seemingly unalterable commitment to reprocessing, has given some indications that it will consider co-processing at La Hague.

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tude to cancel so precipitously projects previously publicized as critical to national welfare and at an opportunity cost of tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars. The intrinsic appeal of plutonium recyling is its promise of energy self-sufficiency. The recyling of separated plutonium fuel into LWRs would extend the life of LEU fuels by only 20 per cent or so. The fast breeder, however, does have the potential of providing a near limitless energy source; and attitudes toward reprocessing are colored by the presumed link to fast breeders.[16] Although the connection may be forced, and the promise of fast breeders exaggerated, it nevertheless casts a shadow over efforts to win acceptance of a recycling moratorium. Earlier Suppliers' Club restrictions on the civilian nuclear industry could be more easily swallowed. The blockage of export markets for sensitive fuel-fabrication facilities, and the resultant large loss of foreign earnings, could be reluctantly accepted, in the light of their apparent proliferation danger. However, to forgo the expected fruits of enhanced energy independence from hard-won technological achievements in the reprocessing and fast-breeder field (which Europe and Japan see as posing a proliferation threat only by example and inference) constitutes a sacrifice that can only be accepted if that action removes an equivalent threat to national well-being.

Fuel Assurances for Consumers

The perceived link between reprocessing and fast breeders also complicates the campaign to enlist technically nonproficient consumer states in a fuel-assurance program predicated on the indefinite postponement of plutonium fuels (which offer the long-term hope of attaining a measure of energy self-sufficiency, and which, by their denial, heighten awareness of present vulnerabilities). The point of the fuel-assurance proposals, together with the open invitation to participate in the international fuel-cycle review with its implied commitment to a share in future technologies, is to reassure consumer countries that they will not be disadvantaged by relinquishing, in the near term, their claim to reprocessing technology. Ideally, the incentives should be made so attractive that their rejection could logically be taken as prima facie evidence of an ulterior (i.e., military) interest in acquiring a reprocessing capability. To serve as a true litmus test separating those with valid economic

[16] The Carter administration is correct in claiming that reprocessing today is not an integral step in fast-breeder development, either for the light-metal breeder or other, related technology. Fast breeders require relatively small amounts of plutonium as start-up fuel, of which there need be no accumulation now.

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concerns from the prospective proliferators, the assurances would have to approximate ironclad guarantees. As the following summary of proposals (tabled or pending) shows, the American-led suppliers are unable or unwilling to be so definite. Even the most generous terms under consideration are qualified with respect to amounts, price and certitude of availability.

An International Fuel Bank

The concept that has shaped official thinking on fuel assurances is that of an international reserve of LEU fuels. President Carter has sketched the American conception of a nuclear-fuel bank in very broad strokes, leaving the participants considerable latitude to shape an arrangement satisfactory to the several interests represented. It will not be easy, for a way has yet to be found to reconcile the American/supplier commitment to strict export conditions with the consumer resistance to terms of access that accord control over supply to other governments. There are several variations on the fuel bank idea. In the simplest version, an informal consortium of supplier states would enter into a series of multilateral arrangements to offer mutual backing for fuel-delivery contracts. The scheme would encompass both natural-uranium feed and enrichment services. For the natural-uranium portion of the program, major national producers would contribute a fixed amount of "yellowcake," perhaps a given percentage of contracted capacity, to a reserve stock which would act as insurance against disruption of deliveries by a primary contractor. The buffer stock thus created might be tapped whether a disruption were politically motivated or the result of supply bottlenecks. The plan for enrichment services involves a similar cross-contracting arrangement. American and European authorities would allot a small portion of their enrichment capacity, say 5 per cent, to be held available to compensate for inordinate delays or interruptions in the delivery schedule from a particular facility to Country X. The multiplication of supply sources is also seen as easing the problem raised by the semiautonomous Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which, under the 1978 Nonproliferation Act, retains the power to impede or delay the granting of export licenses.

The aim of these schemes is to improve supply credibility through the diversification of sources and the assumption of mutual obligations by supplier states. *The guarantee is limited, not absolute.* A consumer country would remain susceptible to cutoff if con-

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tributors to the program were to act together to punish a state whose conduct (e.g., violation of NPT provisions or bilateral pledges) they deemed to warrant sanctions. The assurance is against sudden shifts of policy by an individual supplier acting arbitrarily, whether for political ends or because of internal government complications. President Carter, at the INFCE Conference, spoke of a "reservoir of fuel" to be used in the event of a "temporary breakdown in the bilateral supply" of enriched uranium for power reactors. He did not preclude a meeting of minds among all suppliers as to the seriousness of opposing in concert the ambitions of a potential proliferator.

The fuel-assurance program could, in effect, enthrone two cartels. For natural-uranium feed, the result would be to solidify politically what is now a rather decentralized commercial activity under very loose governmental direction. As to enrichment services, by bringing the developing European facilities into a contractual understanding with American plants, a cartel would be substituted for the present American monopoly. The confidence factor would change only in proportion to a consumer's estimate of the likely degree of convergence in U.S. and European interests and attitudes toward proliferation and according to how exacting the common conditions imposed on exports will be.

One answer to possible consumer uneasiness about the enrichment cartel would be the actual stockpiling of LEU as a pledge of the suppliers' good intentions. A reserve stock would serve as an important symbolic gesture and as insulation from the impact of a purposeful and precipitate cutoff. The stock, though, could not be so great as to provide real protection against a calculated joint strategy of sanction: not only would the suppliers be unwilling to assume the financial cost of LEU stockpiling on such a massive scale, it is also unlikely that they could agree on a disbursement formula stipulating actions warranting the withholding of fuel.

The scheme is not meant to provide a consumer country with total security under all contingencies. A complete rupture of nuclear-fuel supplies and/or a long-term embargo could only come about in an extreme crisis, such as that prompted by evidence that the consumer state in question has surreptitiously taken steps toward weapons development. In such a case, nothing short of self-sufficiency in nuclear fuels could protect that state against the cancellation of contracts by suppliers, should they decide that the behavior in question demanded a punitive response. For those governments that simply have an earnest concern about the reliability of LEU supply under normal political circumstances (a concern not

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unfounded in the light of recent perturbations in the international nuclear-fuel market), even a small stockpile could provide tangible evidence of a jointly taken commitment to uninterrupted supply. Location of the stockpile could make a difference. Cost considerations, and organizational simplicity, favor sites in supplier countries. For maximum psychological impact, though, a neutral territory would be preferable. Dispersal of the stock among all consumers seems impractical — administratively and with respect to the total magnitudes that would be required.

Whatever the location, serious thought has been given to a custodial role for the IAEA. That agency is empowered by its charter (Article 12, para. 5a) to serve as a depository for nuclear fuels. The option has never been exercised, although it was discussed in the early days of the organization. Direct IAEA participation in a fuel-storage arrangement could go a long way toward assuaging consumer anxieties about the practical meaning of the buffer stocks. The IAEA figures more prominently in the concept of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA). It is the most far-reaching and drastically innovative version of the fuel bank idea. INFA, as it has been discussed in the INFCE (and urged for serious consideration by the U.S. Congress) would be constituted under IAEA auspices as a multinational body to govern the market in nuclear fuels. As yet, none of the proposals has precisely defined the scope of its mandate or operating format. The idea is that the INFA would (a) act as a contract broker between suppliers and consumers, (b) ensure compliance with contractual provisions and (c) manage the LEU buffer stocks that would be an essential element of the system. There is no doubt that the creation of such a multinational entity would be a powerful inducement for consumers to forgo any plans for independent, national fuel-cycle facilities. Its workability is quite another matter. The plan shares many of the difficulties that face the even more ambitious "multinational fuel center" concept originally advanced by Secretary of State Kissinger as a possible alternative to national reprocessing.

Doubts about the feasibility of multinational arrangements have to do with the following questions: What would be the INFA's authority over the contracting parties? Would the voting arrangements in the organization's governing board be weighted, or would the rule be "one reactor, one vote"? Would there be a fixed term to the organization's life? Will the INFA assume a directive role over other areas of the international fuel cycle, such as reprocessing and fast breeders? What criteria would apply in setting contract condi-

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tions and determining compliance? What provisions would be made for abrogation of a contract? Would these entail an international judicial proceeding? [17]

Plans for an international fuel bank, however constructed, will have to quiet many doubts before they are accepted as sufficient to dampen the lively interest in reprocessing. Three outstanding issues are immediately raised about proposals for assuring LEU fuels: price, availability and reliability.

Prices

The Carter administration has made it clear (as have the governments of other suppliers) that there can be no fixed or guaranteed ceiling price either for natural uranium or SWUs (separative work units). There are special difficulties even in making rough predictions of future price levels. The dramatic rise in the price of yellowcake between 1973 and 1976 was the result of (a) an anticipated growth in demand, (b) a perceived shortage of reserves induced by very conservative official estimates, and (c) the recently revealed machinations of the international producers' cartel. As a consequence, today's prices cannot serve even as a baseline standard of real costs. Any estimate of prices for the next decade is largely guesswork, given the widely divergent assessments of world supplies, projected rates of growth in civilian nuclear power, and the unresolved relationship between the governments of the uranium-rich states and the private corporations that mine, mill and market uranium. The wide confidence margins in price projections make it impossible for a government entering into an LEU fuel-assurance program to determine how the overall costs of LWRs stack up against the costs of plutonium recycling. Whatever price concessions the suppliers might eventually be prepared to make in exchange for consumer acceptance of restrictions on national nuclear programs, they are still not in a position to "guarantee a price for uranium fuel that is less than [the] cost of production," [18] a figure that, at this point, is largely conjecture. Subsidies are out of the question: at the very least, they are unacceptable to Congress.

For somewhat different reasons, SWU rates for enrich-

[17] The promise and problems of truly multinational facilities are analyzed by the contributors to Abram Chayes and W. Bennett Lewis, eds., *International Arrangements for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977). The IAEA has undertaken an exhaustive study of multinationally organized regional centers covering the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Its report appeared last spring: *Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers* (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1977).

[18] President Carter, White House press conference, April 7, 1977.

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ment services pose an equally sticky problem. Confident statements about enrichment capacity *can* be made. By adding the projected capacity of plants under construction in Western Europe and the United States to that of existing facilities, one gets a clear surplus over demand. Figure estimates of future requirements for LEU fuel, while very "soft," nevertheless all point to a demand substantially less than the available supply. Enrichment services, in contrast to the natural-uranium market, are concentrated under government direction and ownership. In theory, then, it should be a simple matter to fix a rate schedule less liable to drastic fluctuations than is the unsettled natural-uranium market.

In practice, though, stable SWU rates will not be easy to achieve. In all supplier countries, there are strong financial and political pressures to put nuclear enrichment on a businesslike basis — with attendant pricing uncertainties. In late 1976, ERDA (now consolidated into the new Department of Energy) projected an increase in SWU rates to $76, based on a statutory formula of change to recover government costs over a reasonable period of time.[19] Prices will rise to $90 if Congress approves a proposed amendment to the ERDA authorization bill for FY 1978.[20] These levels, well above current rates (which are already twice the rates of the early 1970s), would diminish the attractiveness of the fuel-assurance package. If the figures reflect genuine cost increases, and reasonable rates of recovery of initial capital investment, there will be little room for moderating the rate rise without prompting an outcry against the "subsidy of nuclear power." Discriminatory rates, favoring foreign buyers over U.S. public utilities, even more obviously are politically out of the question. As to an across-the-board subsidy, it would have to meet political opposition as well as objections from the economy-minded Office of Management and Budget.

Availability

Concern over fuel availability focuses on natural-uranium reserves, not on enrichment services (as it did a few years ago). The guarantees contained in the fuel-assurance program are directed specifically at a politically motivated cutoff. They do not address the issue of shortages. While the Carter administration affirms that there are sufficient world reserves to meet global demand through the end of the century, the plan offers no certainty of long-term

[19] *Fact Sheet: The President's Plan for a Competitive Nuclear Fuel Industry*, October 29, 1977.

[20] *Nucleonics Week*, May 26, 1977.

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supply. Washington is not in a position to make such an offer, even if it were so inclined.

Most striking to the consumer in this regard is that the numbers vary wildly. The Ford/Mitre study, which has strongly influenced the thinking of the Carter administration, estimates known and potential natural resources at 8,120 (thousand tons) globally.[21] This is substantially more optimistic than earlier ERDA estimates. It also exceeds the projection in a joint report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA which cited a figure of 5,760.[22] The official estimate of America's reserves has fluctuated considerably (now standing at 3,700, available at less than $50 per pound).[23] Numbers as divergent as these do little to inspire confidence on the part of consumer-state governments. This is especially the case for those without the expertise to make assessments of their own. For them, the dominating truth is that nobody knows for sure how much natural uranium is out there. Moreover, those who purport to know are seen to have an interest in persuading consumers that reality lies in the direction of the optimistic figures. Unable to affect the supply situation directly, the consumer states are being asked to place their trust in an energy resource that is both beyond their control, and in uncertain supply.

Reliability

Mutually reinforcing doubts about natural-uranium feed and the cost of enrichment services combine with latent anxieties about the predictability of U.S. export licensing to make reliability the underlying issue of the LEU fuel-assurance program. They also, by implication, brighten the image of reprocessing and, eventually, of the fast breeder, as the true answer to energy needs. The United States' reputation as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels has never fully recovered from the damage done by the 1974 closure of the order books on enrichment services. Subsequent vagaries in export licensing, and the dispute over who in the U.S. government should be responsible for making the final decisions on licensing, have done little to restore confidence in Washington's commitments, or in the consistency of its purposes. The Nonproliferation Act, passed after extensive negotiations between the White House and Con-

[21] *Nuclear Power Issues and Choices* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977), p. 43.

[22] *Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand*, A Joint Report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Paris: December 1975).

[23] *Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry: 1976* (Grand Junction, Colo.: ERDA, January 1976).

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gress, contains revised export-licensing provisions that go some distance in spelling out conditions and specifying procedures. However, the discretion intentionally accorded the president to interpret compliance, along with the perpetuation of shared licensing authority between the president and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, leave an irreducible element of doubt about the surety of American contractual obligations. In the light of recent history, and in the always touchy nuclear circumstances, the new arrangement only marginally enhances the United States' reliability as a supplier. It therefore does little to dissipate the suspicions that already surround the fuel-assurance program.

What Is National Security?

Clearly, the incentive program cannot completely dissolve feelings of vulnerability on the part of nuclear-fuel customers. Nor can it remove all measure of sacrifice in the delay of plutonium recycling. Inducements must be accompanied by agreements that frontally address the issue of energy security and national welfare. The Carter administration has used every forum to make its case strenuously, if not always adroitly or tactfully.

The heart of the nonproliferation argument offered by Washington is that security in energy resources is always relative. Energy independence is not a reasonable objective, even for the United States. The proper question is: What is the margin of gain in protection against interruption of supply, at what cost, by entering into one arrangement instead of another? With the issue framed in this way, the logic of accepting the U.S.-proposed nuclear bargain is developed as follows: (1) Nuclear energy, exploiting whatever technology, can satisfy only a rather small fraction of Country X's national energy needs for the foreseeable future — certainly less than 50 per cent. (2) Fuel assurances now offered to cover that portion of the supply provided by LWRs are manifestly more substantial and credible than those for imported fossil fuels. (3) Given the technical and economic uncertainties attached to plutonium recycling, a move in that direction could not entirely secure the nuclear-energy supply and, even under the most favorable circumstances of commercial development, would not remove susceptibility to the effects of a cutoff in nonnuclear fuels.

To buttress the case made on grounds of economic and technical feasibility, the United States draws attention to the potential security costs of a nuclear quest for energy independence.

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Washington officials are tireless in reminding their foreign interlocutors that the proliferation factor must be accorded its proper negative weight in any equation for estimating the worth of reprocessing. Japan, that most technically proficient and energy-dependent consumer, has been reminded that to proceed with plutonium recycling sets a precedent for South Korea (and Taiwan). How secure would Tokyo feel, it is asked, should the Seoul government come into possession of nuclear weapons and have them available at the time of another North-South conflict? Or, Would the prospects for a stable peace in East Asia be improved by a nuclear-armed Taiwan acutely anxious about its fate?

Of course, there is no easy way to make this sort of trade-off among national interests. States rarely do so. It is the aim of U.S. policy, though, to force governments to confront these choices by holding their feet to the proliferation fire. The supposition is that those of clean heart will come through the ordeal with a clear vision of nuclear realities very similar to the American one. But, is it fair to conclude that those who do not flinch will be presumed to harbor a desire to obtain nuclear weapons and, further, to believe that their overall security situation would be strengthened even if their neighbors were inspired to do the same? It might very well be that, despite external pressures and instruction, these states compartmentalize policy issues and simply look much more intently in a narrow line of vision — at the short run rather than the long run. In the end, then, the fate of the administration's nonproliferation strategy depends on the readiness of states to confront harsh realities and tough choices head-on — and to make decisions based on an enlightened, reasonably far-sighted view of their national interests.

How likely is it that governments in the pivotal states ("proficient" suppliers; "nonproficient" consumers) will accept the essential logic of the American argument? A cautious pessimism seems in order. After all, governments live by illusion, and a pervasive illusion today is that of energy security. Mason Willrich has defined that much used term as the "assurance of sufficient energy supplies to permit the national economy to function in a politically acceptable manner." [24] The stress should be on the last phrase. Substantial *dependence* is unavoidable for all but a handful of fortunately endowed countries. *Susceptibility* to economic disruption through the actions of others follows. But political *vulnerability* to

[24] Willrich, *Energy and World Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 46.

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external coercion applied by suppliers will vary according to the nature of the conflict, the precautionary steps taken by the consumer state, and political will (as well as the precise balance of internal and external supply sources). Stockpiling of fossil fuels, together with guaranteed access to buffer stocks of LEU nuclear fuels, could provide a significant margin of freedom to resist the dictates of a supplier (or a suppliers' cartel) — if the crisis that inspires it is compressed into a narrow time frame; and if the dependent state sees the stakes as vital enough to warrant a measure of economic sacrifice. The more protracted the conflict (and "embargo"), the higher the level of sacrifice demanded and the greater the requirement for strong and stable government. Longer, more enduring conflicts with a supplier would pose a formidable threat to an energy-dependent state. As with the short-crisis scenario, though, vulnerability can be only partially mitigated by emphasizing nuclear-power sources and acquiring full-cycle nuclear-fuel facilities. The key variable in these calculations is the willingness of the populace to pay the economic price or, to put it differently, the ability of a government to induce its citizenry to accept the sacrifice. That is the ultimate truth a consumer country must acknowledge in such a hypothetical confrontation — given the inescapably harsh facts of dependence.

Nuclear power encourages another, more dangerous illusion — that of absolute security. A state need not have an explicit plan for nuclear-weapons development for it to derive comfort from the capability of doing so. The potency of the nuclear totem is unmatched. The singular pride that states take in nuclear proficiency (and in access to nuclear materials) testifies to its unique symbolism. It stands for (a) technological competence in a world that prizes scientific achievement, (b) political fortitude and (c) potential military might. The inevitable association of civilian nuclear energy with the ultimate weapon — the great equalizer — colors all perceptions of nuclear matters. Hence, international nuclear transactions are different from all other kinds of technology transfer and do not lend themselves to the conventional modes of organization or regulation.[25]

[25] By comparison, the country that flies Boeing civilian aircraft, or Phantoms, depends on these exceptional, foreign-built planes for its air transport, or its air defense. Yet it feels few, if any, qualms about leaving its aeronautical fate in the hands of others. It sees to it that its nationals are trained to operate and maintain the aircraft, but in most instances governments will not unduly strain themselves to achieve a manufacturing capacity of their own. Admittedly, there are important differences between aircraft, military or civilian, and nuclear facilities. The former are less crucial to the national economic well-being, if not to national defense. Second, they operate on conventional

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Diplomatic Options: Some Recommendations

The Carter administration's strategy is unfolding against a background shaped by the conventional impulses of technological exchange and the exceptional interest of foreign governments in nuclear power — both for civil and military purposes. It is an uncongenial setting in which to win acceptance of the nonproliferation policy that the Carter people have pursued. To be successful (or, to put it differently, to achieve a reasonable measure of success for what is not an all-or-nothing policy), American policy should recognize the limitations of U.S. diplomacy and the formidable problems of timing and phasing that it faces. A few suggestions are in order.

First, the United States should make up its mind about what it is prepared to offer as incentives to the nuclear-proficient and nonproficient; and about what conditions of export it will accept and what sanctions it will impose on whom for doing what. The clear, even public, stipulation of objectives and conditions, does have the drawback of reducing the negotiating flexibility of the U.S. Special Representative Gerald Smith in his approaches to all classes of consumers and suppliers. That loss, however, is more illusory than real. The U.S. government has never demonstrated a national genius for devising elaborate, carefully crafted diplomatic strategies or a talent for their subtly phased implementation. For all the administration's ingenuity and dedication, the conduct of the Carter nonproliferation policy does not suggest a drastic change of governmental character. The incentive program trailed the official proclamation of the new policy by half a year. President Carter himself demonstrated an unfortunate tendency to misspeak. On one occasion, during his April 7, 1977, press conference, he declared that "Germany, Japan and others . . . have a perfect right to go ahead and continue with their own reprocessing efforts," when in fact his administration was implicitly denying such a right where U.S.-supplied fuels were concerned, and when the United States was strenuously urging a total moratorium on reprocessing. At the height of tense negotiations with the Japanese about the future of the Tokai-maru reprocessing facility, moreover, the U.S. Congress,

fuels for which there are many suppliers. Third, the economic cost/benefit ratio is drastically adverse for the small manufacturer. Even when one discounts for these truths, though, they do not adequately explain the extraordinary attraction, however tinged with dread, of things nuclear. It is the demonstrated power of nuclear magic (both white and black) to disturb conventional ideas — about energy, military power and national welfare — that is the prime impediment to a nonproliferation strategy depending on national self-abnegation.

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by prohibiting the proposed oil exchange that would divert North Slope Alaskan oil to the Japanese market, was undermining the administration's strenuous efforts to assuage Tokyo's energy anxieties.

This last instance of policy at cross-purposes highlights a serious handicap to American diplomacy. Apart from the inherent difficulties of implementing a complicated policy, there are important governmental pieces of the puzzle over which the administration has only tenuous control. Domestically, congressional-executive differences on export licensing have been, for the most part, composed (even if the end product has been extraordinarily cumbersome procedures). But there is still financial support to be won for multilateral fuel assurances; there are still political pitfalls to be avoided with respect to the siting of storage facilities for any repatriated nuclear waste; and there is the continuing question of licensing authority. The credibility of the U.S. government in this area depends on its ability to commit the Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, to the extent politically possible, future American administrations. For U.S. proposals to be heard on their merits and have maximum appeal, the legal and political "ducks" must be lined up at home. The simpler and more straightforward the U.S. position, the easier it will be to reach internal consensus and, from there, to make the necessary external commitments.

Internationally, the suppliers of natural uranium (governments and private corporations) and the suppliers of enrichment services have to be brought into the scheme in a consistent, credible way. The task of organizing the latter group is demanding, but there is at least a vehicle for doing so — the Suppliers' Club. Getting a handle on the world uranium market is a more elusive goal (toward which preliminary discussions began in spring 1977 and have continued inconclusively since then). Once again, simplicity and directness would seem more likely to yield a positive outcome than would a many-faceted, floating diplomacy. Focusing on minimal requirements for natural-uranium feed, and tightening contractual obligations, could help to mute debates about long-term reserves and to avoid direct confrontation with the anomalies of South Africa's position and the awkward industry-government relationship.

A *second* caution concerns the dangers of procrastination. When one is asking people to do things counter to their inclinations, counter to what they perceive as their interests, one must hasten to exploit any moment of doubt and irresolution. The Carter pro-

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nouncements of April 1977 were intended to shake, and did shake, governments out of their habitual ways of looking at civilian nuclear power. The time to recast ideas and programs is when old attitudes are loosened — and before the previous tendencies and programs are reasserted and the established interests have recrystallized. A new American president always has special leverage. Everyone listens carefully. Many wish to win his favor. He has the power to set the agenda for allies and the terms of debate on global issues in general.

American political capital, however, is scarce. Doubts about U.S. credibility are pronounced; cynicism about our intentions and skepticism about our understanding of other peoples' interests are rife. Serial approaches that table one proposal after another in the order of a U.S. priority list tempt failure. So does the inability to synchronize the policy's mutually supporting elements. Failure to elicit a positive response to this initial round of proposals (thereby to lay the foundations for a new international regime in nuclear energy) will diminish the chances of success on subsequent proposals and diplomatic initiatives, whatever their intrinsic merits.

The political space is confined. Nonproliferation diplomacy cannot avoid being influenced by other dimensions of foreign policy. At a time of sensitive dealings with many suppliers and consumers, there is an ever-present danger of disadvantageous spillover from economics, security or human rights. The flare-up of major conflict in any of these fields could so poison the diplomatic atmosphere that any effort at regime construction, a chancy venture under any circumstances, would become well nigh impossible. The United States does retain considerable power for positive political construction, but much depends on a congenial environment. Washington's plans are susceptible to contingent factors that the United States is less and less able to control.

The attention of political leadership is fleeting. Political will is not a constant but intermittent — of varying intensity and duration. Where hard decisions impend (whether international or domestic), the opportunity created by an actively engaged president should be exploited. Directness and dispatch are as much conditions for the current administration's winning its nonproliferation gamble as are daring and conviction.

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PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR OPTION AND U.S. POLICY

by Shirin Tahir-Kheli

The acquisition of "sensitive" nuclear technology by developing countries poses a problem for nuclear nonproliferation. The Carter administration has declared the restriction of nuclear capability to be a high-priority item for U.S. foreign policy.[1] Just as the SALT agreements with the USSR would restrict nuclear weapons competition with the United States' chief adversary, a more aggressive policy against states aspiring to membership in the nuclear club is meant to limit the dangers of nuclear proliferation and thereby to avert a nuclear catastrophe.

Pakistan is at the center of the debate on nuclear proliferation. It does not agree with the U.S. position. Rather, the nuclear option is, in the Pakistani view, a means to an end: namely, national security. In the absence of conventional military power and satisfactory diplomatic alternatives to ensure security, the Pakistanis see the nuclear option as a psycho-political, if not a military, weapon — a weapon which would act as a deterrent by presenting to the would-be attacker a credible threat of massive destruction.[2]

In this paper, we shall examine the nature of the nuclear debate between the United States and Pakistan, identify the issues which have divided the two allies, gauge the effects of that disagreement on relations between them, and analyze the prospects for a resolution of differences.

The Nuclear Debate

The position of the United States regarding the spread of nuclear technology has undergone a major change over the past

[1] See text of President Carter's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, October 3, 1977. (*New York Times*, October 4, 1977.)

[2] Military security is the dominant reason that states acquire, or do not acquire nuclear weapons. See William Epstein, "Why States Go — and Don't Go — Nuclear," *Annals* (Special Issue on Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals), March 1977, pp. 16-28.

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two decades. Indeed, Pakistani leaders point out that it was the United States itself which first alerted them to the potential of nuclear programs. The American exhibit "Atoms for Peace" toured Pakistan in 1954 and was seen by hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis in the major cities. The exhibit, which carried a message from President Eisenhower, explained the virtues of this new-found source of alternative answers to man's search for energy, food and medical treatment. It was an impressive exhibit, and those who saw it were undoubtedly convinced of the fact that nuclear energy was a necessity for the modern, developed state.

Soon thereafter, Pakistan inaugurated a scientific research program which has since been centralized in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), whose main role has been the peaceful application of science technology to electrical power, industry and agriculture. PAEC, set up in the mid-1950s, has developed close links with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna which was established in 1957.

PAEC scientists were sent abroad for training, primarily in Britain, France, Canada and the United States, but many remained abroad after their training had been completed, thus rendering the Pakistani science program less effective. However, this trend began reversing itself in the early seventies, partly because of a changed job market for scientists in the West and partly because of a more aggressive recruiting program by PAEC. Hence, a large number of these scientists have now returned to Pakistan and provide a manpower base should Pakistan launch a serious nuclear program.

Most experts agree that to build a simple nuclear (explosive) device, an advanced, domestic technological base is no longer required. Nowadays, it is possible to acquire the needed components on the open market from technologically developed countries. Moreover, both the physical principles and the engineering considerations that underlie the construction of such a device are widely known and can be gleaned by an assiduous student of the physical sciences from unclassified sources available in many good libraries. The problem is how to obtain weapons-grade plutonium.

The controversy over reprocessing plants revolves around this very point, i.e., whether Pakistan should be permitted to gather plutonium by reprocessing the waste-fuel from its reactor, stockpile that plutonium and, in perhaps six to ten years, arrive at the "nuclear threshold." For the United States, the reprocessing issue has become

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a symbol of the Pakistani development of the nuclear option.[3] This view is enhanced by the fact that experts estimate it takes 25,000 to 50,000 megawatts of installed operating capacity, or twenty to fifty nuclear power stations, to justify a commercial reprocessing plant the size of the proposed French one. Since Pakistan has only one nuclear power reactor, in Karachi, the Americans have declared it "obvious" that the real reason behind the Pakistani desire for a reprocessing plant is the further desire to make nuclear weapons. The Pakistani government has disagreed, arguing that they have an integrated plan to acquire some twenty-four nuclear reactors in order to decrease the dependence on foreign oil which costs Pakistan more than $1 million daily — a cost which has crippled the Pakistani economy. On the other hand, the price of a reactor, of the sort that is being sold by the United States today, is around $600 million at very favorable terms, and Americans question Pakistan's ability to pay such a sum.[4]

Dr. Kissinger's two-day visit to Pakistan on August 8 and 9, 1976, was an attempt to get Pakistan to cancel its order for the French-design reprocessing plant. He was unsuccessful in this attempt and departed both Pakistan and France saying it was a matter strictly between them. In the words of French Premier Chirac, as reported in the *Pakistan Times* of August 7, 1976: "It is an agreement between France and Pakistan. It is not for third party States to interfere in what concerns two sovereign States. There is no question of accepting Dr. Kissinger's proposal to settle with the United States an affair which concerns only France and Pakistan." Yet, the United States is worried that Pakistan does possess the long-term capability to become a nuclear power in an unstable region of the world. It also suspects that India's nuclear-power status is the *raison d'être* behind Pakistan's move toward nuclear capability. The Pakistani government, on the other hand, maintains that it has no plans to violate stipulations on the use of the reprocessing plant even though

[3] For Pakistan, it is an outcome of the desire to make itself "increasingly progressive and more self-reliant in the field of nuclear power and nuclear technology." (Statement by the PAEC chairman, *Pakistan Times*, September 30, 1974.)

[4] Iran is paying $1.5 billion for each of the two 1,200-megawatt reactors it has ordered from West Germany's Kraftwerke Union. (These are already being installed near Bushehr.) The Iranian program calls for a 23,000-megawatt capacity by 1994. The proposed Iranian purchase includes six to eight reactors from the United States. In addition, Iran has signed an agreement with the French firm Framatome for two 900-megawatt reactors. It has also begun negotiations with Kraftwerke Union for two more reactors to be located near Isfahan.

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it is concerned about India's nuclear bomb. This is the crux of the disagreement between the two allies.

Pakistani leaders feel that the United States has been heavily involved in the sale of nuclear reactors in the past — to Israel and India, for example — and that it now unjustly pressures France to cancel its agreement with Pakistan. As an example of the United States' involvement, Islamabad cites the fact that Israeli scientific research has had complete access to, and has benefited fully from, American science programs. The Israeli nuclear capability, which is now deliverable, is but an extension of American "know how." India received Canadian reactors and crucial help from the United States in its nuclear development. Moreover, the Indians have been successful in obtaining supplies of (U-235-enriched) nuclear fuel from the United States,[5] although the Republican administrations did suspend such shipments. The United States also supplied the "heavy water" (i.e., deuterium oxide) that was used as a moderator in the Indian reactors and possibly also in India's bomb. French and German reluctance to cancel their deals with Pakistan and Brazil, respectively, is based on suspicion of sinister motivations behind U.S. urgings, fear that the United States wants to monopolize the market in nuclear sales, and apprehension over the detrimental effect on jobs that cancellation of the deals would entail. It is also remembered that the United States has tended to bypass the IAEA and international controls in the past, favoring bilateral contracts for supplying nuclear fuel to importer nations.

The government of Canada has terminated its agreement to supply fuel rods for the nuclear power plant it built in Karachi. This action was taken in response to the Pakistani government's refusal to cancel its plans for the purchase of the reprocessing plant from France. The Canadians are sensitive to the fact that they supplied India with the reactor that was the source of the plutonium used in the Indian nuclear device. Yet, plans are in the making for additional transfers of nuclear technology: American reactors to Israel and Egypt; French reactors to Iran and Libya; German reactors to Iran and Libya; U.S. reactors to Iran; and, for Brazil, reactors, a fuel reprocessing plant and other nuclear technology from Germany.

[5] Washington, it was reported, lifted the ban on American fuel for Indian reactors in return for New Delhi's assurance that India would not proceed with further development of nuclear weapons. (*New York Times*, June 1, 1977.)

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Possible Benefits of "Going Nuclear"

Nuclear technology is seen to be the new technology that can help in solving old but now urgent problems.[6] It can provide energy to countries that have few or no indigenous sources of fuel. The official Pakistani position has been that nuclear technology can help in reducing water shortages in the desert areas of Pakistan by powering desalination plants along the Makran Coast, which is adjacent to the barren areas of Sind and Baluchistan. The economic benefits of this program would be considerable and would therefore justify the expenditure of funds and resources. Furthermore, in socio-economic terms, it is expected to lessen Pakistani dependence on external sources for energy[7] and food and to bring prosperity to areas that are now economically backward, better integrating them into the mainstream of Pakistani life.

Whether or not Pakistan can pay the economic and social costs of a program for channeling nuclear technology into military defense is largely speculation at this stage. But it is clear that in the Pakistani view, any such program would be defensive in nature. Pakistan would hope to prevent an attack against its territorial integrity by making the costs of such an attack very high. A nuclear defense would help neutralize Indian conventional military superiority and might even prompt India to slow down its nuclear weapons development if Pakistan offered to do likewise. Perhaps most important, such a defense would reduce Pakistani dependence on external powers for its national security.

Pakistan's chief antagonist (according to Pakistani perceptions) continues to be India, with the Soviet Union providing an indirect threat. In no way could Pakistan match nuclear weapons with those of the Soviet Union. Nor is it realistic to think that Pakistan can match either Indian technology or India's commitment of resources toward building a nuclear capability. Yet, Pakistan cannot consider the nuclear threat as remote. Thus, it has sought (but failed to get) international guarantees — a kind of nuclear umbrella — that would bring other nuclear powers to its rescue were it to be subjected to "nuclear blackmail." Under the circumstances — i.e., a history of hostile relations, two major wars, the loss of conventional "parity" (prior to 1965, a five-to-one mili-

[6] *Market Survey for Nuclear Power in the Developing Countries* (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1974). The IAEA "optimum" energy solution for Pakistan recommended one reactor in 1982, another in 1987 and one in 1988.

[7] For a discussion of alternative sources of energy, other than nuclear power, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," *Asian Survey*, June 1976, pp. 580-592.

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tary balance in India's favor was considered to be one of parity; now that ratio stands at about fifteen to one), and no assured source of weapons supply — Pakistan may well someday convince itself that it has no choice but to take the nuclear option.

The commotion over the sale of the French reprocessing plant has dramatized the nervousness of countries that in previous years, when Pakistan drew attention to potential sources of conflict on the subcontinent, remained largely unmoved. It has also shaken up the accepted principle of Indian superiority over Pakistan that has marked the post-1971 period. Moreover, it signifies that the big powers are alert only to the nuclear threat and to the dangers of nuclear proliferation which makes that threat more real. The big powers have somehow come to accept the occurrence of conventional wars, the accompanying defeats and territorial occupation — the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and the resultant dismemberment of Pakistan being a case in point. The use of nuclear "devices," on the other hand, is totally unacceptable. The psychological unacceptability of using this weapon stems, of course, from the horrific trauma that followed the dropping of nuclear bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. To hold this weapon, then, is automatically to involve the major powers in the problems that may lead to its use, or in the solutions that may preclude its use.

Regional Powers

Iran and India will both influence and be influenced by the nuclear policy adopted by Islamabad. Both countries probably know that the nuclear option has not yet been taken by Pakistan. India, which is proceeding with its own nuclear program, cannot have been unaware of the impact its 1974 nuclear explosion had on Pakistan — a country with which it has fought two major wars.[8] Any objections from New Delhi would therefore be dismissed as being a case of "prohibiting [to] another what one does oneself," [9] as the Soviets have so aptly put it!

If at all possible, India naturally would like to prevent any decision by Pakistan to "go nuclear." [10] To this end, it can respond in a variety of ways: (a) accelerate its own program, ensuring that

[8] On the chain effects of nuclear proliferation, as well as its incentives and constraints, see Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, "The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research," ORBIS, Summer 1976, pp. 497-524.

[9] *Morning News* (Karachi), August 21, 1976.

[10] For a discussion of the Indian decision to "go nuclear" and possible Pakistani responses, see Hasan Askar Rizvi, *Politics of the Bomb in South Asia* (Lahore: Progressive Series, no. 23, 1975).

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India remains sufficiently ahead of Pakistan in nuclear technology to render the Pakistani threat insignificant in magnitude and defensive in nature; (b) improve relations with Pakistan, thereby reaching some sort of agreement to forswear the use of nuclear weapons; (c) make use of its improving relationship with Iran, persuading Teheran to put pressure on Pakistan to forsake its quest for a reprocessing plant.

Iran — which has earned congressional ire for the masses of sophisticated conventional arms it continues to purchase from the United States — has, under pressure, accepted the idea of multi-national or joint regional centers to reprocess nuclear fuels. Private sources have told me that, in the course of Kissinger's visit to Iran in early August 1976 (prior to Kissinger's visit to Pakistan), the shah stated that "it would really be ridiculous if masses of countries will be in possession of two or three silly little bombs each. So, we are agreeable, if a reprocessing plant is needed in this region, to have it on a multi-national basis."

The United States plans to make the U.S.-Iranian agreement a model for the transfer of nuclear technology to Third World countries. Americans are worried that, lacking specific regional agreements, Iran might someday want to build a nuclear bomb, using fuel reprocessing by-products toward that end. Although Iranians say they need nuclear power, arguing it is their only assurance of energy after their oil runs out, skeptics say that Iran could use its vast reserves of natural gas and, moreover, that solar-energy technology will be available by then.

Iran's objections to a regional center have revolved around its belief that it would have to pay the largest portion of the costs since no other regional power has proposed nuclear programs that match those of Iran. Washington has now accepted the argument about cost-sharing among the purchasers as well as the suppliers of nuclear technology, and because the United States would like to see Pakistan subscribe to the idea of regional centers, it may ask the shah to apply pressure on Pakistan. Iran has special ties with Pakistan, and since the shah seems to be against the idea of "two or three silly little bombs each," and since reprocessing has now been linked to the issue of nuclear proliferation, he may try to persuade the Pakistanis to change their minds and cancel the French deal. After all, the shah does control some of the purse strings, for Pakistan has received sizable aid from Iran.

In reaction to the French-Pakistani agreement, the Soviets have seen the problem of Pakistan as part of the overall danger of nuclear proliferation. While Moscow may be unhappy with any

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proposed program of nuclear weapons — since it would compete with that of Moscow's friend India — it is being cautious in its response. Indeed, American unhappiness over the sale of the French reprocessing plant, the Kissinger visit to Pakistan in August 1976, and American pressure on France to cancel the deal were criticized in the Soviet press. The Soviet newspaper *Socialisticheskaya Industria,* for example, condemned what it called the "campaign against Pakistan's intention to build a plant for processing nuclear fuel, designed by France." Admitting that the problems of exporting nuclear materials is a serious problem of international importance, it stated: "This problem cannot be solved by unilateral bans, with one prohibiting [to] another what one does oneself." [11]

The United States in Pakistani Calculations

The United States will continue to figure importantly in Pakistan's foreign policy. There was a genuine revival of goodwill toward Washington prior to the recent difficulties, and the CENTO pact is considered to be one of the necessary defenses against foreign encroachment. The general feeling seems to be that Pakistan would like to have even closer relations with the United States. The latter can, after all, guarantee Pakistan's military and psychological security as well as its economic well-being.

The Kissinger visit of August 1976 was an occasion for the renewal of American concern for the "security, territorial integrity and independence of Pakistan" and of Pakistani requests for the fulfillment of its defense needs. Interpreting the positive results of Kissinger's visit to Iran — where an arrangement was made for the supply of $10 billion in American weapons over a period of five years — as a sign of American commitment to Iran's security, Prime Minister Bhutto said to Kissinger: "Your visit to Iran is really quintessential of your perceptions of the whole concept of security arrangements. That is why we are so delighted with the outcome of your visit to Iran." [12] According to Bhutto, the United States had recognized Iran's importance in the Indian Ocean region, and Pakistan regarded Iranian security to be unseparable from its own. He was confident that Iran, too, shared this perception of common security. Concluded the prime minister: "If there are small bangs, it does not matter. If there is a big bang, then [the United States] cannot consider Iran's security separate from Pakistan's." [13]

[11] *Morning News,* August 21, 1976.
[12] *Pakistan Times,* August 9, 1976.
[13] *Ibid.*

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Pakistanis feel that Kissinger understood the larger "balance concepts" and was sympathetic to Pakistan's needs. Also, that he remembered Pakistan's assistance in launching the initiative toward Peking. Indeed, Kissinger acknowledged that Pakistan's help in that respect was important for world peace and that the United States would "never forget it." But this appreciation was not going to be extended into a carte blanche for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology, and even in his last days in office, Kissinger tried actively to dissuade both the French and the Pakistanis from going ahead with their agreement.

The Americans have been unimpressed by the fact that Islamabad has agreed to observe all existing IAEA safeguards as a condition for the sale and that it has also signed a separate agreement with France, pledging to use the plant only for peaceful purposes and permitting frequent inspections by France and IAEA observers. Washington argues that these restrictions and safeguards are not foolproof and would thus require, as a minimum, some sort of French veto on the use of fuel after it is reprocessed. France has responded by pointing out that the French-Pakistani agreement goes beyond international regulations and avoids the dangers of proliferation unforeseen by the United States and Canada in their sale of reactors to India. Specifically, the French argue as follows: (a) the French government only approved of the contract after Pakistan signed an agreement, on March 17, 1976, allowing for supervision of the plant by the IAEA, and this was followed by a three-way agreement among France, Pakistan and the IAEA specifying methods of inspection; (b) the agreement was approved by the IAEA's Board of Governors, which includes a representative of the United States; (c) the agreement stipulates that any other plant built by Pakistan using the French reprocessing method would also be subject to IAEA supervision — a clause which goes beyond all existing international regulations. Paris has stated that it will therefore stand by the agreement,[14] although it may seek further safeguards and modifications to ensure that the reprocessing plant does not produce pure plutonium.

President Carter, too, has explained the rationale behind his position. Calling for an end to "the relentless march of technological development which makes nuclear weapons ever more difficult to control," [15] America's president argues that it is the duty

[14] Statement of the French foreign minister that "this contract will be honored by France." (*New York Times*, September 9, 1977.)

[15] Address to the UN General Assembly. (*New York Times*, October 5, 1977.)

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of states possessing sensitive nuclear technology to curb their exports of that technology to countries that aspire to become nuclear nations. Only the limitation of membership in the "terrible [nuclear] club," he argues, can ease the threat of a nuclear disaster. In other words, Carter's position is that the *possession* of nuclear technology inherently creates a threat, since it destabilizes the situation by making every conflict a potentially nuclear one.

Pakistan's response to the Carter policy has been that it is not the possession of the technology itself which threatens international order. Rather, it is the underlying problem of national security, which forces a country to allocate a disproportionate share of its resources to the pursuit of a nuclear option. Islamabad argues that the United States, as an ally of Pakistan, should carefully examine the entire context of Pakistan's security options and recognize the threat Pakistan feels from its neighbors. The United States, say the Pakistanis, should either take the diplomatic initiative in resolving the underlying threat that Pakistan feels — from India and the Soviet Union (via Afghanistan) — or, at the very least, not restrict and hinder the development of Pakistani responses to that threat.

The same sort of argument — namely, that the nuclear option increases the choices open to a state — was used by the United States to justify development of its nuclear arsenal and by India to justify its acquisition of nuclear technology. Thus, Pakistan perceives the United States as applying a double standard in its foreign policy toward the subcontinent and as accepting Indian hegemony.[16] While few challenge Indian superiority over Pakistan, greatly enhanced since 1971, the problem from Islamabad's point of view is that Carter's "tilt" toward India — expressed in various official statements, implied in the reopening of the nuclear-materials pipeline to India, and lately rather dramatically demonstrated by the inclusion of New Delhi (and the pointed exclusion of Islamabad) during the president's December-January 1978 global tour — intensifies the problem by institutionalizing Indian dominance in the region. Despite the gaffe over the open microphone in New Delhi, where Carter was overheard remarking to Secretary Vance that "when we get back, I think we ought to write [Desai] another letter, just cold and very blunt," the fact remains that Carter gave in when the Indian prime minister remained "pretty adamant," calling on the United States to provide India with nuclear fuel — even though India had broken past promises, undertaken a nuclear explosion and

[16] In July 1977, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in New Delhi that the United States expects India to take a "leading" role in South Asia.

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refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In fact, Carter went a step farther by promising shipments of heavy water.

All of this, in direct contradiction of Carter's censure (when he was running for the presidency) of past American policies, which he said "rewarded India with additional supplies of nuclear materials even though India, not an NPT party, used our past aid to explode a nuclear device," leads one to agree with the *Wall Street Journal*'s editorial of January 11, 1978: "In short, where Candidate Carter told the American electorate he would retaliate for Indian duplicity with heavy water, President Carter told the Indians he would help them over the rough spots in their atomic weapons' program." Pakistan — which does not share Carter's sanguine feelings toward Indian leadership — feels a need to break loose from its rather pitiful position by demonstrating that it, too, can stand up and be counted. The nuclear option offers Pakistan the opportunity to acquire the status of a regional power capable of resisting India. As one senior Pakistani official told me: "The Iranians have oil, Indians have Carter as well as the device — it's only fair that Pakistanis should have at least the bomb."

There are also indications that not everyone in India is totally happy with the renewed Indo-American honeymoon. Indira Gandhi — who is once again rising to prominence — stated to me in August 1977 that the United States wants to weaken India by destroying the latter's policy of self-reliance. Mrs. Gandhi went on to say that Washington wants to have its cake and eat it too: that is, when a developing nation comes to the United States for economic assistance, the Americans respond by labeling that country an "international basket case," [17] but when developing countries, such as India, practice self-reliance, they are called arrogant. Thus, the Desai-Carter relationship is seen as a shift away from self-reliance, which pleases the U.S. government because American economic and technological assistance may buy increased Indian dependency.

The Nuclear Option in the Post-Bhutto Era

Statements such as that by Mr. Bhutto after the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 — that Pakistan will, if necessary, "eat grass but produce the bomb" — does little for the credibility of the Pakistani government's claim that it does not want nuclear weapons. Coupled with the fact that Pakistan is not an NPT signatory,[18] such

[17] A reference to the celebrated Kissinger remark about Bangladesh.

[18] The NPT was signed on July 1, 1968, and came into force on March 5, 1970, after ratification by the United States, the USSR, Britain and forty other states. It pledges

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statements are at the root of the U.S.-Pakistani quarrel and are taken by the United States as indicative of a Pakistani desire to match India's nuclear capability.

It is in order, here, to go into some of the history behind that quarrel. Bhutto and his top lieutenants have said, on a number of occasions, that the reprocessing issue is of fundamental importance to the national sovereignty of Pakistan and that Islamabad would brook no outside interference in this matter. According to them, it was a domestic issue, and the United States had no right to interject its own assumptions. U.S.-Pakistani disagreement over the reprocessing plant slowly destroyed the improvement in relations that had come with Yahya's mediation between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The United States had declared that Pakistan's integrity was a "cornerstone of American foreign policy," [19] but once the Pakistani-French deal was signed (March 1976), Washington dropped a recalcitrant Pakistan from its list of priorities. In June, 1977 — one month prior to Bhutto's fall — I was told repeatedly by the leaders of the Pakistani People's Party that the American government had made cancellation of the reprocessing deal a prerequisite for continued U.S. aid to Pakistan. According to one source, the outgoing American ambassador had gone so far as to tell Bhutto bluntly that if he did not back down, he would no longer stay in power! It was after this exchange that the United States is alleged to have supported opposition candidates in the March 1977 election and to have encouraged the street agitation that ensued. Statements by some leaders in the opposition Pakistan National Alliance [20] — among them, Asghar Khan — that the reprocessing deal was not of critical importance have been cited in support of this view.

With the removal of Bhutto from the office of prime minister and the takeover by the military, one might have expected an improvement in U.S.-Pakistani relations. The military was reported to be considerably less committed to the reprocessing plant than was Bhutto. In addition, the new leaders, because of their dependence on American weapons, were unlikely to want a rupture with the United States over the possible development of a Pakistani nuclear device in the distant future. Some senior officers in the military were even reported to have been unhappy over missing an opportunity to

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nontransfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear states, nonacquisition of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states, and strict safeguards on nuclear reactors etc. to be administered by the IAEA.

[19] During Bhutto's state visit to Washington in September 1973.

[20] A coalition of nine political parties that united in opposition to Bhutto.

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get 100 A7s in exchange for doing without the reprocessing plant — an offer Kissinger made in August 1976. Despite all of this, so far there has been no official Pakistani withdrawal from the agreement with France. In fact, the Pakistani secretary-general for foreign affairs, Mr. Agha Shahi, paid a visit to Paris in September 1977 and reconfirmed Pakistan's commitment. This may be a result of the identification of the reprocessing issue in the public mind as a test of national independence — a feeling that was carefully nurtured by the Bhutto regime. Cancellation of the deal under these circumstances could be perceived as a sellout. Even under martial law, it would be a difficult policy decision to make.

U.S. Options

Given Carter's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and his general lack of enthusiasm toward Pakistan, it is reasonable to expect that the United States' strategy will be to try to keep Pakistan from joining the select nuclear club, should it attempt to do so. Let us therefore examine and evaluate the possible options open to the United States for achieving that goal.

The *first* is the use of economic sanctions against Pakistan. These could be very effective at the present time, because the new government faces severe economic difficulties — a legacy from the Bhutto regime and the political turmoil of the past year. Per capita income, for example, actually declined by 2 per cent during 1977, and the trade deficit that year was $1,172 million. An external debt which was $3 billion in 1971 stood at $7 billion in June 1977.[21] At current rates, approximately 33 per cent of Pakistan's exports go toward servicing that debt. During the Bhutto years, the government was able to ignore the gravity of the fiscal situation because of the financial generosity of friendly, oil-rich countries — Iran and Saudi Arabia, in particular. What could not be borrowed was artificially created with the printing press. Inflation became rampant; but increased salaries were paid with more and more paper money, and raised expectations were temporarily satisfied.

The military government inherited this terrible situation and must improve it substantially if total economic collapse is to be prevented. Yet, Islamabad faces tough choices. It cannot get the money from abroad that kept the Bhutto government going. Middle Eastern countries generally cite the political instability in Pakistan as

[21] Speech by Secretary General-in-Chief Ghulam Isaque; reported in *Pakistan Affairs*, September 16, 1977.

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the reason for their reluctance in providing financial aid. Iran is unhappy with the new regime's commitment to Islamic orthodoxy. Saudi Arabia is seemingly peeved because the military coup d'etat pre-empted Saudi mediation between Bhutto and his opposition. All this leaves Pakistan almost bankrupt. Consequently, Pakistan is now susceptible to financial pressure.

Not only has Washington used the Symington Amendment to cut off military aid to Pakistan, it has reduced U.S. economic aid to a trickle. There is evidence that the Carter administration is now pressuring international lending institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to curtail their aid to Pakistan. In addition, the September 1977 meeting of the aid-to-Pakistan consortium was canceled. The reason given for this behavior is that these institutions cannot make new pledges prior to elections in Pakistan. The real reason appears to be to force Pakistan to face the economic consequences of its nuclear policies, which have been unpopular in Washington.

While this sort of economic pressure can be effective in the short run, eventually it is bound to be counterproductive and work against the long-term interests of the United States. The current regime in Pakistan is more favorably disposed toward the United States than any that is likely to follow. Should the Carter administration deny Pakistan access to sources of economic aid, the squeeze will force out the military government. Economic hardship will induce Pakistanis to recall the Bhutto years with fondness, as a time when economic well-being was possible (even though it was a totally artificial creation). It may even help Bhutto or his supporters return to power, and U.S.-Pakistani relations will then take a definite turn for the worse.

A *second option* for Washington is to work through India for an overall reduction of tension in South Asia. Complete normalization of relations between India and Pakistan would help erase the insecurity that nudges Pakistan toward the nuclear option,[22] for while the Desai government's statements denying any desire to develop nuclear weapons are laudatory, they lack credibility in Islamabad in view of the ever-increasing Indian military budget and India's sophisticated nuclear expertise. High-ranking military officers in Pakistan recognize that peace with India is a necessity. Indeed, it is often heard that only peace can enable both countries to develop

[22] The important question is not simply whether there be normalization but how fast will it take place, what its scope will be, and how permanent it is likely to be. (Ashok Kapur, "Nth Powers of the Future," *Annals*, March 1977, pp. 84-95.)

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to their full potential. Another concern expressed in Pakistan is that Mr. Desai may not remain in office very long. Mrs. Gandhi told me during the summer of 1977 that she felt the Janata Party was making a mistake by slowing India's drive toward nuclear self-sufficiency — which her government, she asserted, had nurtured. A return to power by Mrs. Gandhi, then, would certainly accelerate nuclear development in India. Moreover, there are knowledgeable individuals who believe that the Indian Atomic Energy Authority has plans to develop a fusion-bomb capability within the next five years, and that diplomatic protestations to forsake nuclear weapons development — which recently won India a resumption of U.S. and Canadian shipments of nuclear fuel — are a farce. For Pakistan, selective application of sanctions — i.e., no sanctions against India — has weakened the moral case against proliferation. Consequently, for the second option to have any chance of success, the United States would have to convince Pakistan that India will not repeat the surprise it gave the world when, despite "foolproof" safeguards, it suddenly exploded its "peaceful nuclear device."

The United States could take a *third option:* supply Pakistan with conventional weapons. In sufficient quantity, conventional weapons would raise the costs of a nonnuclear attack on Pakistan and would free Pakistan from its siege mentality. Since conventional war is more likely than a nuclear holocaust, Pakistan might forsake the nuclear option altogether as being unnecessary and too costly if it felt its conventional defenses were adequate to meet the most likely contingencies.[23]

There are, however, several difficulties with Option 3. First of all, Pakistan's economic condition would make payment for conventional weapons purchase difficult. The cash-and-carry system in operation today precludes Pakistani access to U.S. weapons, particularly in the absence of Arab financial aid. Second, congressional scrutiny makes large-scale weapon sales to Pakistan difficult at a time when even U.S. sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia (both considered important to the United States) are being criticized. Finally, because weapon sales to Pakistan would have to be justified to Congress on the basis of U.S. national security, the Carter administration's lack of enthusiasm for Pakistan presents difficulties.

A *fourth option* for the United States is to continue pressuring France to cancel the sale of its reprocessing plant to Pakistan.

[23] Bhutto stated in 1975 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons policy was "under constant review" and depended on whether Washington provided Pakistan with sufficient conventional weapons. (*Pakistan Times*, February 7, 1975.)

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Carter applied such pressure privately and at the London summit of May 1977 and, again, in his meeting with the French president in January 1978. Thus far, the French have resisted. President Carter has also adopted a multilateral approach, through the Nuclear Suppliers Group,[24] in order to deny states access to sensitive nuclear technology. He hopes to persuade the group to agree to formal restraints on nuclear-technology export and to discourage free-market competition. France and West Germany have been the special target of American pressure. Both have resisted. In fact, as reported by Joseph Nye (deputy undersecretary of state for security assistance) after the September 20, 1977, meeting in London, "the French did not want to press ahead" [25] with the restraints, did not cancel the deal with Pakistan, and even tried to terminate the existence of the conference!

There is great uncertainty attached to Option 4. President Giscard's government cannot afford to give in (or, rather, to seem to give in) to U.S. pressure, for it would be subject to political attack at home. Both the French Left and the Right would charge the government with betraying national sovereignty. Yet, American pressure has had some effect: French government sources told me in 1977 that Paris would dearly love Pakistan to cancel the deal. Not only would that avoid the complications of French internal politics, France would also not have to pay the heavy financial penalty that unilateral cancellation on their part would entail.

The United States has a *fifth option:* to push for regional centers for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. On economic grounds, the argument is sound since it would render it unnecessary for each state to bear the heavy costs of going it alone. For example, the cost of the French plant to Pakistan is $150 million. Politically, however, regional centers have so far not ben acceptable since they create dependencies that most states want to avoid. The regional concept was touted rather aggressively by Kissinger in 1976 and even won Iranian concurrence. In recent months, however, the shah's enthusiasm is reported to have waned considerably — because of his nagging suspicion that oil-rich Iran will get saddled with the bills and, more important, because of his feeling that no other regional power should have access to nuclear technology at any level.

A *sixth option* has recently been unveiled by the Carter

[24] Set up by the Nixon administration after the Indian nuclear explosion. The original members were the United States, the USSR, France, West Germany, Canada, Britain and Japan. This membership was expanded in 1976 to include other nations at the nuclear threshold: Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland.

[25] *New York Times*, October 3, 1977.

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administration. It has to do with the U.S. government taking over responsibility for the storage and disposal of spent fuel from nuclear reactors, both in the United States and abroad. Speaking at the thirty-eight-nation International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference, President Carter stated that while his proposal would help meet the legitimate needs of the world for nuclear power, it would at the same time prevent them from acquiring uranium reprocessing facilities and breeder reactors, both of which produce weapons-grade plutonium. He added that the United States would contribute technical advice and supplies of enriched uranium so that the fuel bank could begin operation.

Option 6 does appear to entail a more open-minded approach toward the growing demand for nuclear power, but it carries with it several drawbacks. First, administration officials themselves concede that the fuel bank could be used to enforce international controls over the supply and use of nuclear materials. Second, the controls that would be imposed by the bank in lending fuel could easily become a sensitive political issue. In the words of a European delegate to the conference, "We would not be happy with bank standards that served to restrict nuclear development and exports." [26] Third, other nations would be subject to congressional calls for embargoes which might infringe on their national sovereignty. Finally, Option 6 would put the problem of nuclear waste in the U.S. government's hands without providing either a permanent solution or safeguards. The idea of a fuel bank, therefore, is going to need considerable discussion before it can be launched. The unacceptability of this option to Pakistan was reflected by its absence from the conference at which Carter spelled out his proposal.

Finally, the United States has a *seventh option*, calling for the declaration of a nuclear umbrella for Pakistan which would come into operation should Pakistan be subjected to nuclear blackmail. While Islamabad would view this option very favorably, in an age when even America's West European allies question whether Washington will risk a nuclear Armageddon over their defense, it is an option lacking in credibility. Still, the Pakistani government would no doubt be satisfied were the United States to adopt Option 7.

The Nuclear Issue and South Asian Rivalries: Observations

The United States and Pakistan are formal allies. Yet, disagreements between the two countries have grown especially sharp

[26] *Ibid.*, October 20, 1977.

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and varied since the Carter administration assumed office. At the center of the controversy is the debate over the French-Pakistani reprocessing agreement. Washington sees it as a move toward nuclear proliferation; Islamabad has so far refused to consider cancellation of the deal and has resisted U.S. pressure.

President Carter's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and his lack of interest in Pakistan gives the United States several options for dealing with Pakistan. These include economic sanctions, encouragement of an Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, the supply of conventional weapons to Pakistan, pressure on France, regional reprocessing centers, a U.S. fuel bank, and declaration of a nuclear umbrella for Pakistan.

While Pakistan has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons, neither has it declared that it will never do so. Its sensitivity to hostile neighbors, a history of poor Indo-Pakistani relations, its proximity to three nuclear powers, and its identification of the nuclear issue with sovereignty make it difficult for Pakistan to forswear the nuclear option.

The drawbacks of taking that option are many. Alienation of world opinion, a nuclear race with India, the economic costs — these are but a few. A favorably disposed United States is a better guarantee against Soviet and Indian encroachment, and Washington has made it very clear that it would strongly object to a Pakistani nuclear program with military consequences. Yet, Pakistan has been unable to obtain any guarantees against nuclear blackmail by India, and given the record — world acceptance of nonnuclear military takeovers — perhaps only the nuclear option will alert the West to the underlying problems which threaten the security of South Asia and which must be resolved before a new and more equitable relationship can bring lasting peace.

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CANADIAN SEPARATISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

by Howard H. Lentner

In November 1976, Canada was jolted by Quebec's provincial election. Quebec elected a government dedicated to separatism, thus precipitating a crisis that seriously threatens Canada's unity. During the past year and a half, attitudes have become increasingly polarized. As challengers of the status quo, the separatists have held the initiative. But they have been met by a growing defensiveness among Canadians seeking to preserve national unity. Although the crisis must be resolved by Canadians, it holds very serious implications for the United States. Should Canada break up, the United States would face difficult economic and political decisions, some of which might affect the character and territorial definition of the United States itself. In this essay, I will discuss Canada's crisis of unity, the factors that will likely shape its outcome, and the historical forces underlying Canada's relationship with the United States. Finally, I will suggest broad guidelines for U.S. policy toward Canada.

I

With the rise to power of the Parti Québécois, following the November 1976 provincial election, René Lévesque, the party's leader, became Quebec's new premier. Although the campaign themes sounded by Lévesque and his colleagues were chiefly those of ending corruption and establishing effective government, they are committed to Quebec's independence. To sustain its initiative the Quebec government has been encouraging an atmosphere of "inevitability."

Mr. Lévesque expects Quebec to be an independent country by the end of the decade, with only one question remaining: How will independence be attained? For in his view, it is only a matter of time until a majority of Quebecers vote in favor of separatism. Although polls show that fewer than 20 per cent of Quebecers

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favor independence, the respected editor of *Maclean's Magazine*, Peter C. Newman, explained why the separatists are confident of reaching their goal: "By 1978, when the referendum will actually be held, 42% of the Quebec electorate will be between 18-27 years old. This group is almost entirely separatist — and this is what Lévesque really means when he preaches that independence is inevitable." [1]

A sense of inevitability has been fostered not only by preaching, however, for the actions of the Quebec government have also served to engender that atmosphere. The most prominent and controversial act was the passage of Bill 101 in August 1977, proclaiming French the official language of Quebec. It also requires that most children be educated in French-language schools and encourages the use of French in private business.

Although Bill 101 is contrary to the Canadian government's policy and might even be unconstitutional, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced on October 6, 1977, that his government would not take direct action to oppose it. Two direct courses of action available to Trudeau were explicitly rejected by him. The first was disallowance, the power granted to the federal government by the Canadian Constitution to prevent the application of a provincial law. Although this power has fallen into disuse, it remains available. Apparently, Trudeau was persuaded that disallowance would simply lead to passage of a similar bill. He also avoided making a direct court challenge to the bill's constitutionality. Instead, Minister for Federal-Provincial Relations Marc Lalonde announced a much milder policy — that Ottawa would intervene in court cases brought by individual citizens against Bill 101. Athough this policy avoided a direct clash, it showed the difficulty of wresting the initiative from the Quebec government.

While Bill 101 was before the National Assembly (Quebec's legislature), Lévesque cultivated the sense of inevitability in other ways. Assuming a posture like that of the head of a sovereign state, Lévesque offered to negotiate bilateral agreements with the other Canadian provinces, trading concessions on English-language rights for immigrants from those provinces to Quebec in exchange for French-language rights for Quebecers who moved to other provinces. This proposal was rejected by the premiers of the English-speaking provinces, who opposed not only the proposal's divisive-

[1] *Financial Post*, April 30, 1977. It appears now that the referendum will not be held in 1978.

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ness, but also the implicit assumption that Canada was a mere collection of provincial sovereignties.

In addition, the Quebec government plans to hold a plebiscite — the term in current use is "referendum" — though the vote would not have the binding force of a legislative act. Although it has announced neither the date nor the format, the Quebec government issued a white paper at the end of August 1977 proposing ground rules for a plebiscite. The actual form of the question will be determined by legislative act of the National Assembly.

There has always been some ambiguity in the Parti Québécois's position on the form independence would take. Lévesque's view is that Quebec's independence should be accompanied by the formation of a Canadian customs union based on the European Community model. In his January 1977 speech to the Economic Club in New York, Lévesque held out the possibilities of a monetary union and joint economic ventures with Canada, and even a common market embracing the United States. But, economic union has been ruled out by the premiers of Ontario and the four western provinces. Moreover, such choices are subject to domestic pressure in Quebec. The formation recently of the Mouvement pour l'Independence Nationale (MIN) may be indicative of the pressure on Lévesque for an uncompromising position on independence. Thus, it is wishful thinking to project that the Quebec government will modify its goal.

Despite a deeply troubled economy, there has been a growing concern for national unity among English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking federalists. Public opinion polls have clearly reflected the growing cohesion of antiseparatist forces. In a May 1976 Gallup Poll the main opposition party, the Progressive-Conservatives, was preferred by 43 per cent of the voters; Trudeau's Liberal Party, by 31 per cent. But — after the November election in Quebec — public opinion slowly turned around. In February 1977 the Liberals moved ahead by 4 per cent and, by May, achieved a complete reversal, leading the Progressive-Conservatives by a 47 to 32 per cent margin. The opinion polls were confirmed when the Liberals won five of six by-elections in May. In light of the fact that this reversal coincided with the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression, the fall of the Canadian dollar to nearly record-low levels and an unpopular federal policy of wage and price controls, the impact of the Quebec election on the rest of the country is striking.

The public response to the Quebec challenge also has

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been expressed in the many speeches, meetings, and letters to editors concerning national unity. There have been two major conferences dedicated to exploring alternatives to separatism. With strong support from Ontario's premier, William Davis, York University sponsored a Destiny Canada conference, and in October 1977, a National Unity conference was held at the University of Toronto.

Also worth noting is the emergence of a less constructive public response. In his column in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* on October 7, 1977, Norman Webster wrote, "There's evidence that the nasty side of the Canadian character is starting to assert itself, and that can be nasty indeed." Webster said his mail indicated that some English-speaking Canadians were readying their guns. Quoting a *Fortune* article which stated that "young Francophones in Quebec have a growing tendency to equate their position with that of blacks in Rhodesia," Webster observed: "That's preposterous, but it spawns some very ugly thinking."

Private citizens and provincial officials who seek to preserve national unity necessarily look to Ottawa for leadership. Prime Minister Trudeau has actively opposed separatism but has not succeeded in gaining the initiative. He does not have a positive conceptual framework to match that of separatism. In his speeches, Trudeau has sought to arrest the growing sense of inevitability nurtured by the Quebec government. He points to the fact that the Parti Québécois did not receive a vote for independence in November 1976, only an endorsement to provide effective government in Quebec. Yet, he has admitted the possibility of defeat. In a January 1977 television interview, he speculated that "if Quebec were to vote very massively for separation in an election or any other form, I would have failed and I would silently go away." [2] Convinced that such a possibility is far from inevitable, however, Trudeau has taken a number of steps to make Canadian unity attractive for Quebecers.

In July 1977, the prime minister announced the formation of a Task Force on Canadian Unity. He appointed two distinguished Canadians to head this unit: Jean-Luc Pepin, a former cabinet minister, and John Robarts, a former premier of Ontario. The task force has been traveling the country, hearing testimony concerning solutions to the crisis of national unity. Whether this mechanism will be able to produce a politically effective response to Quebec nationalism remains to be seen.

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[2] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1977.

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On September 2, 1977, Prime Minister Trudeau wrote to the provincial premiers to propose a constitutional guarantee of language rights. This initiative, however, was parried by Premier Lévesque when he claimed that such a guarantee would be an improper federal intervention in a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Although Trudeau wrote back to Lévesque on October 6, asking him to reconsider his position, it is hard to foresee anything in the future except a continuing impasse.

Later in September, Trudeau appointed a Quebecer, Jean Chrétien, as minister of finance. This is the first time in Canadian history that a French-speaking minister has held this important portfolio. In the same cabinet shuffle, the prime minister appointed another Quebecer, the hard-working and effective Marc Lalonde, to a new Ministry of State for Federal-Provincial Relations, and he appointed French-speaking Monique Begin to the difficult post of minister of health and welfare.

The 1977 Speech from the Throne — the government's comprehensive statement of its program, delivered by the visiting queen — included economic reforms linked to the question of national unity. The queen also spoke of the possibility of adopting constitutional changes, although these were unspecified.

During the past year constitutional revision has emerged as the favorite alternative to Quebec independence. The most popular version is decentralization, i.e., yielding more power to the provinces. Advocates of this remedy for Canada's ills, however, are faced with the formidable task of developing a response to the separatists' position. In an interview in the *Financial Post,* Dr. Jacques Parizeau, Quebec's minister of finance, was asked if Quebec would opt for decentralization instead of independence. Dr. Parizeau declared: "As far as I'm concerned one of the serious problems of economic policy in Canada, is that the federal government does not have enough power. Given that fact, why on earth should I want Quebec to acquire extreme forms of provincial rights? This would imply that Canada would work even less well than it does now. So obviously what we want is independence. . . ." [3] The unfeasibility of granting greater authority to the provinces was acknowledged in a speech at Dalhousie University by Gordon Robertson, a highly respected and thoughtful senior civil servant. Robertson averred: "The decentralization myth is pervasive but it seems to me that there is really very little more that can be constitu-

[3] *Ibid.,* January 22, 1977.

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tionally decentralized if we want to retain a manageable country with a manageable economy. We are already one of the most decentralized countries on earth." [4]

Long before the 1976 Quebec election, the federal government had done a number of things to try to accommodate Quebec's demands. In the late 1950s, Prime Minister Diefenbaker introduced simultaneous translation into the Canadian House of Commons, which allowed French-speaking members of Parliament to participate in debate in their own language. Another development was "cooperative federalism," a term whose meaning is imprecise but which spurred numerous meetings among high-level federal and provincial officials on a wide range of problems. Under the auspices of cooperative federalism, several programs have been designed to overcome regional disparities, including a national pension plan, federal aid to education (though education falls within provincial jurisdiction), and various taxation schemes. Much of this was accomplished by former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, but it has been continued and expanded under the Trudeau government. Recently, Ottawa has agreed to share control over immigration with the provinces.

One of the most prominent of Trudeau's programs is official bilingualism, i.e., giving every Canadian the right to communicate with his government in his own language. Its implementation has required, of course, that civil servants and judges be bilingual. Not only has this led to French-language training for English-speaking civil servants, it also opens up equal career opportunities in the federal civil service for French-speaking Canadians. Resistance to bilingualism, however, has led to some backtracking by the Trudeau government.

In another area, the symbols of Canada have been changed to reflect only Canada. Signs of the British connection which so many Quebecers had resented have been removed. A Canadian flag was adopted in 1963, and terminology has been changed: the word "royal" has been removed from titles and signs, and phrasings most easily rendered in both languages have been adopted.

Thus, the federal government, especially during Trudeau's term, has tried to offer Quebec a way to achieve its aspirations within a united Canada. Federal policies, however, have not been able to allay the deep nationalist feelings of some Quebecers. If no

[4] *Ibid.*, May 21, 1977.

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commanding alternatives to Quebec independence have emerged, perhaps the reason can be seen in Trudeau's ultimate objective — the transformation of Canadian culture. French and English Canada have remained "two solitudes" having little contact or understanding between them. In promoting bilingualism and in trying to explain to English Canada the necessity of change in order to preserve the country, Trudeau has sought to construct a new culture. Yet, societies are not transformed quickly, and the race between transformation and fragmentation may very well be lost to those who are convinced that the only way to protect French culture and language in North America is to have an independent Quebec.

II

Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of the crisis, some of the factors that will determine the outcome can be identified. It is an old political saw that political outcomes are shaped in large part by the definition of the issue. In Canada, the issue of separatism has been shaped primarily by Quebecers, who have defined the problem as one which only Quebecers need decide. The few voices in Canada arguing that the French-English division does not coincide with provincial boundaries — that French-speaking Canadians live in many different parts of Canada — have not been successful in defining the terms of debate. In the 1960s, national leaders of both major political parties made some concessions to the view that Quebec was a province unique among the ten Canadian provinces. But Prime Minister Trudeau rejected that view and has taken the position that Quebec's aspirations can be realized within a united Canada. Since the victory of the Parti Québécois, Trudeau has promised that any successful referendum in Quebec would be followed by a national referendum. Thus, he has defined the issue as a national one rather than a provincial one. It is difficult to know which terms of debate the Canadian public will be persuaded to accept. Should they accept the issue as defined by Lévesque, Ottawa's position would be seriously weakened, and secession would become difficult to resist. When I recently asked an observer of Canadian politics to assess English Canadian opinion, he told me that it was two-pronged: there is an increasing belligerence to the proposal for an economic union, but there is also "more fatalism in English Canada."

A second factor that will greatly influence the outcome is political organization. Within Quebec, the Parti Québécois not

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only controls the government but has a far more effective electoral organization than the Liberals. From the Quebec election until recently, the Liberals of that province were essentially leaderless. After former Premier Robert Bourassa's resignation from the party leadership following his defeat, an interim leader was selected. It was not until April 1978 that the Quebec Liberals settled on their new leader, Claude Ryan, the respected and influential editor of *Le Devoir,* a prestigious Montreal daily. Whether Ryan, who has no political experience, will be able to provide effective leadership remains to be seen. Since the future may well be determined more by what happens in provincial politics than in national politics, the relative effectiveness of provincial federalists is significant. Moreover, pro-unity strength has been further sapped by the partial loss of what Peter Newman calls the Montreal "establishment," the English-speaking business community. A Canadian government report issued in April 1977 indicated that ninety-one Canadian companies or subsidiaries of American companies had moved their corporate headquarters out of Quebec in the four months following the election. Although no major corporations had moved, Prime Minister Trudeau commented at a press conference: "The best way to insure a separatist victory is not to stay and fight but to run away." [5]

A third factor is leadership. Both Trudeau and Lévesque are Quebecers and both are intelligent, energetic and formidable politicians. They are men of a caliber that would be notable in any political system at any time and, thus, are worthy adversaries in Canada's constitutional struggle.

Pierre Trudeau entered federal politics in 1965 for the express purpose of arranging a federalist solution to Quebec's aspirations. His view was that the Ottawa government had been ineffective in its dealings with Quebec, and that continued ineffectiveness in Ottawa would lead to a separatist triumph. Trudeau rose rapidly and, upon Prime Minister Pearson's retirement in 1968, was chosen to be the Liberal Party's leader.

For Trudeau, there must be no compromise with separatism. His commitment to a united Canada is rooted in profound philosophical beliefs. Trudeau deeply believes in democracy and abhors tyranny. He rejects the idea of a political order based on ethnicity, for in such a state it would be impossible to create "counterweights." Following Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, Trudeau believes that institutional equilibrium based on checks and balances

[5] *Washington Post,* April 29, 1977.

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is necessary to the preservation of individual freedom. For Trudeau, defending the federal system means more than conserving the status quo — it means defending certain fundamental political values.

Trudeau's efforts as prime minister have been directed to making the federal government of Canada more effective and to giving French Canadians the same opportunities, respect and sense of purpose as other Canadians. All these efforts have sought to preserve and strengthen national unity. Although entirely clear and outspoken on these basic principles, Trudeau is, beyond that, a pragmatic, not-at-all doctrinaire leader.

If Trudeau's clarity of thought and expression are regarded by his admirers as virtues, his confidence and his bluntness are regarded by his critics as arrogance and insensitivity. Sometimes, too, his crudities of speech have been an embarrassment to colleagues. Trudeau's success in making the federal government more effective and the 1970 Liberal victory in Quebec led to some smugness in Ottawa. A close associate of Trudeau told me, after the federal election of 1974, that the separatists had been "thrown back" quite impressively, and in 1976, Trudeau declared that "separatism is dead." Any trace of arrogance surely has been erased, however, by the ascendancy of the Parti Québécois.

Trudeau refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the proseparatist position. He has reiterated that the November 1976 election campaign in Quebec was fought on grounds other than separatism. On February 22, 1977, Trudeau assured the U.S. Congress that Canada would remain united, and he has urged American investors to proceed on that assumption.

Prime Minister Trudeau has stated that he will not use force to keep Quebec within Canada, but he warned there might be other leaders who would. One must remember, however, that other political leaders have changed their minds about the use of force when circumstances changed — Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, for example — and that Trudeau, too, has reversed himself on certain issues. Whether Trudeau or another prime minister were to take the lead, the possibility of civil war exists.

Lévesque is as dedicated to separatism as Trudeau is to federalism. A journalist by profession, Lévesque was a member of the Liberal government under Premier Jean Lesage in Quebec in the early 1960s. As minister of natural resources, Lévesque advocated the nationalization of Quebec's hydroelectric power industry — a major plank of the Liberal platform in the 1962 election. Following the Liberals' defeat in the 1966 election, Lévesque left the party and

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formed the Mouvement Souverainete Association. Later, he organized a coalition with the right-wing Ralliement National and other separatists to form the Parti Québécois in October 1968.

Having obtained increasing gains in each election which it contested — in 1970, 1973 and 1976 — the Parti Québécois now forms a government committed to ending corruption, improving the economic situation in Quebec and negotiating independence. Lévesque has sought to reassure the U.S. investment community, specifically in his January 1977 address to the New York Economic Club, of the moderate intentions of his government. He reassured his listeners that the Parti Québécois would preserve continuity with the past. Labeling his economic program "social democratic," along West European lines, he signaled his government's sympathetic treatment of private enterprise by promising that the government's plans for nationalization were limited to the asbestos industry.

III

Throughout Canadian history, there have been contradictory pulls between the profound moral commitment to the continued existence of an independent Canada and other dynamic forces at work on the continent. The similarities in American and Canadian cultures and the substantial exchange of people through tourism and immigration have helped to forge north-south continental ties, but the more powerful forces have been economic and political. The United States and Canada have created a number of mechanisms to solve common problems. In 1909, an International Joint Commission was created to work on boundary waters and other problems of mutual concern. The St. Lawrence Seaway was a joint project, and the Columbia River Treaty provided for sharing hydroelectric power. Canada and the United States were allies in both world wars, and were especially close in World War II. Canada was involved in the original tripartite talks that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, since 1957, the defense of North America has been coordinated through the bilateral mechanism of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

The primary forces exerting a north-south pull, however, are economic. These were apparent as early as the 1870s, and the Canadian pattern of offsetting them was set by Prime Minister John Macdonald's national policy. The centerpiece of Canadian policy was the tariff, but the policy also included the building of exclusively

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Canadian railroads even when economic efficiency pointed to joint American-Canadian enterprise. The issue of free trade was raised but roundly defeated in the election of 1911. Nevertheless, with a vast immigration and a relatively less developed economy, there has persisted in Canada much demand for American capital and technology. Moreover, the dynamism of American enterprise has provided additional pressure to invest in Canada. The close political alliance of the Cold War provided a context in which U.S. direct investment in Canada reached immense proportions. For example, by 1967, Americans owned roughly 45 per cent of manufacturing and 60 per cent of petroleum and natural-gas enterprises in Canada. As the Cold War eased and as American society became less attractive in the wake of violence, urban decay and the Vietnam War, increasing numbers of Canadians became alarmed by the vast U.S. presence in the Canadian economy. Consequently, as the issue of separatism unfolds, it complicates, and temporarily overshadows, the questions posed by Canadian nationalism. If Quebec achieves its independence, we can expect Canadian nationalism to re-emerge into prominence.

Throughout Canada's history, the French-English cleavage has been at the center of national politics, requiring a constant effort to accommodate the two "charter groups" of Canadian society. Moreover, there are other cleavages in Canada (particularly regional ones) which are reinforced by economic disparities, and to some extent, the outcome of Quebec's separatist movement will depend on the persistence of these regional cleavages and economic disparities.

Ontario is the largest and wealthiest of Canada's ten provinces. Although there is no apparent separatist sentiment in Ontario, the province could easily exist as an independent country. It has a large territory and a population of roughly 8 million that enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world.

In the western provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, public sentiment may not be so attached to the idea of a united Canada. The western region is the second wealthiest of Canada. Distant from Ottawa and endowed with tremendous natural resources, this region has been particularly susceptible to north-south pulls from the United States, and small separatist movements have appeared. Cooperation between British Columbia and the American Northwest is partly integrated by the Columbia River Treaty, and American capital and technology are heavily invested in Alberta's oil and natural-gas industries. While Quebec separatism has induced

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the western region to rally behind the standard of Canadian nationalism, the potential exists for a domino effect. Should Quebec secede, the western region might also reject Ottawa. While the western region could exist as an independent country, its secession would almost certainly engender pressures for association with the United States.

The prairie provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, sparsely populated and primarily agricultural, are more likely to be buffeted by the forces around them than to provide a dynamic to engender some such forces. Nevertheless, the response of the leaders and people on the prairies may influence the outcome of the crisis.

Should Quebec succeed in establishing its independence, one of Canada's greatest problems would be the maintenance of communications between the industrial heartland of Ontario and the poorer maritime provinces. Without Quebec, Canada would be "another Pakistan." New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland comprise the least economically developed region of Canada. Generally, sentiment there is likely to be in favor of unity and remaining in Canada — with or without Quebec. The French-speaking community in New Brunswick, however, may, in the long run, cast its lot with Quebec. Or, association with the United States may become attractive, particularly if the northeastern United States regains its former prosperity and economic dynamism.

IV

Historically, Americans have paid little attention to Canada. Americans' images of their northern neighbors are amorphous and based on little knowledge of Canada. Indeed, Canadians are fond of pointing out gaffes made by U.S. presidents. For example: Nixon's identification of Japan as America's greatest trading partner — a position actually held by Canada. When U.S. presidents do not have even elementary knowledge of Canada, is it any wonder that ordinary citizens know so little about this major ally and neighbor?

There are perhaps as many lessons to be learned from the war in Vietnam as there are writers on the subject. But one lesson that can be applied here is that a nation's foreign policy should be based on a rigorous and sensitive understanding of other nations. Canada does not present formidable obstacles of language or a vastly alien culture to make such understanding difficult for Ameri-

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cans. What is required, however, is *attention* to Canadian politics, values and problems.

Undoubtedly, Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to Washington helped to inform President Carter and U.S. congressional leaders about Canada. Beyond that, the National Security Council staff and other government departments in Washington need to pay more attention to Canada. With so many U.S. agencies influencing relations with Canada, and with U.S. interests in Canada so varied, it may be difficult to develop an overall political perspective or to construct a coherent policy from the welter of fragmentary views. Moreover, informed views at the official level are not enough, for political leadership needs broad public support. Interest groups, such as big business and labor unions, will undoubtedly pressure Washington for their own ends, but if the U.S. government is to develop a coherent policy in response to Canada's crisis, an effort must be made to achieve public understanding of Canada's political struggle.

When Prime Minister Trudeau was in Washington in 1969, he told the National Press Club that Canada's position next to the United States was akin to that of a mouse sleeping with an elephant — "You feel every twitch and grunt of the beast." Indeed, Canada is very sensitive to events in the United States. U.S. inflation, for example, places significant inflationary pressure on the Canadian economy. This "sensitivity interdependence," however, to use the phrase coined by political scientists Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, does not mean that the United States can intervene with impunity in Canada.

America's ability deliberately to influence Canadian events is limited by Canadian nationalism. Although nationalist feeling is centered in Ontario, it is sufficiently widespread to support such policies as the Foreign Investment Review Act (a screening program for foreign, particularly American, direct investments in Canada) and requirements for "Canadian content" in radio and television programming. In its more virulent forms, Canadian nationalism has considerable anti-American content. Moreover, in this regard, public opinion tends to be ahead of the government. Thus, any direct American pressure on, or overt interference in, Canada would probably lead to significant nationalistic counterpressures. Given a very competent government in Ottawa, it would be wise for the United States to refrain from intervention. There may arise circumstances in which the United States must act to preserve its own interests, but otherwise, an attitude of understanding and sympathy for Canadian problems is the best posture for the United States.

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When considering U.S. interests in Canada, it is worthwhile to distinguish between the public interest, represented by the government, and private interests — especially those of multinational corporations. These interests can coincide because a stable investment, banking and industrial environment is beneficial both to private businesses and the general public. The most important economic decisions, however, will not be made publicly. There will be thousands of discrete investment decisions made by individual firms. When Premier Lévesque spoke before the Economic Club of New York, he is reported to have received a cool reception. That could hardly have been unexpected, for the prospect of separatism creates uncertainties and thus makes investments riskier. Although Prime Minister Trudeau has urged continued American investment in Quebec, it is hard to see how private investors could do other than calculate the risks before undertaking any new ventures.

Nevertheless, if individual firms try to manipulate the political climate in Canada through their investment decisions, they risk great harm to the broader interests of the United States. For example, a few very large firms might see their long-term profitability enhanced by the breakup of Canada and, consequently, might decide to invest in Quebec. Such a calculation would be based on the logic that enhancement of Quebec's prosperity under the Parti Québécois government would arouse political support for separatism. Another possibility is that American firms might be tempted to shift their investments from Quebec to other parts of Canada, hoping thereby to weaken separatist sentiment among Quebecers. I believe that such calculations severely underestimate the emotional dimension of nationalism. If Canadians perceive such political calculations governing American investment decisions, there would most likely be a political reaction and unpredictable damage to U.S. public interests. In addition, such political reactions would complicate Canada's already difficult problems.

The interests of the American people would best be served if private investment decisions are devoid of intentions to manipulate Canadian politics. The U.S. government, if it does anything at all, should dissuade private firms from becoming political manipulators.

Beyond its interest in continued economic stability and prosperity, the United States has other interests with respect to Canada. The most basic of these is continental defense. With the Soviet Union as the most likely source of aggression on the United States, and with Canada lying in the path of such an attack, the

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defense of Canada is critical to the defense of the United States. In 1938, Franklin Roosevelt recognized our interest in defending Canada; in the missile age, the logic of defending the North American continent, as a single unit, is even more apparent.

The breakup of Canada would pose new, and more difficult, security questions for the United States. Although Canada should not be taken for granted, a united and stable Canada nevertheless poses no security threat to the United States. American officials are spared the security problems that would exist were there a number of small neighbors. At the very least, organizational arrangements for North American defense would become more complex. Moreover, the greater vulnerability of smaller countries might occasion alliances with our adversaries. All these are security concerns that Washington need not face with a united Canada.

The deepest fear of Canadians, as expressed by the historian W. L. Morton in his book *The Canadian Identity,* is that the United States "in some sudden convulsion of the world balance, will simply occupy Canada. Circumstances may easily arise in which the United States would have no more choice than Canada." Although Morton was thinking of broad changes in international circumstances rather than Canadian separatism, the partition of Canada would cause Canadian fears to surface. Likewise, new insecurities would emerge in Washington. It is impossible to predict the consequences of changed attitudes, but it is not unreasonable to envisage American military intervention in the affairs of weaker neighbors to the north.

As an independent ally, Canada has exerted on occasion — the Korean War is an example — a moderating influence on the more extremist tendencies of American foreign policy. On such occasions, Canada's views are scorned by American officials, but in retrospect, they can be seen to have served common interests. Moreover, Canadians have been able to act when the costs of action by the United States appeared to be prohibitive. Thus, in the Suez Crisis, Canada led the way to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force, and in 1964, Canada responded positively to a request by President Johnson to place peacekeeping troops in Cyprus. Ottawa's departures from U.S. foreign policy, exemplified by Canadian trade with Cuba, is the cost of association with an independent ally. But the benefits of Canadian independence have far outweighed the costs.

Just as the partition of Canada would require more com-

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plicated arrangements for mutual defense, so would it require new and tortuous arrangements for managing trade, boundary problems such as pollution and fishing rights, and the various projects jointly operated by Canada and the United States. None of these concerns may be regarded as having the same significance as the major economic, security and political interests, but life for the United States would surely become more difficult.

V

Canadian unity is clearly in the interest of the United States. Although Canada's future will be decided by Canadians, it is worthwhile for Americans to contemplate the possible scenarios, for the United States may have some difficult decisions ahead.

Given the deep emotional content of the protagonists' views, civil war is not unthinkable. Canadian society contains strong strains of racism. Recognizing that there are only about 7 million French-speaking Quebecers on a continent inhabited by 230 million English-speakers, the Quebec government will try to avoid fanning racist feelings among its constituents. Any outbreak of violence by French-speaking Quebecers against the English-speaking minority, however, would very likely provoke countrywide demands for federal intervention. Even apart from such a contingency, Canada may decide to resist secession with force.

In a civil war, both sides would use diplomacy to try to gain support from external powers and to prevent such support from going to the other side. Given the U.S. interest in a united Canada, Washington would find itself in the position of continuing normal relations with Canada — including the provision of arms under the Defense Production Sharing Agreement — while preventing the use of American territory bordering Quebec from being used either as a sanctuary or as a point of access to Quebec. In addition, the United States would be faced with disruption of commerce on the St. Lawrence River. Undoubtedly, some Americans would be persuaded to support U.S. intervention in the war, while others would be horrified at the thought of "another Vietnam." The strains on American society would be severe. American diplomacy would also have the task of preventing intervention by other countries. Improbable as it is that Quebec would win a civil war, it is equally improbable that Canada could sustain a long war.

A second scenario is that of a negotiated Quebec separation and the establishment of a customs union with Canada. Should

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this occur, renegotiation of existing agreements with the United States would be required. During a transition period, the economic climate in Quebec would be uncertain. Assuming that a sovereign government could demonstrate its ability to rule, however, there would be immense new investment opportunities for Americans. Perhaps the greatest difficulty with an independent Quebec would have to do with joint defense. With a social-democratic orientation and little interest in military-security matters, an independent Quebec government might very well decide on a course of neutrality. The rejection of an alliance with the United States would arouse U.S. insecurity. An attempt to compensate for the loss of Quebec by tightening our alliance structure with English Canada would be resisted by Ottawa, further diminishing our sense of security. (This assumes that without Quebec Canada would be able to exist as a united country.)

In another scenario, Quebec independence is followed by the emergence of other separatist movements. The areas most likely to be affected are the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta. Moreover, incentives to secede would be compounded by pressures from the United States. U.S. annexation of the far western provinces would consolidate the continental United States with Alaska. As Professor Eric Kierans (McGill University), formerly a Liberal cabinet minister, has written, "The immediate result of Quebec's separation would be a rapid slide of all sectors into the American orbit." [6] Although Professor Kierans was discussing trade flows rather than political integration, economic pressures might well unleash political pressures for annexation. Kierans warned: "One would not expect that Russia and Europe would look kindly upon the prospect of an increasingly competitive United States stretching, economically at least, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic." [7]

The maritime provinces, comprising the most economically underdeveloped region of Canada, might seek affiliation with the United States for geographic and security reasons and, possibly, in order to attract investment. An independent Quebec would bifurcate Canada, dividing Ontario from the maritime provinces. In fending off separatist pressure from the western region, Ottawa might neglect the maritimes, thus allowing those provinces to cast their lot with the United States. Another possibility is that an independent Quebec could become a magnet for the French-speak-

[6] *The Guardian*, March 31, 1977.
[7] *Ibid.*

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ing people of neighboring New Brunswick. Moreover, the possibility of Quebec imperialism exists and might cause the other maritime provinces to seek U.S. protection. Because the Canadian maritimes are important to the security of the North Atlantic, any doubt about Canada's ability to provide protection for this area would lead quickly to an American response — annexation would be one solution.

VI

These secondary separatist effects of the establishment of Quebec's independence lie in the time period beyond the present decade. How quickly or slowly they might develop is impossible to gauge. It is also impossible to know precisely what action the United States should take should this sort of "domino effect" come to pass. Nevertheless, there are certain broad principles that can be contemplated in advance.

Whatever the process and the outcome, the United States has very important security and economic interests in the whole continent. The problem of dealing with those interests is obviously less complicated and more manageable in the context of a united Canada. Thus, the first principle to guide American foreign policy is that the United States should do nothing that would either constitute or create the impression of American support for separatism.

However, if the Canadians themselves create a new set of circumstances by establishing a new independent state of Quebec, then the United States must pursue its interests in those new circumstances. Most helpful to clear thinking in such a situation would be the drawing of sharp distinctions between American national interests, on the one hand, and Canadian interests and American private interests, on the other. There might be a wide range of possibilities for the fulfillment of U.S. political, security and economic interests above the 49th parallel. The range might encompass everything from (a) recognition of, and cooperation with, two or more independent governments to (b) a North American common market to (c) the eventual annexation of parts of a fragmented Canada. Above all, the United States should refrain from casting its concerns in terms of what is good for Canadians.

Something else to keep in mind is how what we do in one part of the continent is related to other parts of the continent and, moreover, how what we do is related to U.S. relations with the rest of the world. Even the scenario which envisages a com-

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plete fragmentation of Canada would leave at least two independent countries to the north — Quebec and Ontario — and even the long-term possibility of annexing parts of Canada would have to be accomplished in such a way as to preserve good relations with those two countries. This would be particularly difficult because Ontario is the seat of the most intense Canadian nationalism (with a rather high anti-American content).

Although each of the scenarios sketched above is a serious possibility, perhaps the most probable is the continuity of a united Canada. The history of Canada is one of tension between its French- and English-speaking people. Although the current crisis is the worst Canada has faced in its 110 years of unity, it may be possible to renew the contract upon which Canada was founded. In that case, Americans might find some comfort in recognizing that the irritations and difficulties of dealing with an independent ally were merely that, and that U.S. interests on the North American continent were basically secure.

Even with such a favorable outcome, however, the crisis in Canada will raise to new prominence a concern in the priorities of American foreign policy closer to home. During most of the post-World War II period, our attention has been directed toward Europe and Asia. Today, under pressure from the Third World, we are confronted with the need to attend to North-South relations. For the United States, North-South relations have a double meaning, for America's relations with its northern neighbor are going to command increasing attention in the years ahead.

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THE SUPERPOWERS IN SOUTH ASIA: A GEOSTRATEGIC ANALYSIS

by Leo E. Rose

In the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union became involved in South Asia with different objectives but similar motivations. An analysis of the factors that persuaded these two powers to immerse themselves in the politics of this volatile, conflict-ridden region will not only help explain their past behavior but also provide insight into their current policies, objectives and strategies. In this essay, I will emphasize those critical strategic and geopolitical factors that, over the past two decades, have influenced the decisions of policymakers in Washington and Moscow concerning Asia, particularly South Asia.

Perhaps the most important distinction between Soviet and U.S. involvement in South Asia since the mid-1950s concerns the intensity with which the two superpowers pursued their interests in the region. South Asia — especially India — has occupied an important place in Soviet strategy. The interests of the USSR are perceived by Moscow to be strongly affected by developments in South Asia. However, this has not been the case for Washington, except for relatively brief periods of time and under special circumstances. For the most part, the American leadership has viewed South Asia with a sense of equanimity, even when developments there conflicted with U.S. objectives in surrounding areas. The assumption has been that nothing is likely to happen in South Asia that will seriously affect vital U.S. interests elsewhere in Asia.

The impact of this difference in perspective between the two superpowers on the scope and nature of the superpowers' involvement in South Asia will be described in this essay. Subsequently, I will evaluate the relevance of U.S.-Soviet interaction in South Asia to the superpowers' respective Asian policies and suggest that both have experienced difficulties in fitting these policies into a broader range of political and strategic objectives. I will argue that, until recently, the Soviet Union may have been over-involved in

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South Asia, unnecessarily complicating its relationships with powers both inside and outside the region. The United States, on the other hand — because of the narrow, unimaginative approach adopted by successive administrations, and the propensity in Washington to view South Asia from every perspective but that of the region itself — has rarely been able or willing to use the substantial economic and ideological advantages it has enjoyed in South Asia.

The United States and South Asia

Relatively large-scale American involvement in South Asia commenced in the early fifties but only as an appendage to an Asian policy that sought to contain communist expansion. Indeed, South Asia played a very minor role in this broad policy objective, even when it was the recipient of substantial military and economic assistance. From the very beginning Washington placed a higher priority on certain strategic considerations that were only peripherally concerned with developments in South Asia itself.[1] Pakistan, rather than India, became the principal focus of U.S. policy in the region despite the fact that India was by far the larger, more powerful, more "respectable" (in terms of democratic political ideals) and, by most standards, the more important power, not only in South Asia but throughout the noncommunist Third World.

The selection of Pakistan as the regional focal point of U.S. policy can be understood, however, within the context of American strategic objectives. For the first decade after World War II, U.S. policy in Asia was preoccupied primarily with the containment of what was then perceived to be an overt Soviet military threat to West Asia — in particular, Iran and Turkey — and secondarily with suspected long-range Chinese expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia. In both West and Southeast Asia the United States was considered to have vital interests to protect; South Asia, in contrast, was viewed as a region outside the arena of direct "Communist World–Free World" confrontation, thus requiring only limited American involvement.

The principal consequence of the U.S. perception of security interests in Asia was an American policy toward South Asia

[1] For an Indian perception of U.S. policy objectives in South Asia, see Baldev Raj Nayar, "Treat India Seriously," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1975, pp. 133-154. Nayar errs not so much in his analysis of the direction of evolving U.S. policy as in his failure to comprehend the motivations and objectives underlying U.S. policies. He generally assumes that American policies detrimental to Indian regional or global objectives were motivated by anti-Indian sentiment in Washington. In reality, it was rarely that simple, even in the days of John Foster Dulles, whose expressed distaste for Nehru's nonalignment policy (and for Nehru) was only incidental to U.S. decisionmaking on South Asia.

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devised, essentially, to protect and serve U.S. objectives in adjacent regions to the east and west. Thus, the emphasis given by the United States in the mid-fifties to its relationship with Pakistan, at India's expense, becomes clear. The western wing of Pakistan, a Muslim area with strong ties to the Islamic world of West Asia, shared borders with Iran and Afghanistan, both of which were viewed as dangerously exposed to Soviet expansionism. The build-up of Pakistan as a military and political support base for its two Muslim neighbors thus became an important element of U.S. strategic policy in West Asia. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was geographically positioned to play at least a minor role in U.S. efforts to contain (perceived) Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Pakistan was persuaded — rather easily — to join both the West Asian and Southeast Asian military alliance systems, CENTO and SEATO, respectively. But there was a price — namely, a recurring if low-level crisis in American relations with India. This, in turn, provided the Soviet Union with an unprecedented opportunity to establish a significant presence in South Asia.

The Kennedy administration made significant revisions in the American geopolitical perspective on the southern Asian region. By 1960, Soviet policy toward West Asia de-emphasized a threatening military posture and was directed instead toward expanding Moscow's political and economic presence. The United States responded by shifting its policy from a military-strategic to a political emphasis. The primary targets of the Soviet political offensive were the "radical" Islamic regimes (in particular, Egypt) with whom India maintained strong ties. Thus, India became at least as important as Pakistan to the attainment of U.S. goals in West Asia.

But while the "containment of Russia" policy in West Asia was being substantially modified, the "containment of China" policy in the rest of Asia was retained virtually intact by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Here again, however, the roles of India and Pakistan were reversed by the course of events. By 1960, New Delhi had become involved in a series of disputes with Peking that led to a brief border war in 1962 and chronically bad relations between the two states thereafter. India now emerged as the more important factor supportive of broader U.S. policy objectives in Asia as well as (in contrast to Pakistan) a useful collaborator with the United States in its containment of China. Consequently, in the early 1960s, the United States substantially modified its alignment with Pakistan and concentrated instead on better relations with India. Pakistan retaliated by soliciting and obtaining an expanded relationship with

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China, in the process abandoning its role in the containment-of-China policy. Islamabad also sought to develop relations with the Soviet Union, but met with limited success as Moscow was no less committed than Washington to support of the Indians in their confrontations with the Chinese.

By 1965, however, South Asia had again become an area of little interest to the United States. For all practical purposes, the United States chose against a competitive role in the region vis-a-vis the Soviet Union when Washington decided not to challenge Moscow's efforts to mediate the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. This constituted tacit acceptance of Moscow's role as the primary mediating power in South Asia—a position previously held by the United States.[2] Without reversing its slightly pro-India thinking, Washington left the Russians with the principal burden of building up India as a counterweight to China while focusing its own containment-of-China efforts on Southeast Asia—viz., in Vietnam.

The American "opening" to China in the early 1970s once again introduced subtle changes in the geopolitical scenario throughout the southern Asian region for all the powers involved, leading to some modifications in the U.S. role in South Asia. From 1972 to 1977, Washington and Peking shared a concern with what they perceived to be excessive Soviet influence in southern Asia (for example, in Iraq, Syria, North Vietnam and Laos), particularly in South Asia. Moreover, the Americans and Chinese viewed India as an important (if sometimes reluctant) channel through which Soviet influence might be exerted in areas where Moscow had only limited military or economic capabilities of its own — that is, South and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region, including eastern and southern Africa.

The scope of Indo-Soviet cooperation on broader regional issues was seen by Washington and Peking as still sufficiently limited not to require vigorous countermeasures. Rather, both countries sought to complicate New Delhi's collaborative role in its relations with Moscow through "carrot and stick" policies of their own. The carrot offered was an improvement in their political and economic relations with India; the stick included hints at the expansion of assistance to Pakistan and, since 1975, to Bangladesh.

[2] The USSR also offered to serve as mediator after the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, again with American acquiescence. The response from South Asia was unexpected. Pakistan, which had been vociferous in criticizing Moscow's role in the 1971 war, accepted the Soviet offer. India, then often described as a Soviet ally, rejected the proposal on the assumption that Indian interests would be better served by a bilateral settlement with Pakistan.

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By 1977, the ascendance of new leaders in Washington, New Delhi and Peking as well as a burgeoning systemic crisis in Pakistan again affected the direction of the limited U.S. involvement in South Asia. Important elements of the Indian political and administrative elites had indicated a responsiveness both to Chinese and American overtures for an improvement in relations, even before the defeat of Indira Gandhi. The new prime minister, Morarji Desai, initially indicated that his government would not retain the "special relationship" with the Soviet Union (though during his visit to Moscow in late 1977, he assured the Russians that no downgrading of Indo-Soviet relations was projected). Meanwhile, the Janata Party government is seeking to diversify its external relations by expanding economic and political ties with the United States, Western Europe and China (should Peking prove responsive). The Carter administration has revived the Kennedy policy of placing India first in U.S. calculations on South Asia. Nixon may have been the first U.S. president to accept publicly New Delhi's status as the dominant power in South Asia, but Carter is the first to indicate an interest in using American resources and influence to sustain and extend the Indian regional hegemony.

Whatever the American perception of South Asia's importance may be at any particular time, there are several practical concerns that make it difficult for Washington to completely ignore the region.

(1) South Asia is a strategic transitional zone between West Asia and Southeast Asia, each of which is an area where the United States has important, perhaps vital, interests. Events in South Asia have considerable impact on neighboring areas.

(2) The Indian Ocean region plays an important role in U.S. strategic planning. For example, it came as a shock to Washington during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli October War that the Soviets had a large naval force "on station" at the commencement of hostilities, while the United States in both cases had to hastily assemble and dispatch naval forces to the Indian ocean.[3] The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in intermittent negotiations on the Indian Ocean that may

[3] The usual interpretation of these events in India and elsewhere is that the Soviet naval force (sixteen vessels, including missile cruisers and destroyers) was sent as a counterbalance to the U.S. task force headed by the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*. According to press reports, however, both contingents reached the Bay of Bengal at the same time, implying that the Soviet vessels must have left Vladivostok several days before the U.S. task force commenced its mission. Thus, it is possible that the *Enterprise* served as a counterbalance to the Soviets' greatly expanded Indian Ocean force, rather than the reverse, although that would have been only one factor in U.S. decisionmaking.

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eventually lead to an agreement based on the minimum terms acceptable to both — that is, maintenance of the status quo in their respective regional-force deployment (though the eviction of the Soviets from their important complex at Berbera, Somalia, could complicate this issue for Moscow). While virtually all of the southern Asian littoral states have endorsed the proposed declaration of the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace," India is the only major regional power ostensibly dedicated to the total withdrawal of external-power naval forces and bases. There are indications, however, that even New Delhi may be prepared to modify its position. A frank exchange of views between the United States and India could make an important contribution to a U.S.-Soviet agreement.

(3) South Asia figures prominently in international discussions on a broad range of global issues. For instance, the region has been described in several futuristic studies as the most serious drain on world food resources, with potentially disastrous consequences. While South Asia, particularly India, is in a rather strong position with respect to foodgrains at the present time, the history of the area makes it reasonable to assume that another crisis requiring massive inputs from the outside is not unlikely in the early 1980s. As the principal source of both surplus food and agro-industrial technology, the United States would have a large role in resolving such a crisis.

(4) Since India is often the adviser on tactics and the source of economic position papers for the oil-importing Third World states, the outcome of the "North-South" negotiations will be significantly influenced by India's policies. Under existing conditions, it is unlikely that any formulas proposed by the developed states would gain general acceptance by the LDCs over the opposition of India. As the closest approximation of spokesmen for their respective constituencies, Washington and New Delhi might usefully indulge in bilateral discussions rather than leave the resolution of these issues to unproductive international conferences.

(5) Two South Asian states, India and Pakistan, are likely to become nuclear powers over the next decade. If Carter's objective of limiting nuclear proliferation is to be achieved, the United States must be prepared to commence serious negotiations with India, which is the pivotal state on this issue.[4]

The above considerations make necessary a deeper U.S.

[4] Prime Minister Morarji Desai of India has taken a stronger and less ambiguous position against nuclear weapons than his predecessor. While I do not question his sincerity, it should be noted that powerful forces (political and military) within the Indian bureaucracy still argue that a nuclear weapons option should be kept open.

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involvement, both political and economic, in South Asia. While no vital U.S. interests — in the narrow sense — are at stake in South Asia, a low-profile policy for this region could be seriously detrimental to a wide range of American goals and policies on the global level.

The Soviet Union and South Asia

Strategic and geopolitical factors have also been critical to the evolution of Soviet involvement in South Asia since the mid-1950s. With its spectacular "opening" to India, Moscow abandoned several fundamental features of the Stalinist policy toward non-communist Afro-Asian states. This change in policy has usually been interpreted as the Soviets' response to Pakistan's involvement in U.S.-sponsored military alliance systems. While this must have been a vital factor in Moscow's calculations, we now also know (from Chinese sources) that Sino-Soviet relations were just entering into the state of crisis that has prevailed ever since. It is probable that Moscow was already looking for an alternative Asian power to play one of the roles that had been projected for China in the Stalinist foreign policy — that is, to serve as a channel to the nonaligned or reluctantly aligned nations of Asia and Africa. India seemed to fill the bill.[5]

With India's aspiration to hegemony in South Asia threatened by U.S. aid to Pakistan, New Delhi responded enthusiastically to the Soviet overtures. The Indians interpreted the Soviet shift as a reaction to the massive U.S. involvement in Pakistan. It is possible that if New Delhi had understood the implicit anti-Chinese aspect of the Soviet effort to establish a presence in South Asia and other parts of the nonaligned world, its response might have been more cautious. In this period, Nehru was still giving the highest priority to maintaining and expanding the working arrangements that he had painstakingly constructed with Peking in 1953-1954. But no one was predicting a Sino-Soviet confrontation in those days. As it later turned out, India's receptivity to the Soviet overtures in 1955 played a large role in the sudden, unexpected deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in the 1957-1959 period. The Indians observed this trend with dismay, but they lacked the capacity or the will to reverse it.

[5] Bhabani Sen Gupta, in a perceptive essay, noted that "if Soviet strategy has been much more stable than American and Chinese, it is because the Russian leaders anticipated problems with China even in the mid-fifties and decided to build-up India as a counterweight to China, even during the zenith of Sino-Soviet amity." ("South Asia and the Great Powers," in William E. Griffith, ed., *The World and the Great Power Triangles* [Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1975] p. 248.)

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By the early 1960s, the anti-American component in the Soviet policy that had attracted New Delhi in the first place had been relegated to a secondary role, while the anti-Chinese component had become blatant and primary. Moscow considerably expanded economic and military aid to India, applied various pressures on Pakistan to stay out of the Sino-Indian dispute (mainly through Afghanistan, which was encouraged to aid and abet the separatist movements on Pakistan's northwestern frontier), and even co-operated informally with the United States through separate but mutually supportive containment-of-China policies.

The public emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute coincided — by no means coincidentally — with the shift in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in West Asia from a primarily military to a primarily political rivalry. The earlier rivalry made close cooperation with India attractive to Moscow; the later version made it feasible at a relatively low cost, as the United States virtually abandoned any competitive role in South Asia during the mid-1960s. The Soviets, however, were never completely satisfied with the imbalance intrinsic to their policy of close alignment with India and were interested in rectifying that situation — if the price were right. Moscow made several attempts in the late sixties to modify its almost total commitment to India, even to the extent of introducing a small-scale military-aid program in Pakistan in 1968. Intended to reduce Pakistan's increasing dependence on China, the program had to be abandoned almost immediately in the face of India's forceful objections and the political upheavals that rocked Pakistan during 1969-1971.

The 1970s began with what were interpreted as a series of triumphs for Moscow in South Asia that seemingly made the Soviet Union the dominant external power in the region. In August 1971, on the eve of yet another Indo-Pakistani war, New Delhi agreed to sign the "friendship pact" that the Soviets had first broached with India in 1969. The wording of the key clauses in the treaty was carefully made susceptible to a variety of interpretations, but Moscow apparently interpreted the treaty as a step toward an Indian endorsement of the Asian "collective security" system also proposed by Brezhnev in 1969. Moscow's support of India in the December 1971 Bangladesh War furnished opportunities for the Soviets that they hoped would lead to a considerable projection of Soviet power in the entire southern Asian region.

By the mid-1970s, however, Soviet aspirations for using their pre-eminent position in South Asia as the basis for break-

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throughs in adjacent areas had proved illusory, even when supplemented by the victory of the Soviet-supported North Vietnamese in Vietnam and Laos. Both India and Pakistan remain cautiously ambivalent toward Moscow's collective security proposal for Asia, neither openly rejecting nor endorsing it. New Delhi continued to demand — and receive — full support from the Russians for India's objectives in South Asia, while conceding little of substance in exchange.[6] The Indians even normalized relations with the Chinese in 1976, creating doubts about India's role in Soviet efforts to block Chinese expansion. This raised concern in the Soviet Union that India might turn out to be "another Egypt" — that is, an area of major Soviet investment and commitment over a long period with few positive returns for Moscow's long-range policy objectives. The 1977 Indian elections, resulting in the defeat of a regime Moscow had strongly supported, fed Soviet apprehensions on this issue and possibly lowered Soviet expectations.

The Bangladesh experience has been even more painful, if less expensive, for the Soviets. Once it became obvious in mid-1971 that another Indo-Pakistani war was inevitable, Moscow openly threw its support behind India and the Bangladesh freedom movement. This was done at some sacrifice to the Soviet reputation in West Asia, as the Bangladesh War was widely perceived as pitting Islamic Pakistan (supported by China and the United States) against Hindu India (supported by the Russians). This contributed, if only marginally, to the problems the USSR has faced in maintaining credibility in West Asia.

Moscow thus had good reason to expect the Bangladeshis to demonstrate their appreciation in tangible ways. Yet, once again, they were disappointed. Soviet efforts to obtain access rights to a Bangladeshi port, for instance, were eventually rejected by Dacca — reportedly on the advice of the Indians! The assassination of President Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, in 1975, and the installation of a government that displays rather strong anti-Indian and anti-Soviet proclivities was another setback. While the new government in Dacca had to exercise caution when dealing with India, its vastly more powerful neighbor, it could safely move to limit the presence of the Soviets. To make this even more galling for Moscow, it is the

[6] Though very little was conceded on foreign policy, Mrs. Gandhi's government did concede to the Soviets a broad influence in internal Indian political and economic developments. According to knowledgeable Indian sources, the Russians usually donate 2 or 3 per cent of their returns from trade with India — a very large amount — to friendly Indian organizations, newspapers, journals and individuals, with little or no hindrance from the Indian government.

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United States and China that have benefited from the change of regime in Bangladesh. The 1977 elections in Sri Lanka, unseating a government in which the pro-Soviet Communist Party was a partner, has produced similar consequences in that country.

Finally, the Soviet relationship with Pakistan that seemed to blossom briefly in the late 1960s barely survived the 1971 war. Moscow has indicated on several occasions its interest in reviving relations with Pakistan, and the Pakistani authorities have generally responded in kind. But there are serious obstacles to any significant movement in this direction. Given the importance of the Chinese and Americans both to its domestic and its foreign policy, Islamabad must be primarily concerned with possible reactions in Peking and Washington to any substantial improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations. For its part, Moscow continues to tilt toward India in its South Asian policy and thus cannot safely ignore the still evident tendency in New Delhi to view the expansion of relations with Pakistan as potentially detrimental to Indian interests.

Recently, Soviet ambitions in the broader Indian Ocean region have not fared much better, despite several local "victories" in Africa. India's support for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean that would exclude the naval forces of any but littoral states has been publicly directed at U.S. naval activity and base construction, but logically would apply to Soviet naval forces and bases as well. This is another major issue on which Soviet and Indian policy objectives do not converge.

For the most part, both Moscow and New Delhi have preferred to play down their differences on this issue, and the Soviets have even implied that they would accept a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean if the United States would do so as well. The Carter administration's unexpected expression of interest in the proposal placed Moscow in a quandary, for Soviet policy throughout southern Asia and much of Africa depends to a considerable extent on access to the Indian Ocean on something more than an "innocent passage" basis.

While the Soviets may feel somewhat frustrated in their failure to obtain more tangible results from their across-the-board support of India, Moscow's options are limited. No alternative policy (other than rapprochement with China on terms approximating those that prevailed in the early 1950s — which seems almost inconceivable) is likely to bring better results in an area where the

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Soviet Union has limited military and economic capabilities of its own.

It appears that Moscow still places a higher priority on expanding its ties with India (or, from another perspective, increasing India's dependence on the USSR) than on other important political and economic objectives. While the reasons may not be readily comprehensible to an outside observer, there are several factors influencing Soviet decisionmaking on this issue.

One is India's critical role as an intermediary between the USSR and the noncommunist Third World countries. No doubt this consideration was of greater importance to the Soviets in the mid-1950s, when India was the acknowledged leader of the nonaligned Afro-Asian states, and when it was Prime Minister Nehru who provided that bloc with ideological guidance both on foreign and economic-development policies. The overture to India was thus a logical first step in the Soviet Union's lengthy campaign to establish an effective presence in the growing nonaligned state system.

By the early 1960s, India's influence in other Afro-Asian states had declined because of (a) the increasing complexity of interrelationships within the Third World and (b) the Chinese challenge to Indian leadership. But while New Delhi may not be as useful to Moscow as it once was, the Indians can still provide some services and create some opportunities for the Soviet Union that it would otherwise lack, not only in South Asia but in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region. A limited but significant congruity in Soviet and Indian policy objectives has provided both Moscow and New Delhi with greater influence in these regions than either would have had on its own. While the relationship with India may not have fulfilled Soviet expectations, Moscow still seems to be convinced that the USSR would have been worse off without at least the tacit cooperation of the Indians on several critical issues.

Geopolitical factors have also played an important part in the definition of Soviet policy in Asia over the past two decades. That the USSR is separated from South Asia by only seventeen miles of Afghan territory is enough to ensure concern in Moscow over developments in the subcontinent. Probably even more important in Soviet calculations since the early 1960s is the long border South Asia shares with China and the occasionally violent competition between Peking and New Delhi for a hegemonic position in this difficult frontier area. It is obviously in the interest of the Soviet

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containment-of-China policy [7] to keep the Sino-Indian boundary a "hot" border and to discourage any rapprochement. The Chinese have had to divert to Tibet substantial military and logistic resources from its disputed borders with the Soviet Union — not only to discourage any Indian military adventurism, but also to protect the vital communication system that runs through Tibet to China's exposed western province of Sinkiang.

Another factor influencing Soviet policy toward India and South Asia is the Asian collective security system that Brezhnev first proposed in 1969. The negative response from virtually all Asian capitals led Moscow to downplay the proposal for several years. But it was revived in 1975 following the communist victory in Indochina and has subsequently provided the major theme in Soviet policy projections for Asia. India's status as the dominant power in the southern Asia area most immediately adjacent to the USSR makes it essential for Moscow to gain New Delhi's cooperation in this security-system venture. With Indian participation, several other South and Southeast Asian governments would be inclined to consider the proposal; however, so long as New Delhi remains aloof and uncooperative, there is virtually no possibility that any Asian state will be prepared to risk the adverse reaction of China — and possibly the United States — by endorsing a Russian-sponsored security system.[8] So far, New Delhi has exercised the utmost caution in handling this issue, and there is no reason to expect the Janata Party government to demonstrate any enthusiasm for a proposal that runs counter to some of its own policy objectives. But once again, the best long-term policy for the USSR — other than dumping the proposal — is to create conditions that might make collective security attractive to the Indians, even if this requires considerable, possibly expensive persuasion.

On balance, the Soviets can view with some satisfaction the results of their long-term strategic approach to South Asia, emphasizing relations with India over all other regional considerations, and thus they are likely to maintain this set of priorities despite

[7] The Soviet Union has repeatedly denied that it has a containment-of-China policy. So long as actions speak louder than words, however, Moscow will have no success in convincing anyone on this point. The Soviets have sought in every way possible to limit and, if possible, eliminate China's presence and influence beyond its border.

[8] The Russians insist that their collective security proposal is not directed at any state and that the United States and all Asian nations, including China, are welcome to participate. The universal interpretation in Asia, however, is that the proposal forms an integral part of the Soviet containment-of-China policy. That is certainly the way Peking understands the Soviet objective, and the Chinese have made it quite clear that any endorsement of the proposal by an Asian state will be considered an unfriendly act.

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the traumatic political developments on the subcontinent during 1977. But whether the substantial payoffs that accrued to Moscow in the 1950s (the solidification of ties with the nonaligned states) or in the 1960s and early seventies (India's recruitment into the containment-of-China forces) will continue seems more doubtful. South Asia is more likely to be an area of extensive investment and diminishing returns for the Soviet Union.

U.S.-Soviet Regional Interaction

The interaction between the two superpowers in South Asia over the past two decades does not fit easily into the pattern seen elsewhere in Asia and in Africa, where both states have massive investments and important interests to protect. Outside South Asia, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has normally been characterized by a subdued but persistent competition, interspersed occasionally with either brief periods of hostile confrontation or expedient collaboration. Superpower cooperation, despite the rhetoric of detente, has been a rarity in most of the Third World. The only significant exception to this general rule occurred in South Asia during the 1960-1972 period, when U.S.-USSR interaction could best be described as tacit collaboration and deliberate maintenance of competition at a low level.

It had not always been this way, of course. Between 1955 and 1960, South Asia seemed to be emerging as an important competitive arena for the United States and Soviet Union, although even then on a nonconfrontation basis. The two governments supported different sides in South Asia — Moscow enthusiastically endorsing any Indian regional claims (for example, Kashmir); Washington tilting, although not unequivocally, toward Pakistan. U.S.-Soviet rivalry, however, was more verbal than real, for the Russians had little to offer the Indians other than vocal support. In that period, U.S. and West European trade and financial assistance to India was incomparably greater than the dribble provided by the Soviets, an economic fact of life that even the Nehru regime could not easily ignore. It was only with the termination of the Soviet aid program to China in 1959 that Moscow unexpectedly found itself with an aid capacity that could be, and was, directed toward establishing a significant economic relationship with New Delhi. Today, Soviet aid is critical to Indian economic planning.

The heightened Russian presence in South Asia during the early 1960s did not lead, however, to increased competition with the

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United States. Rather, changed perceptions in both Moscow and Washington concerning their respective roles in South Asia led to a quasi-alliance between the two superpowers. The critical factor, of course, was the outbreak of a border dispute between India and China which developed into a major confrontation on virtually all levels of their relationship.

The Sino-Indian dispute redirected both Soviet and U.S. policy in South Asia, with Moscow and Washington providing an indispensable support base for India. Russian and American motivations were quite clear — namely, to enlist India's cooperation in the containment-of-China policy, which by 1963 had become the basis for the Asian strategies of both superpowers. Militarily, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in India's behalf took the form of an informal division of labor between the respective aid programs. The Soviets, for instance, supplied jet fighters and even jet-aircraft factories; the United States provided an air-defense support system.[9] Indian ground forces obtained Soviet tanks to combat the Pakistanis on the plains and U.S. arms for ten "mountain divisions" to battle the Chinese in the Himalayas. Since New Delhi was very apprehensive about the possibility of Sino-Pakistani collusion in any renewal of hostilities, the Soviet and U.S. military-aid programs were instrumental, both physically and psychologically, in enabling India to regain the initiative in the management of South Asian regional developments.[10]

The tilt toward India was also evident in the roles assumed by Moscow and Washington vis-a-vis other South Asian states. For instance, after India's defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Katmandu considered encouraging a greatly expanded Chinese presence in Nepal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union warned the Nepalis that they would pay a high price for this in economic assistance, and the Nepalis correctly interpreted U.S. and Soviet policies as supportive of New Delhi's efforts to regain a hegemonic

[9] In the 1962 war, the Indians refrained from using their air force even though they probably would have had air superiority over the Chinese in the battle area. The reason for this was India's almost total lack of an air-defense system against Chinese bombers, which might have attacked the population centers and vital communication facilities in northern India. The development of an air-defense capacity, then, was a prerequisite to the unleashing of the Soviet-supported Indian air force in any subsequent hostilities, such as those of 1971.

[10] There is no intention here to imply that the United States and the Soviet Union consulted on military-aid questions (though they may have). Both sides, however, were fully aware that their aid programs were complementary and found this acceptable.

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position throughout the hill area to the south of the Himalayas: such a combination of external pressures was difficult to resist.[11]

Soviet and American policies toward Pakistan in the 1960s were also regulated by the tilt toward India, perhaps with more subtlety and less consistency than in Nepal. The United States continued its military aid to Pakistan in the first half of the decade, but the program was substantially reduced both in the quantity and the types of military equipment supplied. This coincided with the introduction of a U.S. military-aid program to India in early 1963 which Islamabad depicted as anti-Pakistan; likewise, the Indians objected to U.S. arms aid to Pakistan, even on a much-reduced scale. Having angered both sides, it was with a sense of relief that Washington terminated both military-aid programs at the start of the 1965 war.[12] This action — still the basic U.S. policy in 1978 — affected Pakistan *much more than it did India and thus redounded to the latter's* advantage. Pakistan has had to obtain arms from China (whose equipment is plentiful but antiquated), Iran (under strict U.S.-imposed limitations), the international arms market (limited by the nonavailability of substantial foreign-exchange reserves) and the United States (when occasional exceptions are made in its arms ban). Whereas India has had a much more reliable arms supply: the Soviet Union, India's own substantial arms industry and the United States equipment (again, as exceptions to the U.S. arms ban). Thus, the military gap between India and Pakistan has steadily widened since 1965, partly as a consequence of the military aid policies adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union.

So far I have emphasized Soviet and U.S. policy objectives on which there has been substantial superpower agreement. It can also be argued, however, that there was at least unintentional collusion between Moscow and Washington *even when the public postures of the two governments were opposed.*

Perhaps the most obvious case was the 1971 crisis in South Asia that led to the disintegration of Pakistan and yet another Indo-Pakistani war. As the crisis developed, Moscow and Washington assumed positions that were farther and farther apart, culminating in the American denunciation of India as an aggressor and the

[11] Identification of this U.S. role did not survive the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and Nixon's Peking visit in 1972. Yet, even in 1977, the Soviet ambassador was still trying (unsuccessfully) to persuade the Nepali public that the Soviet Union's role in Nepal was not directed at providing support to a third power — i.e., India.

[12] The American abandonment of a competitive role in military assistance to South Asia after the 1965 war is further evidence of Washington's willingness (at the time) to concede Moscow's pre-eminence in this region.

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Russian accusation that Pakistan had initiated hostilities. The United States and the Soviet Union also chose to oppose each other in the UN: the Americans urged an immediate cease-fire and "mutual withdrawal" of military forces (read: removal of Indian troops from East Pakistan), while the Russians employed delaying tactics to enable the Indians to complete their occupation of East Pakistan before any cease-fire was approved. There even seemed to be the prospect of a superpower military confrontation when the Russians reinforced their Indian Ocean naval force and the Americans sent a task force into the Bay of Bengal.

But were these different postures the result of a real conflict of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union? To a limited extent, perhaps; but I argue that the areas of congruity in the two governments' policies were more important than the differences. Thus, the events of 1971 did not constitute a fundamental change in the superpower relationship that had prevailed in South Asia since 1962. This becomes apparent when the U.S. and Soviet positions on the basic issues involved in the crisis are examined.

First, neither Washington nor Moscow wanted to encourage the disintegration of Pakistan, for this would set a precedent for destabilization elsewhere and, ultimately, would threaten detente. Both the Soviets and Americans proffered essentially the same advice to the Pakistani government — namely, accept the legitimacy of the Bangladeshi demand for autonomy, but within the framework of a decentralized state system that would maintain at least the façade of a federal union.

Second, both superpowers discouraged India from using military force. Only when it became apparent that New Delhi had decided to use force, in late summer 1971, did the Russians and the Americans respond differently. Finally, during the December war both Washington and Moscow warned New Delhi against extending the hostilities to West Pakistan because they feared Pakistan's disintegration into three or four nonviable states within a highly strategic area (the area between South Asia, West Asia, the USSR and China). Maintenance of the status quo seemed preferable to the superpowers, for the potential for big-power confrontation under such conditions would hold dangers for all.

Several aspects of the 1971 South Asian crisis do not fit so easily into this scenario (of superpower harmony), but, even in these situations, the impact of Soviet and U.S. policies was not so

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contradictory as is sometimes depicted. The superpowers' policies on arms aid have often been contrasted as evidence of the different objectives pursued. Throughout 1971, the Russians maintained and even expanded their arms aid to India. Moscow also signed a "friendship pact" with New Delhi that supposedly served to guarantee a Soviet response against Chinese support of Pakistan in the event of hostilities, thus making it safer for India to resort to force. U.S. aid policies, perhaps adopted with different intentions, nevertheless produced the same result. In April 1971 the United States cut off the small-scale supply of military equipment to Pakistan that had previously been approved as an exception to the ban, and a few months later economic aid was suspended in order to pressure Islamabad to come to terms with the Bangladeshi movement.[13] On the other hand, U.S. economic aid to India and the permits that allowed New Delhi to purchase U.S. military equipment were not suspended until the actual outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, if there was a tilt in U.S. policy in South Asia in 1971, it was toward India throughout most of the year.[14] Only after Indian forces had invaded East Pakistan was the widely publicized (and widely misinterpreted) tilt toward Pakistan adopted as American policy.

In other words, there was a plethora of public posturing by both Washington and Moscow during the 1971 war that had little to do with the South Asian crisis itself. By December, both superpowers had accepted, albeit reluctantly, Pakistan's imminent dis-

[13] The Nixon administration was strongly criticized by Western and Indian commentators for not having applied greater pressure on Pakistan to revise its policies in East Pakistan. But what more could have been done once the United States suspended its economic- and military-aid programs? Applied almost anywhere else, such actions would have been denounced by the same set of critics (including the Indians) as neocolonialist, on the grounds that aid from developed countries should have no strings attached. Thus, these complaints are really directed at Washington's failure to vocally denounce Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan while taking the actions it did. Perhaps the Nixon administration should have made its position public, but one very knowledgeable source doubts that public U.S. denunciations would have had any more effect on the Pakistani government than the quietly imposed aid restrictions had. (G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974], p. 220.) The substantial U.S. economic assistance to East Pakistani refugees in India also contributed to the Bangladeshi resistance movement, though that may not have been the intention.

[14] I realize that Nixon and Kissinger, who were strongly denounced in Washington for a supposed pro-Pakistan bias during the Bangladesh crisis, may be as distressed as their critics by my interpretation of their policy. Nixon and Kissinger had, if anything, only a moderate bias toward Pakistan, reflecting in part their reaction to Mrs. Gandhi and her ambassador in Washington whose distaste for the Nixon administration was barely disguised. To judge by what the United States *did* between March and December of 1971, rather than how the American leadership *felt*, it appears that U.S. intervention was directed at pressuring the Pakistani government into making fundamental changes in East Pakistan. As this served New Delhi's objectives, the "tilt" was toward India until the actual commencement of hostilities in December.

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integration and their own inability to stop it. In these circumstances, the United States once again sought to reap some benefit by adopting positions that would redound to its advantage outside South Asia. Though U.S. support of Pakistan during the war was almost exclusively verbal, that support facilitated the American entree into the Islamic states of West Asia (all of which strongly supported Pakistan). Washington also found it propitious to take the same side as Peking at a time when U.S.-Chinese rapprochement was just taking form. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was able to strengthen its relations with India, thus setting the stage for a closer cooperation that, Moscow hoped, would lead to an Indian endorsement of the Soviet collective security proposal.

U.S.-Soviet Perceptions and the Future of South Asia

Thus, there were minor gains and losses for both superpowers in 1971, but these regional developments neither posed serious problems for them nor placed a great strain on their overall capacity for interaction. Rather, it has been certain developments *outside of South Asia since 1972* that have had repercussions on the superpower relationship within that region. Undoubtedly, the most important of these has been the improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations, which the Russians suspected might eventually be transformed into a quasi-alliance directed against Soviet aims in Asia, including South Asia. A supplementary consideration is the success achieved by the United States since 1974 in limiting the Soviet role in West Asia. Some Soviets have expressed concern that South Asia might become the next area of the Third World in which the USSR's presence will be diminished, as a consequence of possible U.S.-Chinese collaboration and of recent political developments on the subcontinent itself. The U.S. perception of the Third World, with respect to superpower competition, is a mirror image of the Russian perception: Washington views with growing concern the rapid expansion of Moscow's capacity for intervention on a global scale.[15]

[15] Events of May 1978 have served to raise apprehensions concerning possible superpower collaboration for stability in South Asia. The statements made by NSC Chairman Brzezinski during his visit to Peking can only have escalated Soviet concern, and, as seen from the United States, the coup in Afghanistan holds as yet unknown significance for regional security. If the Afghan coup involved merely Moscow's approval of the victory of one political faction over another, as now seems to be the case, then the regional security situation will not be seriously affected. But, if it turns out that the coup was an opening Soviet gambit in a campaign to transform Afghanistan into a full-scale satellite, to be used as a base against the beleaguered governments of Pakistan and Iran (the objective being those states' disintegration), then an entirely new geostrategic environment will be the probable outcome. The Afghan develop-

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These wary superpower perceptions, which have resulted in hardened political stances, may prove to be temporary, but their negative impact on the capacity of Moscow and Washington to cooperate in defusing explosive situations around the world cannot be denied. South Asia is not likely to require such superpower collaboration so long as India maintains its hegemonic status in the region. Yet, recent South Asian political developments and the obvious aversion in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal to Indian dominance could undermine the regional stability that has prevailed since 1971. The prospects for superpower cooperation in limiting the impact and scope of a renewed South Asian conflict as efficiently as was seen in 1965 and 1971 may well have diminished — with potentially serious consequences for South Asia and, perhaps, for U.S.-Soviet relations as well.

ments are under careful and suspicious scrutiny, not only in Washington, Peking, Teheran and Islamabad, but also in New Delhi, which is not prepared to accept *this* kind of new Soviet role in a region where India sees itself as a hegemonic power with responsibilities for regional security.

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THE ASEAN STATES: OBSTACLES TO SECURITY COOPERATION

by Sheldon W. Simon

Although bilateral military cooperation in Southeast Asia has occurred intermittently since the late 1940s, multilateral efforts — viz., the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Five-Power Defense Agreement — have always included external powers. With the end of the Vietnam War, pressing questions have emerged regarding the ability of noncommunist states in the region to develop security arrangements which exclude major-power participation. Will Vietnam's pre-eminence in Indochina hasten indigenous regional-security efforts among Vietnam's noncommunist neighbors? Will the socioeconomic achievements realized through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1975 be complemented by the development of regionwide security? Can the desire for greater security against communist insurgencies overcome a heritage of mutual suspicion and contention?

In this essay, I will discuss the general obstacles to security cooperation within ASEAN, specific sources of antagonism and areas of policy disagreement including (a) the proposal to declare the region a "zone of neutrality," (b) the continued existence of American military bases in the Philippines (and, until July 1976, Thailand) and (c) Thailand's future relationship with other ASEAN members. The essay will conclude with an overview of ASEAN security trends.

The most dramatic diplomatic consequence of America's reduced military presence in Southeast Asia since 1973 is the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China by all ASEAN states except Indonesia. (Even though formal diplomatic ties between Singapore and the PRC do not exist, Lee Kwan Yew's two-week, spring 1976 visit to China had the practical effect of normalizing relations.) By establishing relations with Peking, the ASEAN states sought (a) to demonstrate that regional security must be ASEAN's responsibility and (b) to acknowledge Peking's importance to, and legitimate interest in, Southeast Asian affairs. In particular, the

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ASEAN states hoped to receive some assurance from Peking that it would refrain from providing concrete support to insurgencies in their respective countries and that it would use its influence on Hanoi toward the same end.

The policies of the Southeast Asian states have shifted away from an emphasis on extraregionally-supported *defense* against external aggression toward intraregional (essentially, intrastate) maintenance of *security* with respect to insurgency. This shift manifested itself in the attempt to accommodate China and Vietnam — the two major regional powers in favor of radical political change.[1] Such accommodation revealed that peace was threatened by domestic opposition to "conservative" governments. (The term "conservative" here does not necessarily refer to policy orientation, but rather to the fact that governmental elites come from and represent the oligarchic interests of the small, affluent portions of the national populations. National leaders, then, are concerned with maintaining their political and economic prerogatives. They encourage "development" because they are the ones who disproportionately benefit from aid and investment. But they are essentially uninterested in policies which would threaten their own positions by creating new, alternative sub-elites.) This opposition is concentrated in ethnic minorities residing near national borders who frequently display more affinity with their cousins in a neighboring state than with their own central government which is geographically and ethnically distant. Thus, the primary challenge to security, in the wake of the Indochina War, is not so much the potential for invasion or even subversion, but rather the historically rooted antagonisms among the heterogeneous populations in each state. The question arises, Can pluralist domestic-political structures produce policies to raise the economic and social status of national populations that have neither power nor wealth and, as a result, have become prime candidates for insurgencies?

II

Reinforcing the new inward focus on regional security is the recent history of relations among several of ASEAN's members.

(1) Singapore

Singapore, the most unusual member of ASEAN, is a city-state, rather than a country, and views itself as much a global city as

[1] Jerry M. Silverman, "The Domino Theory: Alternatives to a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," *Asian Survey*, November 1975.

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a regional one. Not only is it a major international financial center, it also possesses one of the world's largest ports and petrochemical refineries. Thus, Singapore's attitude toward regional cooperation has been cautious, if not downright skeptical. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam has stated more than once that regional progress can best be promoted through "informal and flexible arrangements" free from "political overtones" and "grandiose schemes." Progress is seen as the product of economic efforts aided by outside industrial powers.[2] In this view, Singapore's interests are best served by establishing a broad array of international contacts. Malaysian and Indonesian efforts to develop their own trade facilities, thus reducing their dependence on Singapore, have accelerated the city-state's search for extraregional economic partners. At the Fifth ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference in Singapore (1972), Rajaratnam averred that the urgent and vital problems of Southeast Asia are economic. Therefore, he argued, the countries of the region must cooperate with extraregional states, for they are the only sources of the capital and technological expertise needed to raise regional economic standards. Since regional growth is dependent on global economic ties,[3] ASEAN should not sever its members' international links in the vain hope of developing regional common markets or import-substituting industries.

Just as Singapore has displayed skepticism over regional economic activities which eschew a global orientation, so has it viewed any discussion of regional-security arrangements that exclude external powers. That Malaysia and Singapore do not cooperate fully in defense matters is seen in the former's persistent refusal to allow Singapore access to the jungle-warfare training grounds at Johore. Singapore's fear of the use of a "nutcracker strategy" by its Malay neighbors to the north and south, however remote the possibility, constitutes at least a partial explanation of its desire for a great-power military presence in the region.

As early as 1967, Lee Kwan Yew was arguing publicly for the continued presence of American military forces in Southeast Asia, regardless of the outcome of the Indochina War. Further, Singapore has placed a high value on the Five-Power Defense Agreement (Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore) and on the presence of ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) forces in both countries. For Malaysia, they

[2] Kawin Wilanat, *Singapore's Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Field Report no. 10, June 1975), pp. 45-46.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

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provide a counterweight to Indonesia; for Singapore, a counterweight to Malaysia. Moreover, with the phasing out of the defense agreement, Malaysia sees no conflict between the agreement's transitional validity and ASEAN's movement toward regional neutralization.[4]

(2) Malaysia

Unlike Singapore, Malaysia has changed its strategy from defense to security:

"Defense" implies a definite military strategy of a state protecting its borders, usually by means of a military pact where its own military capabilities are thought to be inadequate. "Security", on the other hand, suggests a more general — both political and military — orientation toward minimizing threats to a state's territorial integrity. In Malaysia's case, the [earlier] emphasis on defense . . . was manifested in the Anglo-Malayan defense pact while the new emphasis on security . . . is reflected in its pursuit of regional neutrality.[5]

A security-oriented policy would attempt to bring about a lower level of regional tension without military alliances. Thus, the detente with communist countries, the proposal to create a regional zone of neutrality, politico-economic cooperation through ASEAN and overtures toward the new Indochinese regimes are all part of Malaysia's broad plan for national and regional security.

Whereas defense was seen as a strictly national matter, security is visualized more in regional terms. One Malaysian Foreign Ministry official spoke of regional neutralization as a standard against which other national foreign policy actions should be assessed. Thus, at such international meetings as the Lusaka and Commonwealth conferences, as well as at ASEAN conclaves, zonal neutrality became Malaysia's primary policy position.[6] In the aftermath of the Indochina War, the emphasis on regional security cooperation led the late Prime Minister Tun Razak to call for an extension of ASEAN to the rest of Southeast Asia (i.e., Burma and Indochina). Emphasizing ASEAN's nonideological nature, Razak told the ASEAN foreign ministers in May 1975:

Some eight years ago, even as the war in Indochina was raging, we five countries in Southeast Asia established ASEAN and began nurturing a structure of regional cooperation which over the years has proved itself

[4] Sevinc Carlson, *Malaysia: Search for National Unity and Economic Growth* (Beverly Hills: Sage, Washington Paper no. 25, 1975), p. 63.

[5] Jayaratnam Saravanamuttu, "A Study of the Content, Sources, and Development of Malaysian Foreign Policy, 1957-1975" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1976), p. 165.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

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constructive in promoting regional understanding and friendship. . . . The growth of ASEAN has been nurtured with care to maintain its non-antagonistic, non-military, and non-ideological character. I think today we can truly say that ASEAN's independent and progressive nature has won admiration from many quarters — large and small powers alike. . . . At this juncture, when the war in Indochina has ended, the countries of Southeast Asia have the opportunity to extend the scope of regional cooperation throughout Southeast Asia. I think I can say for the other ASEAN countries that ASEAN is ready to cooperate with the new Governments of Indochina and to offer its hand of friendship.[7]

Malaysia's emphasis on mutual self-abnegation as the road to security reflected, at least in part, that country's difficulties in effecting successful regional-defense collaboration. These difficulties are evident in border areas with two ASEAN neighbors, the Philippines and Thailand, although military cooperation with Indonesia in North Borneo has been progressing satisfactorily. Joint Malaysian-Indonesian efforts in 1975 were judged to have reduced the number of insurgents on the Kalimantan-Sarawak border to only 200. Malaysia's willingness to accommodate Indonesia's strategic policy in exchange for security cooperation even extended to Kuala Lumpur's acceptance of Djakarta's archipelago principle (by which Indonesia claims control of the seas surrounding its thousands of islands) with the understanding that Malaysia will retain direct access to its Borneo territories.[8] An additional sign of defense cooperation is that more and more Malaysian officers are going to Indonesia's military academies for training rather than to Sandhurst.[9]

Malaysian-Philippines relations have not fared so well, although the desire to maintain a semblance of ASEAN unity has led to concessions by both sides sufficient to keep their difficult Sulu Sea border situation essentially an internal Philippine problem — no small diplomatic accomplishment. The Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines has important ramifications for Philippine-Malaysian security cooperation. While both countries' membership in ASEAN has toned down the dispute, the conflict has had an inhibiting effect on actual defense collaboration.

According to one observer in 1975, Kuala Lumpur tacitly agreed not to condone further efforts by Philippine Muslim rebels to use Malaysian Sabah as a supply-and-training base, in exchange for which Manila agreed not to press its claim to Sabah.[10] With the

[7] Cited *ibid.*, pp. 187-188.
[8] "Malaysia '75 Focus," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 29, 1975, pp. 21-22.
[9] *Ibid.*, December 26, 1975, p. 24.
[10] Lela Garner Noble, "Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations," *Asian Survey*, May 1975. See, also, Marcos's public repudiation of the Philippines' Sabah claim in *Agence France Presse* (Hong Kong) March 3, 1976 (hereafter cited as *AFP*).

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ouster of Sabah Chief Minister Tun Mustapha, Sabah's support for the Philippine insurgency appears to have ceased in 1976, and most important for future Malaysian-Philippine political cooperation within ASEAN is the diplomatic support provided to Manila by ASEAN'S two Muslim members — Malaysia and Indonesia. At international Islamic meetings in 1973, 1974 and 1975, both declared Manila's policies toward the Muslim minority to be an internal Philippine matter, and both have urged that any international ramifications of these policies be discussed exclusively within ASEAN.[11] Indonesia has been particularly sympathetic to the Philippines' concern that the Muslim rebellion might develop into a full-scale secessionist movement. Foreign Minister Malik argued at the July 1975 Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Jeddah that no sovereign government can accept secession of a region within its borders.[12]

Nevertheless, the dispute has taken its toll in trust between Manila and Kuala Lumpur. As Lela Noble notes, general contacts between the two states are far fewer than either has with other ASEAN states.[13] The likelihood of positive military cooperation in this atmosphere is slim indeed.

If Malaysia and the Philippines have experienced difficulties over the Muslims in Mindinao and the Sulu Archipelago, the Malaysians are faced with an even more tense situation along the Thai border. Two insurgencies meet in that region — one, an irredentist Muslim movement in southern Thailand; the other, essentially an ethnic Chinese communist movement, directed against Malaysia but operating from base camps across the Thai border. In November 1969, Peking opened a clandestine radio station on behalf of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and in its initial broadcast, the MCP called for "an extensive people's war" in Malaysia and Singapore. Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok responded by setting up a joint antiguerrilla command which conducted operations against guerrilla training camps in southern Thailand. Such operations, of course, primarily benefited Malaysia, for the MCP did not constitute a threat to Thailand.

(3) Thailand

Thailand's problems in the South are centered on the five provinces immediately north of the Malaysian border in which

[11] Noble, pp. 462, 463, 466, and 467.
[12] "Indonesia '75 Focus," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 7, 1975, p. 24.
[13] Noble, p. 469.

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Malay-speaking Muslims make up most of the population. Suspicion of the central government and an absence of social ties with the Thai Buddhist community are compounded by the fact that only a handful of government bureaucrats stationed in the region are Muslim or speak Malay; none of these is a senior province-level official.[14] Declining economic fortunes during the past twenty years have been particularly objectionable to Thai Muslims because of the unfavorable comparison between their standard of living and the upward movement experienced by Thai Buddhists and nearby Malaysian villagers.[15]

Thus, Thai Muslims have some reasons for joining a variety of local groups agitating against the central government. Because the goals of these groups are so disparate — ranging from autonomy within Thailand to secession and unification with Malaysia — they have not cooperated effectively. One close observer of the region concludes that although the vast majority of Thai Muslims have not shown much interest in separation, they also refuse to report separatist activities because the separatists are fellow Muslims, whereas the Thai police are Buddhists.[16]

Thai authorities believe that the separatists have been receiving supplies from the Malaysian state of Kelantan, which is controlled by the militant Partai Islam (PAS), and that activities of separatist leaders in Kelantan have been ignored by the local authorities.[17] According to research in the border area undertaken by Ladd Thomas between 1970 and 1975, Malaysian support for the Thai Muslims lessened Thailand's willingness to cooperate in Malaysian efforts to destroy MCP sanctuaries. Some Thai officials reasoned that so long as the Malaysians are occupied with a communist threat on the border, they would not risk involvement in the separatist cause.[18] Moreover, Thai officials may believe that the sincerity of their rapprochement with Peking can be signaled by a less vigorous assault on MCP havens. Therefore, the mid-seventies saw growing tension over the manner in which anti-insurgent activities should be conducted.

In the spring of 1976, a single incident called into question the whole future of Thai-Malaysian border cooperation. Betong,

[14] M. Ladd Thomas, *Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper no. 28, April 1975), p. 5.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

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where the incident occurred, is a Thai border town whose population is virtually all Chinese. It has long been regarded by Malaysians as a communist enclave so undisturbed by Thai police that MCP organizers have openly collected party dues from local tin miners.[19] According to Malaysian officials, Thai toleration of MCP activities has made it possible for guerrilla forces in the area to grow in number from about 300 to more than 2,000 during the period 1960-1976 — most of them recruited in Thailand. If each guerrilla needs 6 supporters to survive, then the Thai side of the border may have close to 11,000 communist agents.[20]

The incident that triggered the Thai-Malaysian crisis concerned their "hot pursuit" agreement, which sanctioned Malaysian attacks on MCP positions in southern Thailand if permission was first secured from Bangkok. In early May 1976, a strafing-and-troop-landing operation was launched on a guerrilla base near Betong. Although the camp was destroyed, most of the terrorists escaped because Thai forces did not cut off routes to the North. Privately, Thai officials have justified their lack of cooperation in Malaysian forays on the grounds that if Thai troops are to aid in suppressing the MCP, then Malaysian troops must reciprocate by suppressing Muslim separatists in Kelantan.[21]

The Malaysian incursion became a Thai *cause célèbre* as mass demonstrations against the "hot pursuit" agreement occurred in Betong. Organized, according to Malaysian observers, by the local MCP, the demonstrators charged that Thai sovereignty had been violated and that Thai nationals had been illegally detained by Malaysian soldiers. The Bangkok press, reflecting the nationalist and more neutralist orientation of the civilian government in power since late 1973, pointed to the benefits of having Chinese guerrillas on the border to counter Muslim bandits who attempt to cross over from Malaysia — thus implying that neither Thai nor Malaysian border forces have been effective in this task.[22]

The Betong demonstrators, together with large numbers of university students in Bangkok, demanded that the 1965 pursuit agreement be revoked and that the 200-man Malaysian police detachment in Betong as well as the Thai forces in Kroh, Malaysia, be recalled to their home countries. Malaysian officials hoped to avoid such a denouement but did not want to jeopardize cooperation on

[19] K. Das, "Border Breaking Point," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 14, 1976, p. 10.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[22] Editorial in *The Nation* (Bangkok), May 5, 1976.

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other ASEAN matters. Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik urged both sides to preserve the agreement so that the communists would not succeed in their "new strategy of causing division among the ASEAN partners." [23] Malaysian observers declared that a scrapping of the border agreement would reduce Malaysian military strategy to one of containment, of intercepting the terrorists only when they crossed the border and chasing them only up to the frontier when they retreated for their sanctuaries in southern Thailand.[24]

After several weeks of discussion during May and early June, 1976, Thai Foreign Minister Pichai Rattakul insisted that Malaysian forces withdraw to their side of the border, thus straining relations between the hitherto close ASEAN partners. Malaysian Home Minister Ghazalie Shafie warned that Malaysia might well have to regard the Betong salient as "hostile territory" since there would be no further attempt to disrupt the MCP sanctuary:

> I fear the Betong salient will be completely dominated by the communists. Should this happen, that part of our border could be seriously threatened since the enemy will have an unencumbered base to train, plan, initiate action and withdraw to safety with impunity. . . . To protect our national interest and to regard that part of Thailand as hostile territory and the ramifications of such an attitude must not only be understood but also accepted by all.[25]

Prime Minister Hussein Onn indicated that the border might even have to be closed.

Malaysian officials believed that the main problem stemmed from low-level Thai officials in the South who reached a *modus vivendi* with the MCP in order to protect their own vested interests. As noted earlier, southern Thailand is regarded by Bangkok as a kind of Siberia where Thai officials operate almost as a Foreign Service. Local suspicion of Thai officialdom is buttressed by claims that Bangkok is actively colonizing the area through the expropriation of Muslim land for Thai settlers.[26]

Hence, Malaysia and Thailand found themselves, after ten years of security cooperation, at an impasse — each, with some reason, believing the other to be unconcerned about its neighbor's security situation. Nevertheless, at least some leaders in both countries realize that the primary reasons behind the agitation by Thai

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[23] Editorial in *Bangkok Post*, May 18, 1976.
[24] Editorial in *Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), May 13, 1976.
[25] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 18, 1976, p. 11.
[26] Norman Peagam, "Boiling Point in the Troubled South," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 21, 1976, p. 10.

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Muslims in northern Malaysia, and by Chinese MCP members in southern Thailand, concern the inequities each group has suffered at the hands of their respective governments. Thus, in each case, any long-term solution lies less in military suppression than in the provisions for more equitable socioeconomic conditions. So long as each minority believes that its home government operates on behalf of a majority ethnic community to the minority's detriment, then the socioeconomic base for political rebellion remains intact and the insurgencies will not atrophy regardless of border pacts.

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the October 1976 military coup, Thailand's new leadership reverted to the pre-October 1973, strong anticommunist orientation characteristic of the armed services. In order to re-establish "hot pursuit" arrangements in the border region, the new Thai government reportedly dropped its civilian predecessors' insistence on Malaysian cooperation against Thai Muslim separatists. Putting the best possible face on what clearly was a significant concession to Kuala Lumpur, General Kriangsak Chamanan declared:

> Whether they are separatists or not, they are Thai citizens. . . . We will not allow Malaysian troops into our country to fight them. They are our own internal problem. . . . We also should not give the so-called separatist movement any political status. . . . This would be making it possible for them to officially ask for assistance from countries like Libya or make appearances at international Muslim conferences to make attacks on our government.[27]

In late November 1976, the Thai and Malaysian prime ministers stated that a new border pact was imminent. Simultaneously, the Thai military launched a direct attack on three terrorist camps in Yala Province, in coordination with Malaysian forces which moved into position on their side of the border to cut off any escape into Malaysia.[28] In March 1977, the two countries concluded a border-cooperation pact establishing the right of hot pursuit for Malaysian forces as well as provisions for joint military operations. Once again, Malaysian troops were given permission to operate on Thai soil against the MCP in the Betong salient.

Within days of the military-cooperation agreement, the two states launched a force of 5,000 troops against an estimated 200 insurgents in the Sadao region. Aircraft and ground forces from both armies were employed and the duration of the engagement was left

[27] Interview in *Bangkok Post*, October 28, 1976.
[28] Editorial, *ibid.*, November 30, 1976.

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to the field commanders. Clearly, a new, highly cooperative stage in Thai-Malaysian military relations had been reached.

Although Thailand's primary goal was undoubtedly to engender a sense of political debt in Malaysia — a debt perhaps to be repaid in ASEAN councils over future questions of Thai security needs — Bangkok also received some direct military benefits. Insofar as the Thai communists and Muslim separatists have been allied with the MCP, military operations have disrupted the activities of all three. Nevertheless, Thailand still prohibits Malaysian action in those areas of southern Thailand inhabited primarily by Muslims.

Military operations continued throughout 1977, making the combined border forays the most extensive bilateral Thai-Malaysian collaboration in modern times, involving up to 16,000 troops.[29] While communist casualties have been minimal — suggesting sufficient local cooperation to inform them in advance of military strike plans — the operations have destroyed a number of jungle strongholds, and the MCP appears to be on the run.

Bangkok's ambivalence in dealing with the Malaysian communists may also be partly attributed to its new relationship with communist-controlled Indochina since May 1975. As Jeffry Race has pointed out, between 1950 and 1973, Thai military and bureaucratic elites cooperated with the United States to buy off the urban middle class and the peasantry.[30] The student-led revolt of late 1973 saw this coalition come apart as the middle classes strove for a share of internal power and the United States began to disengage from the Southeast Asian mainland. Through 1973, Thailand aided anticommunist regimes in Indochina, believing that if opponents were busy dealing with civil wars, they would hardly be in a position to meddle in Thai affairs. Thus, a unified Thailand benefited from American military spending, while both halves of Vietnam were ruined by war and Laos and Cambodia remained fragmented.

In the hope of sapping Bangkok's energy and diverting its attention, Hanoi responded to the Thai strategy by advising and supporting rebels among the hill tribes of northern Thailand and disaffected ethnic Thais in the Northeast. Hanoi's success was demonstrated by the growth of both insurgencies — from an estimated 1,500 and 1,700 rebels, respectively, in 1972 to approximately 3,500

[29] Frederic Moritz, "Thailand, Malaysia Step Up Joint Pursuit of Guerrillas," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 1, 1977.

[30] Race, "Political Change in War-Time: Thai Elite Responses to Stress," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 1975.

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each by 1974.[31] But, the reasons for this growth are manifold and are related more to domestic inequities than to Hanoi's external aid. Although these reasons will not be considered here in detail, they are worth listing: (a) obstacles to vertical social mobility for regional peoples who are advancing in literacy and awareness of the outside world; (b) a highly centralized bureaucratic structure extracting resources from the countryside to support the cities; (c) lack of political-recruitment mechanisms in the countryside, thus prompting aspiring elites to opt against the central government; (d) military and bureaucratic ineptitude, leading to ineffective suppression efforts; (e) a growing population, the lack of new cultivable land, and an archaic rice technology.[32]

Race reports that the structure and operations of the rebel movement in Thailand's North and Northeast resemble the revolutionary movement in Vietnam: a hierarchical organization with party cells extending down to the local level. Moreover, recruitment is facilitated by the opportunity for vertical mobility offered to those at the bottom of the social scale through training in China, Laos or Vietnam.[33]

A North Vietnamese military document intercepted in 1975 revealed that Hanoi planned to step up the level of conflict in the Northeast in order to establish a liberated area of 50-100 kilometers along the Mekong River and to make it a protectorate of both Vietnam and Laos.[34] The Vietnamese have already established a sophisticated logistical system between Hanoi and several entry points along the Thai-Lao and Thai-Cambodian borders through which they funnel literature, currency, weapons and communications equipment in support of the Thai Communist Party.[35]

Capping the insurgency problem in the North and Northeast is the presence of more than 70,000 refugees brought about by the Indochina War. When tens of thousands of Thais are clamoring for land of their own, the Thai government is in no position to provide a permanent home for these refugees. Nor did the Thai civilian government (prior to the military coup of October 1976) wish to

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 3. These figures were provided by official Thai and U.S. Mission sources. See, also, Robert Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1976.

[32] These are discussed at some length in Race's paper. See, also, his article, "The January 1975 Thai Elections: Preliminary Data and Inferences," *Asian Survey*, April 1975.

[33] Race, p. 5.

[34] Cited in Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm," *Asian Survey*, August 1975, p. 685. See, also, Robert Zimmerman, "Thailand 1975," *Asian Survey*, February 1976. p. 170.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 691.

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antagonize its neighbors by encouraging any further population flight or by seeming to harbor an exile army. Indeed, both Hanoi and Vientiane have charged that counter-revolutionary activities in Laos are being directed by an organization of former Laotian military officers based in Thailand and aided by U.S. and Thai authorities.[36]

Hanoi has made its position perfectly clear regarding the prerequisities for improved Thai-Indochinese relations: (a) the abrogation of all defense ties with the United States and (b) the removal of all American military personnel from Thailand. Prime Minister Seni Pramoj signaled his willingness to accommodate Hanoi's demands by his June 1976 decision to sustain the previous government's policy (requiring all U.S. military facilities in Thailand and the remaining 1,830 U.S. military personnel to be withdrawn by July 20 — with the exception of about 270 advisers). Pramoj's decision required the shutdown of the highly sophisticated electronic-intelligence post at Ramasun which was reportedly capable of monitoring virtually any airwave communication emanating from Indochina. Thai Foreign Ministry sources stated, however, that the exit of U.S. military personnel did not mean a cessation of U.S. aid.

From the Thai viewpoint, the continuation of U.S. military aid adds to their defense capability and deters Vietnamese plans to expand the northern insurgencies. But to Hanoi, American aid is an indication that the United States intends to continue interfering in regional affairs.

With the installation of a military regime in the last quarter of 1976, Thai relations with Indochina — never cordial, even under the previous government, which had made a major accommodative effort — plummeted to a new low. Whereas prior to October 1976, Thai-Laotian negotiations on the opening of border-crossing points and the repatriation of Lao refugees were proceeding slowly, these meetings ceased as the new government reverted to strident anti-communism. Within a week of the junta's assumption of power, Thai and Laotian forces were once again clashing along the border. Thai appeals for closer relations with the United States met with stepped up propaganda attacks against Bangkok from Hanoi and Vientiane.[37]

Hanoi was concerned that this provided an opportunity for the United States to re-establish a military presence on the

[36] See, for example, the report in *The Nation* (Bangkok), March 14, 1976, and Vientiane Radio in Lao, May 26, 1976.

[37] David Andelman, "Junta Re-Examining Thai Relations with Neighbor Nations and U.S.," *New York Times,* October 18, 1976.

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Southeast Asian mainland. News media in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) argued, probably with a Soviet audience in mind, that Washington planned once again to add Thailand to a chain of bases running from Okinawa to Diego Garcia.[38] Western reports noted that American technicians were preparing Takhli Air Base, ninety miles north of Bangkok, as a refueling station for U.S. Navy planes monitoring the Soviet Union's Indian Ocean fleet.[39]

The new Thai government is beefing up its military capabilities. Even under its civilian predecessor, the military enjoyed large budgets and U.S. aid infusions, including helicopters, trucks, mobile artillery, small arms and Sidewinder SAMs. In addition, the current army commander-in-chief has asked for American F-5Es to match Laotian MiG-21s.[40]

Hanoi has charged Bangkok with depredations against the resident Vietnamese community in Thailand's Northeast, including the internment of some 7,000 Vietnamese. Thailand has denied these allegations, insisting that only a small number of Vietnamese refugees who entered the country after the communist victory of April 1975 have been sent to a refugee center, which is open to inspection by representatives of appropriate international organizations.[41] Ignoring this reply, Hanoi claimed that Thailand's actions, in effect, abrogated the August 1976 Vietnam-Thailand joint communique on normalization of relations. Moreover, Hanoi cited VWP First Secretary Le Duan's political report to the National Assembly in which Vietnam pledged support for "the just cause of the peoples in Southeast Asian countries for national independence, democracy, and social progress" — thus implying that such independence had not yet been attained.[42]

That many noncommunist leftist and moderate students and officials, previously active in the Thai parliamentary system, have fled to Laos and, for the first time, have associated with the Thai Communist Party (CPT) is an ominous sign for future Thai stability and for the long-term legitimacy of the military government. In late 1976, four exiled members of the Socialist Party endorsed the CPT armed struggle — the first such endorsement by any parliamentary group.[43] Thai authorities estimate that there are about 1,200 Thai

[38] Hanoi International Service in English, October 21, 1976.
[39] UPI dispatch; in *The Arizona Republic*, October 20, 1976.
[40] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 23, 1976, p. 28, and *Bangkok Post*, November 11, 1976.
[41] Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai, November 5, 1976.
[42] Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, November 20, 1976.
[43] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 5, 1976, p. 9, and Frederic Moritz, "Thai Leftists Swing over to Guerillas," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 27, 1976.

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students in Laos, may presumably being trained to join the CPT.[44] Moreover, in what may be an indirect appeal to Peking not to endorse the new rebels, Thai news media have reported that the Soviet Union is funding rebel training in the USSR, Laos and Vietnam.[45]

From the perspective of ASEAN military cooperation, the whole issue of Thailand's security in the North and Northeast would seem to be irrelevant. While it may have been viewed as a Thai-U.S. problem before the American disengagement, no ASEAN leader, with the exception of Singapore's Le Kwan Yew, has offered assistance or advice to Thailand with respect to its northern insurgents. Because none of them shares a border with Thailand in the insurgent-ridden areas, and because all are fearful of Vietnam's capabilities and intentions, the ASEAN states have studiously avoided this most serious security challenge to one of its number. In short, the situation on Thailand's Indochinese border is not seen as a regional issue but, rather, as the exclusive responsibility of Bangkok. It is this unwillingness to think of security in a regional context — despite lip service to the contrary — to which we turn below.

III

ASEAN's nonmilitary orientation is best exemplified by Malaysia's suggestion that the organization expand to other Southeast Asian states, including Indochina. This willingness (even desire) to include states with incompatible ideologies emphasizes the lack of military arrangements in ASEAN and the desirability of neutralizing the region. By May 1975, during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference in Kuala Lumpur, it was publicly announced that a "Blueprint for the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" was being formulated by senior ASEAN officials; the plan would stress regional and national self-reliance rather than big-power guarantees, which had been a part of the original 1971 proposal. The absence of any big-power response hastened the replacement of the "neutralization" concept with a new expression — "zonal neutrality."

In his address to the 1975 Foreign Ministers Conference, Malaysia's Prime Minister Tun Razak stated:

> The premise of the neutralization proposal is regional and national resilience. Southeast Asia must stand on its own feet. We — individual countries as well as the region as a whole — must be self-reliant if we wish to survive. If a country or a people values its way of life, it must be prepared to defend it against any form of external encroachment. *If a people is not*

[44] *Siam Rat* (Bangkok), November 27, 1976.
[45] Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai, November 30, 1976.

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prepared to fight in the defense of its sovereignty and its values, it will not survive — indeed it does not deserve to survive. The best defense lies in the people themselves — in their commitments, their will and capacity. This is the premise of the neutrality system as it applies both to individual countries and to the region as a whole. It is not premised on vague hopes and euphoric dreams. It is premised on friendship and goodwill, on an openminded readiness to cooperate . . . *and equally on national resilience*. . . . The key to our future security and stability lies not in outdated and irrelevant attitudes of the cold war, but in imaginative and constructive response to the new realities of today.[46]

"National resilience" was further defined by Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Ghazalie Shafie in Djakarta, when he said that a state is resilient if "its socio-political system is nationally accepted and [if] it has the inherent ability to meet the heightened expectations for greater prosperity and social justice of its population." [47] Note that this definition of national resilience includes no international component.

Malaysia's view of regional security does not, however, represent the consensus in ASEAN. From the beginning, Singapore has expressed doubts about the 1971 proposal, arguing instead that a great-power balance in the region would lead to greater stability than would the absence of such a balance. Without a balance, nations in the area would be encouraged to fend for themselves, leading to tension and instability which the great powers could subsequently exploit.[48] Thus, Singapore does not believe that ASEAN is capable of running its affairs smoothly and equitably. As the smallest state in the region and one whose economy is the most globally oriented, Singapore believes its interests would not be served by a politically self-sufficient ASEAN. Nor does it believe that neutralization can be declared as a *regional* principle, so long as the Philippines maintains U.S. bases and both the United States and the Soviet Union are building up their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.

China, of course, endorsed ASEAN neutralization when Tun Razak visited Peking in May 1974 to establish diplomatic ties. ASEAN neutralization squares with Peking's view that no single power should dominate the region and with its Third World diplomacy of nonalignment and opposition to "superpower hegemonism."

The equanimity with which the ASEAN states seem to

[46] Cited in Saravanamuttu, pp. 153-154. (Emphasis added.)
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 155.
[48] These are Lee Kwan Yew's views as summarized by Wilariat, p. 97.

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have accepted the Philippines' decision to retain American bases is rather anomalous, however. Indonesia, the best-armed and largest member of ASEAN, appears in no hurry to see an American military exodus from the region. Foreign Minister Adam Malik has stated that "the role of the Americans is still important in this area as a Pacific power and as a superpower. That is why, before the American bases are released, we [wish to be able] to protect ourselves." [49] Although the Thais insisted on the shutdown of all U.S. military bases, in response to domestic political dynamics and in the hope of placating the Vietnamese, it is worth noting Washington's agreement that it is still obligated under the Manila Pact to defend Thailand against aggression.[50]

Moreover, it is apparent that the Philippines intends neither to abrogate its security treaty with the United States nor to close down the sprawling naval and air bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field. President Marcos has stated that although Manila wishes to convert some of the base installations into trade, industrial and Philippine-military facilities, he agrees that the bases are necessary if the United States is to maintain an effective presence in the Western Pacific and contribute to the military balance in Asia. Marcos has stressed that U.S. forces in the Philippines are responsible not for counterinsurgent efforts, but for regional security.[51] Despite Philippine endorsement of the zone of neutrality, Manila is promoting the continuation of a U.S. military presence in Asia in order to effect a balance of forces in the region.

In 1976, leaders in three of the ASEAN states (Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore) indicated their desire to retain American forces and bases in Southeast Asia, and the other two have raised no objections. At the June 1976 meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers, in Manila, while zonal neutrality was once again endorsed as a regional goal, the assembled officials also accepted President Marcos's decision in regard to U.S. bases.[52]

These conflicting positions are indicative of the ambiguous security policies in Southeast Asia. With the exception of Bangkok, ASEAN governments probably concur with President Marcos's view: (a) there is no forseeable foreign threat to the ASEAN states, and (b) security problems center around internal insurgencies

[49] Interview with Adam Malik, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 4, 1975, p. 30.
[50] Report of a statement by U.S. Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, *ibid.*, April 2, 1976, p. 14.
[51] *AFP*, December 7, 1975, and Marcos interview, *Die Welt* (Bonn), December 30, 1975.
[52] "Neutral Zone Backed in Southeast Asia," *New York Times*, June 27, 1976.

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springing from the social and economic grievances of national minorities. If those grievances are not redressed, then the opportunity for foreign intervention increases.[53] But, while abjuring any ASEAN-wide military arrangement, the five states still hedge their bets by leaving out the regional welcome-mat for U.S. naval and air forces, particularly since the USSR is increasing its naval presence and seems to be competing with Hanoi.

Moreover, it may be easier to rely on an external power whose regional motives are seen as politically benign than to create regional military organizations that would involve neighboring states still viewed with suspicion. For example, ASEAN — because of a Philippine-Malaysian disagreement on whether each state should have the veto over any mediation undertaken by a proposed ministerial council — has been hard-pressed to achieve consensus on a treaty of amity and cooperation.[54] Retention of the veto in the draft treaty demonstrates the high level of suspicion which would have to be overcome before any truly regional security cooperation could begin.

IV

The most important external impediment to regional military cooperation is Hanoi's attitude toward ASEAN. Since the end of the Indochina War, the ASEAN states have assiduously reiterated their good intentions toward the new communist governments of Indochina, an earnest of which has been their agreement not to add a military dimension to ASEAN. Publicly, however, Hanoi has not only spurned these overtures but responded with vituperation, insisting that ASEAN is nothing more than an American stalking-horse serving "to rally all pro-American reactionary forces [against] the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia." According to the Vietnamese army's press service: "ASEAN's extraordinary summit conference this time is actually prompted by the United States with a view to speedy realization of this new scheme of intervention and aggression . . . in the Southeast Asian region." [55]

While Vietnam views ASEAN with suspicion, Hanoi has indicated that it desires cordial bilateral relations with the group's members. In July 1976, in the course of visits to several ASEAN

[53] Marcos press conference, *AFP*, January 28, 1976; Philippine-Singapore joint communique, *AFP*, January 29, 1976; and Marcos address at the Bali summit, Kuala Lumpur International Service, February 23, 1976.

[54] *New York Times*, May 16, 1975, and *AFP*, February 21, 1976.

[55] *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (Hanoi), February 22, 1976.

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states, SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien reportedly assured his hosts that the Soviet Union would not be given a base at Camranh Bay and that his country did not consider the Malayan Communist Party to be a national liberation movement. Hien stated that what the SRV meant when it insisted the countries of Southeast Asia become "independent" was the exclusion of American bases, rather than the rise to power of a communist-led insurgency.[56]

Hien's encouraging remarks were offset, however, by Laotian and Vietnamese objections to the 1971 ASEAN neutralization scheme during debate over that proposal at the August 1976 Conference of Nonaligned States, in Colombo. ASEAN members were keenly disappointed when Laos and Vietnam exerted sufficient pressure on conference delegations to reverse the nonaligned countries' 1974 endorsement of the ASEAN zone-of-neutrality declaration. Moreover, the Indochinese alternative declaration appeared to reverse Deputy Foreign Minister Hien's bilateral promises not to support local insurgencies, since it cited the Indochinese victories as a model for the struggle against neocolonialism in Southeast Asia. Singapore's prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, asked if this was "a precursor of the kind of double definition of independence which will classify a Marxist state as being genuinely independent and the others as being not genuine [and hence subject] to overthrow by violence." [57]

It is noteworthy that Cambodia did not allow itself to be associated with the Laotian-Vietnamese objections to the ASEAN neutrality zone or with their counterproposal. Integral to the Laotian-Vietnamese alternative was the statement that communist forces had emerged dominant in the region. Hence, it appeared the path was being laid for legitimizing a permanent Soviet presence in alliance with two of the Indochinese victors.

The SRV's primary aim is to bring about a total American military withdrawal from Asia — fitting nicely into the USSR's strategic design but certainly not into China's. As its "ace in the hole," Hanoi has the ability to "fully support the struggle of the peoples of the Southeast Asian nations," and it has implied that to forestall the playing of that ace, ASEAN must refuse to tolerate retention of any U.S. forces.[58] Yet, it is precisely because the ASEAN states are

[56] Nayan Chanda, "Vietnam's Dove Flies Home," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 30, 1976, pp. 11-12.

[57] Singapore Domestic Service in English, August 18, 1976.

[58] *Nhan Dan;* reported in the *Washington Star,* March 3, 1976. See also, "The Future of Southeast Asian Countries Must Be Genuine Independence, Peace, and Neutrality," in the Vietnam Workers Party's theoretical journal *Hoc Tap,* May 1976.

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unable to engage in mutual security efforts that they desire both an American presence and continued U.S. military aid. Therefore, the tension between the ASEAN states and Indochina persists, in part at least, as a function of ASEAN's inability to create an exclusively regional security arrangement. Although the ASEAN members point to the absence of such an arrangement [59] as a sign of their benevolent intentions toward Indochina, Hanoi would probably view a regional security arrangement with more equanimity than it views the current situation.

[59] The reader should keep in mind the distinctions among "multilateral defense planning," "mutual defense" and "bilateral assistance through multilateral institutions." The 1954 SEATO agreement provided a framework both for multilateral defense planning and bilateral (U.S.) assistance to Southeast Asian allies. But it did not really provide for mutual defense in the sense of organized military operations, which would include all member states defending one of their number under attack. More recently, ASEAN is clearly not a military arrangement, although some of its members engage in mutual defense activities (Thailand and Malaysia; Indonesia and Malaysia). In short, there is no multilateral security institution operating in Southeast Asia today.

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U.S. FOREIGN AID AND THE UNSTABLE POLITY: A REGIONAL CASE STUDY

by Charles F. Doran

Policymakers and analysts have long debated whether U.S. foreign assistance contributes to the political stability of the country that receives aid.[1] Political stability is often regarded as a prerequisite for satisfactory economic growth and development. Without a modicum of stability the developing polity — be it democratic, communist or rightist authoritarian — is less likely to carry out its investment programs efficiently, train its labor force effectively, or consistently expand its GNP, services and per capita income. While investment imbalances and planning disjunctures may on occasion act as a positive stimulus to development, political violence and chronic mass unrest are generally viewed as constraints on rapid economic progress: sufficient disruption inevitably occurs in the economic and planning sectors without borrowing additional problems from the political arena. Foreign economic aid contributes to the overall

[1] Although argumentation has varied, those writers who in general share the premise that aid contributes to stability include the following: John D. Montgomery, *Foreign Aid in International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 54; James R. Schlesinger, "Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade," in David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen, eds., *National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 687-690; Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey, *The Economics of Under-developed Countries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Max Millikan, "The Political Case for Economic Development Aid," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 1-9; Richard Rosecrance, *International Relations: Peace or War?* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 258. Those analysts who have expressed varying degrees of doubt concerning the stability thesis include Herbert Feis, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Dell, 1966), p. 68; Samuel P. Huntington, "Foreign Aid: For What and for Whom?," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1971, pp. 114-134; Morton Kaplan, "United States Foreign Policy in a Revolutionary Age," in Kaplan, ed., *Great Issues of International Politics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p. 207; George Liska, *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); pp. 172-173; Edward C. Banfield, "American Aid Doctrines," in *Public Policy* (1961), pp. 44-74; Philippe C. Schmitter, "Foreign Military Assistance, National Military Spending and Military Rule in Latin America," in Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), p. 172; and, most poignantly, Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review*, June 1962, pp. 301-309.

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development process, it is argued, by providing the recipient government with greater decision flexibility through funds which can be used to reduce the strains caused by inflation, foreign-exchange deficits or investment shortfalls in specific project areas. Foreign military assistance may similarly be employed to bolster regime structures. Thus, foreign aid allegedly reinforces orderly political relationships and thereby enhances economic growth and development.

Debate over the nature of linkages between aid and stability has grown more important in the light of President Carter's proposed overhaul of the foreign assistance program. For example, the administration's Development Coordination Committee, a high-level study group, is concerned about the effect that "security-supporting assistance" and other categories of aid have had on the availability of funds and on the rate and manner of economic development. A pending bill sponsored by the late Senator Humphrey would create a new International Development and Cooperation Administration, which would attempt to organize aid much more effectively and try to focus more directly on world hunger and poverty while de-emphasizing security goals. But administrative reform cannot occur in a vacuum, devoid of historical experience. In particular, many of the policy recommendations on aid currently being offered to Congress and the president presuppose an answer to the question of whether past foreign assistance allocations have sustained orderly development.

In this article, we shall examine the aid/stability linkage in the context of historical experience within the Caribbean-Central American region. Sharp increases in U.S. economic assistance to parts of that region are planned for 1978-1979. Innovative multilateral aid relationships among several donor governments and the World Bank are also under consideration.[2] Against the background of renewed interest in assistance policy, an examination of the impact of foreign aid on the domestic political stability of Caribbean and Central American polities is especially timely.

The Aid/Stability Debate

"Liberal" and radical-left critics of U.S. foreign aid attack it not on grounds of political failure, but on the grounds that it has

[2] World Bank, "Conference on Economic Development in the Caribbean" (news release), December 15, 1977.

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been too successful.[3] It has, they assert, sustained the veneer of political order too effectively, reinforcing corrupt and repressive military regimes at the expense of more responsive democratic governments. Pluralism, they say, already carries a handicap in the race for survival. External pressure aside, democratic governments such as those of Bosch, if denied vigorous external support, are more likely to be toppled because of their parliamentary reluctance to use force and their more diverse ideological composition of centrist and left-of-center elements, epitomized by Allende of Chile. In democratic countries, assistance which bolsters the military at the cost of the civilian sectors in fact undermines the capacity of civilians to retain control, according to these critics.

Another political argument heard against the current distribution of foreign military aid is that although such aid may counter insurgency and domestic turmoil in the short run, it facilitates revolution in the long run. Since the receipt of military assistance obviates the need to make political reforms in the short term, so the argument goes, foreign assistance stifles political adjustment which can be critical to the nonviolent transformation of class relations and regime structures. The present generation receives a false subsidy, in terms of regional calm, for which the next generation must pay. Short-run political benefits have been purchased at long-run political cost.

Proponents of current aid programs have responded to these accusations in a number of ways. They point out that aid is less often reduced or terminated because of the political complexion of the regime than because of a violent change of regime accompanied by the loss of constitutional privileges and rights. Between 1961 and 1963, for example, governments were overthrown in Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. The Kennedy administration, fearing contagion, officially stated U.S. opposition to the interruption of constitutional guarantees by any faction of whatever ideological persuasion. Moreover, despite the troublesome observation that the United States has pursued detente and greater commercial ties with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (governments scarcely known for their toleration of personal freedom) and is being asked to reduce its ties with rightist governments which tradi-

[3] Juan Bosch, *Pentagonism: A Substitute for Imperialism;* trans. by H. Lane (New York: Grove Press, 1968); Senator Fullbright, in U.S. Congress, *Economic Issues in Military Assistance, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 25-29.

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tionally have been friendly to the United States, Washington has in some instances used aid as a lever to oppose dictatorship in this hemisphere. Duvalier, for example, lost external aid from the United States in the mid-1960s because of his notorious suppression of domestic freedoms. But the implementation of such policies is often bureaucratically difficult and potentially compromising with respect to external alliance relations more broadly viewed. What was true in regard to Greece and Turkey within NATO might also be true within the OAS for political reasons strictly internal to the alliance. Aid-termination policies are internally complicated, necessitating extraordinary administrative measures because ethnic and national interest groups may lobby for special treatment. Such policies can be embarrassing when the recipient government questions the equity of policies within the alliance which could be construed as contradictory or characteristic of a double standard.

In addition, if rightist or quasi-military dictatorships are deplorable, communist totalitarianism may be seen as worse from the perspective of the individual citizen who wishes to achieve both political freedom *and* economic well-being. Dictators may come and go, but totalitarian governments remain in power. For the United States to oppose rightist governments actively, it would require at least some assurance in regard to the nature of the new regime, and such assurance is unlikely to be forthcoming.

The essence of the policy trade-off is this. Which cost is greater? The cost for the average citizen of living under a rightist dictatorship? Or the cost to oneself of attempting to transform another government's domestic policies from outside? That the individuals in the respective societies bear different (and perhaps unequal) costs does not make the choice any easier. Similarly, is there a greater risk of communist takeover in unseating an unattractive regime now, or in continuing aid policies which may at some future time precipitate a revolution? The dilemma for the policymaker is that even if he makes a valid choice, he does not have much direct control over the creation of new regime structures or societal conditions. Furthermore, depending on how one looks at the aid decisions, the initiation, continuation or termination of foreign aid can all be viewed as interference in other governments' domestic affairs and can have decisive local and regional effects. Hence, the policymaker is likely to act very cautiously in revising programs which could have enormous consequences for the recipient polity, for alliance relationships and for U.S. strategic interests.

Finally, aside from dictatorships like that of Pérez Jiménez

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or "Papa Doc" Duvalier, which have become infamous for their corruption and disregard for the public welfare, there is a problem of information concerning the nature of most political regimes for the analyst who seeks to make equity judgments. Which military dictatorships are to be viewed as socially beneficent and which as socially reprehensible? Military governments such as that of contemporary Peru, which has a populist, reform orientation, can be socially progressive, just as a number of "civilian" regimes can be unequivocally repressive. Nor are distinctions according to the degree of "democracy," the rate of economic growth, or the level of income equality likely to be intellectually satisfying, especially where empirical data are either missing or ambiguous and where congruence across indicators is less than uniform.

Both sides of the aid debate having been stated, it is apparent that a fundamental relationship is still quite uncertain: that is, the impact, if any, that U.S. aid in fact has on domestic turmoil and subversion — in this case, in the Caribbean-Central American region. Regardless of one's political objectives in distributing aid, one can scarcely discuss policy prescriptions concerning its proper allocation without knowing whether aid has any impact on the recipient society. Indeed, one can ask four questions:

(1) What has been the historical pattern of U.S. foreign-aid allocation in the region across a reasonably extended interval?

(2) What is the pattern, if any, among various types of domestic political instability among the aid recipients over the same period?

(3) Is there or is there not a significant relationship between the allocation of aid and the incidence of political strife within the recipient polity?

(4) Has the United States used aid as a punitive instrument, accompanied perhaps by an implied threat to domestic order, in order to keep obstreperous states in line?

By answering these questions empirically, one may be in a better position to determine what aid policies to recommend and what possible reforms to suggest in light of the Caribbean and Central American experience.

U.S. Foreign Aid and Conflict: Stimulus or Constraint?

A remarkable historical feature of the U.S. program of foreign assistance in the Caribbean and Central America is its homogeneity. Figure 1 shows the extremely high correlation over time between military and economic aid. While the increase in magnitude of economic aid has been much more pronounced, the pattern

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of economic and military aid deliveries to the region has been similar at each time point. When economic aid increased in the periods 1954-1957 and 1960-1963, for example, so did military aid; likewise, both kinds of aid declined slightly during 1957-1960. Thus, the general impression left by the data on aid allocation to the Caribbean and Central America is that economic and military aid follow the same pattern across time.

For practical purposes, one can speak of a single aid package (see "Total," Figure 1) having two components of rather constant relative change. Economic assistance is much larger in dollar amount than its military counterpart, but because of the sensitive character of military assistance, the potential political impact of the two kinds of aid may not be so different. The high correlation between the respective aid components suggests that the same factors tend to condition the regional distribution of each. Whether U.S. administrators view the objectives of the two kinds of aid as identical is an open question. The practical outcome, however, is that in the Caribbean-Central American area, the U.S. government appears to have coordinated the two components of its foreign assistance program closely.

The other salient feature of U.S. aid to the region is the sizable increase in the amount of aid distributed over the fifteen years covered in this study. In 1952, total U.S. aid deliveries to the Caribbean and Central America were less than $8 million. A decade later, U.S. assistance totaled more than $65 million. True, percentage increases can be misleading because of the small size of the initial base, but the upsurge in aid levels within a single decade is nonetheless noteworthy.

Late in Eisenhower's first term, a huge increase in aid expenditures took place. After 1960, the second major increase occurred on the heels of the Castro revolution and Kennedy's inauguration of the Alliance for Progress. The failure of the Bay of Pigs expedition probably stimulated the slight expansion of military aid noticeable in 1962-1963. (See Figure 1.) With the growing and expensive U.S. involvement in Vietnam, overall aid allocations to the Caribbean-Central American area fell in 1964, but they were still far above the average of the prior decade. Given the small size of the region's economies and the fragile foundations of its governments, the substantial dollar flow into these countries by the mid-1960s carried at least the potential for massive social influence.

With respect to the second question — the nature and dimensions of political instability in the region — Figure 2 shows re-

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ported events of guerrilla warfare (subversion), mass political demonstrations and politically motivated arrests. Each event-type was chosen because it represents an important component of a "factor," or cluster of variables, in a number of data studies; taken together, the event-types are also representative of three broad forms of political instability. Another criterion of choice was that the event-types be sensitive to aid impacts, assuming that foreign assistance has some sort of effect on societal stability. One advantage of the choice is that the variables were uncorrelated with one another. The events were coded and collated from the regional press and the *New York Times*.[4] They provide a broad, but selective, index of the domestic political instability experienced by eight Caribbean and Central American nations: Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.[5]

The frequency of domestic instability is highly stochastic; that is, it tends to vacillate greatly across time, rather than follow a smooth curve. Despite the stochastic nature of political instability, something of a trend (see Figure 2) is evident from 1948 through 1959-1960 for all three event-types. In fact, regional domestic conflict seems to reach a peak in these years of the Cuban Revolution, although the data do not include Cuba.[6] The impact of the Cuban Revolution on politics throughout the region is undeniable, but it is an impact which dissipates by the end of the period.

From the presentations in Figures 1 and 2, one cannot either verify or reject the hypothesis that U.S. foreign aid has an impact on domestic political instability. For a more precise test, we must employ time-series analysis, regressing the dependent variables of political conflict against the independent variable, U.S. for-

[4] A 3,000-event data bank on domestic political instability in the Caribbean and Central America formed the basis of this study. Limited on the one hand by the origins of the postwar external-assistance program and on the other by the resources available and time required to complete the laborious task of coding and collation, the period covered by this study overlaps with that of several other event-data collections, including WEISS, COBDAB, the Second Yale Handbook, and the Feierabend Data Bank, thus facilitating comparison and replication. For an extensive discussion of the problems of source reliability, see Charles F. Doran, Robert Pendley and George Antunes, "A Test of Cross-National Event Reliability: Global Versus Regional Data Sources," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1973, pp. 667-684. For the factor results from which the variables were chosen, see Doran, *Domestic Conflict in State Relations: The American Sphere of Influence* (Beverly Hills: Sage, Professional Paper in International Studies, 1975).

[5] These nations constitute what might be described empirically as a core-state region and sphere of influence in which hierarchy, dependence upon the United States, and isolation from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are the principal features. Doran, "Hierarchic Regionalism from the Core State Perspective," in W. O. Chittick, ed., *The Analysis of Foreign Policy Outputs* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1975), pp. 210-235.

[6] Doran, *Domestic Conflict in State Relations. . . .*

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FIGURE 1

U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE CARIBBEAN-CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION*



*Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama

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FIGURE 2

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN-CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION*



*Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama

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eign aid.[7] Since the two aid components are so highly correlated (r=.80), they are treated as a single variable. A strong and statistically significant result — *U.S. foreign assistance co-varies with subversion in the Carribbean and Central America* — is reported in the following:

$$\text{Subversion}_{t-2} = -.97 + .035 \text{ Total Aid}$$
$$t\text{-ratio} = (-3.38)\ (5.61)$$
$$R^2 = .51 \qquad F = 31.44$$

While total aid fails to explain an appreciable amount of variance in either the "Political Demonstrations" or the "Arrests" variables, the results for subversion are significant (P=.0005).[8] In this bivariate test, more than half the variance (R^2) in subversion appears to be explained by the receipt of U.S. foreign assistance. Even if some of the importance of aid is shown to have been accounted for by other variables in a multivariate test, the strength and reliability of this relationship is such that is unlikely to disappear.[9]

Of course, foreign aid does not "cause" political violence in the sense that the external assistance actually creates violent be-

[7] Regression is a common form of statistical analysis in which a line is "fitted" between points in a cluster created by plotting one variable (in this case a type of political conflict) against another variable (total U.S. foreign aid to the region for a given year). The criterion for determining how to fit the line is derived from "least-squares analysis" and is essentially based upon finding the minimum variance of the points around the line. For introductory discussions, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); pp. 273-325; Ronald J. and Thomas H. Wonnacott, *Econometrics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 1-14.

[8] An alternative hypothesis, which cannot altogether be discounted, is that aid and instability are merely *coincident* and not causally related. Aid may in fact have nothing to do with political conflict, despite objectives both of donor and recipient governments to the contrary. It is known, both from statistical evidence and interviews with former embassy officials, that aid follows the incidence of political conflict in the region. In other words, the U.S. government has responded to calls for aid on the part of recipient governments facing turmoil. But aid might simply have increased as the infrequency of instability increased without producing any constraining effect; according to this argument, where aid declines conflict will also decline. A flaw in the argument, however, is that changes in conflict lagged *behind changes in aid*. This means that aid declined before, not after, instability began to diminish, making the causal hypothesis more plausible than the coincidence hypothesis. Moreover, even if the coincidence hypothesis were correct, the political objective of increased stability through foreign assistance has not been met. Lack of any correlation between aid and instability would have shown that. My evidence of an inverse correlation is much stronger, therefore, and more perturbing.

Since rho had a value of —.42, indicating serial correlation, the Cochran-Orcutt transformation was performed, improving the variance substantially. The resulting value of the Durbin-Watson statistic was 2.01, well within the acceptable range. The logarithm of the likelihood function for non-linearity of the dependent variable showed that the linear fit was appropriate.

[9] In a dynamic, causal model of somewhat broader conceptual scope, a more extensive multivariate test among several conflict variables and aid, showed no weakening of this bivariate relationship. The current test used in effect one of the marker variables from the larger model. (Doran, "Political Instability, U.S. Foreign Assistance, and Dependence: A Push-Pull Hypothesis" [1978].)

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havior where the potential for that behavior does not already exist. Foreign aid catalyzes the tension and frustration associated with fears of governmental dominance, rapid social change or loss of political autonomy. Foreign aid stimulates conflict processes already latent within the society.

My findings are even more plausible when one realizes that there is a two-year lag between distribution of the aid and the consequent increase in domestic political unrest. This two-year period is of critical importance because it indicates that the effects of an influx of foreign aid are not immediate, but require an opportunity to permeate the various layers of society, ultimately inducing a violent response at the mass level. This "lag" (or delay in response) also suggests that *it is probably not the initial receipt of foreign exchange against which opposition groups have reacted but, rather, the purposes to which the recipient government has put those funds.* The effect of aid on the behavior of the recipient government may, therefore, be as important as its direct effect on the subversive forces themselves.

It is also noteworthy that guerrilla warfare, a massive and violent form of social rebellion, is correlated with the receipt of foreign assistance. Milder forms of unrest, less visible and less destructive of political legitimacy, property and human life would be easier to rationalize or tolerate. But guerrilla warfare, so prevalent in the Caribbean-Central American area during the 1950s, sixties and seventies, is the very thing which aid, at least partly, was designed to offset or constrain. It is ironic that foreign aid should become the stimulus or catalyst to internal aggression, rather than its nemesis.

Why aid has failed to achieve a larger measure of political stability in the Caribbean-Central American region is not difficult to comprehend. Insofar as economic assistance spurs development, fundamental changes occur in systems of land tenure, rural and urban mobility, institutions and the political aspirations of members of the middle class. In the short term, moreover, large doses of military and economic aid designed to strengthen a regime may generate two kinds of violent political opposition. *First,* guerrilla forces operating in the countryside may redouble activities calculated to undermine and discredit the government's growing foreign dependence. *Second,* girded by foreign aid, the government may mount campaigns to rout subversives, thereby catalyzing increased confrontations with various "out groups" and leading to incessant warfare rather than victory for either.

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In addition, external ideological and minor material support, stimulated by the larger U.S. role in the area, probably also increased for opposition groups operating in the Caribbean and Central America. Evidence for this proposition is quite solid at the overt level of communist-bloc aid to Third World countries. Massive amounts of communist aid have found their way into the hemisphere in a variety of forms; in the decade ending in 1975, for example, two Latin American countries, Chile and Argentina, each received more than $500 million in such aid. The communist states seemed to feel less need to compete with the United States when the U.S. government offered less material support to Third World nations. Conversely, when U.S. foreign assistance has increased, tending to shift attention and the political balance toward the United States, governments outside the hemisphere — particularly the Soviet Union — have felt called upon to demonstrate greater support for movements and groups aligned with their own interests. While it is true that for much of the period included in this study neither the Soviet Union nor China had the capacity for substantial covert influence, and while in the late 1960s the Soviets increasingly supported legitimate governments rather than indigenous communist parties, in the years of the Cuban Revolution and immediately thereafter, communist-bloc financial and ideological support was forthcoming for Latin America. Feeble though this support may have been, it nonetheless could bolster a sense of confidence in the minds of guerrilla leaders that regimes could be toppled despite U.S. assistance. Hence, increases in U.S. foreign aid in that climate may have been politically counterproductive.

The relevance of these findings to the various arguments treated in the introduction to this paper will be explored below. Before we look at the policy implications of the findings, however, we must examine the fourth and last question: Has the United States, as some aid recipients have alleged, employed foreign aid as a punitive instrument (other than Kissinger's occasional threats to cut off aid and Carter's use of aid to further the cause of human rights)? Let us test this question by looking at a well-known OAS vote in which a number of hemispheric governments chose not to support the United States on an issue which was considered important in Washington. This was the January 1962 vote to exclude Cuba from the OAS.

Table I shows that in 1963 — one year after the critical vote was taken — not a single country voting against the United States was penalized by a decline in the amount of U.S. economic

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TABLE 1

1962 OAS VOTE AND SUBSEQUENT RECEIPT OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID

	Voted With U.S. Position	Voted Against U.S. Position	Aid Increase 1963*	Aid Increase 1964†
Argentina	...	X	Yes	No
Bolivia	...	X	Yes	No
Brazil	...	X	Yes	Yes
Chile	...	X	Yes	No
Colombia	X	...	Yes	No
Costa Rica	X	...	Yes	No
Dominican Republic	X	...	Yes	No
Ecuador	...	X	Yes	No
El Salvador	X	...	Yes	No
Guatemala	X	...	Yes	No
Haiti	X	...	No	Yes
Honduras	X	...	Yes	No
Mexico	...	X	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	X	...	Yes	Yes
Panama	X	...	Yes	No
Paraguay	X	...	Yes	No
Peru	X	...	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	X	...	Yes	No
Venezuela	X	...	No	No

* Chi-square = .614. (*See* text.)
† Chi-square = .222. (*See* text.)

aid (exclusive of possible actions by the Export-Import Bank) relative to the allocation of the previous year. In 1964, two years after the OAS vote, most of the countries in Latin America suffered budget cuts in economic aid. Although four countries that had opposed the United States on the Cuban issue (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador) sustained decreases in U.S. economic aid, a far larger number of states which had voted *with* the United States also experienced declines in U.S. aid. The chi-square test for statistical significance reinforces rejection of the null hypothesis of punitive aid sanctions.[10]

The results, for both economic and military aid,[11] absolve

[10] The chi-square test is a simple statistical test to be applied to data of a dichotomous or nominal sort, such as the data employed here, where the actor either received or did not receive an increase in U.S. aid and voted either with or against the United States. A large value for the chi-square coefficient implies a real association between the two variables; a small value suggests that the association may be due to chance. The values here (.614 and .222) are clearly small, indicating that voting in the OAS and receipts of U.S. aid are *not* associated. See Robert S. Weiss, *Statistics in Social Research: An Introduction* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 178-197.

[11] For a test using U.S. military aid, see Marvin G. Stottlemir, "Measuring Foreign

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the United States (at least in this instance and on the statistical average across the OAS membership) of having reduced aid as a penalty for not supporting U.S. policy. This is not to deny that U.S. influence may have been exercised in other ways (e.g., the alleged Haitian decision to accept a large cash subsidy in return for support of the American position); nor that the rate of increase in an OAS member's annual aid allotment was impermeable to attack where a country grossly challenged U.S. policy. The latter effect would be too subtle for symbolic purposes, however, and for the recipient, could at worst only lead, on the average, to a maintenance of status-quo aid levels. Certainly on the 1962 exclusion-of-Cuba vote — perceived by Washington as directly touching U.S. interests outside the Caribbean — there is no evidence of punitive aid sanctions against those members voting in opposition to the United States.

In short, foreign assistance has grown in magnitude and in political significance for alliance relationships and for the recipient polity. While foreign aid is an important avenue for redistributing some wealth within the hemisphere and for providing skills and working capital for development purposes, it also creates potential political leverage for the donor, especially where military and economic aid are closely coordinated throughout the region. But the striking empirical finding of this paper is that the political objective (as distinct from the economic-growth objective) for which aid is often supplied has been thwarted. Aid has *not* contributed to internal political stability. On the contrary, empirical evidence shows that U.S. foreign aid catalyzes domestic political conflict within the small, predominantly poor Caribbean and Central American countries.

Critics who argue that grants of foreign aid tend to suppress pressures for reform and revolt in the short term, only to lay the groundwork for future revolution, must confront this evidence. The "liberal thesis" would be correct if instability continued despite grants of assistance or if instability varied inversely with aid allocations in the short run. But neither relation holds. Instead, the amount of subversion occurring in the Caribbean-Central American area over approximately fifteen years varies directly with the amount of U.S. foreign aid received. Given these empirical findings, what recommendations regarding U.S. aid policy are feasible?

Policy: Determinants of U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America" (Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, May 1975). Again, the empirical evidence showed no punitive bias.

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Decoupling Instability and Aid

Given that a primary objective of foreign aid is the tranquillity and prosperity of the recipient governments, and that instability and economic growth are themselves correlated in certain phases of a country's history, how can foreign aid further both stability and growth? Additionally, given that the primary *alliance* objective of foreign assistance must be the security of the alliance and of the individual alliance members (and that military aid, in particular, is a means to that end), how can alliance security be preserved without generating negative side effects such as the propensity for oppression or rebellion? How can one reverse the empirical reality which now confronts the U.S. policymaker? In short, how can the approach to aid disbursement be revised so as to reduce rather than increase the likelihood of domestic political unrest within recipient nations? To shed some light on these questions, I shall evaluate several aspects of aid-allocation procedure.

(1) While the purposes of economic and military aid are (or should be) quite different, and while the disbursement of each type of aid on a country-by-country basis may vary widely, on the aggregate regional level the two kinds of aid have been in fact highly correlated. This suggests that the same forces underlie the distribution of both kinds of aid, even though the initial motivations for granting aid may have differed. One can question whether the consequences for stability would not be improved if the military and economic facets of the U.S. aid program were more carefully delineated and kept separate.

Economic aid, on the one hand, ought to provide a rather continuous, long-term source of foreign exchange for purposes of economic development. The absolute level of poverty of the recipient nation, its capital-absorption capability, its economic importance as a trading partner, and its past use of aid funds — all ought to be criteria for determining who gets what, how and when. On the other hand, military aid has a much greater *political* rationale. It is more explicitly intended to further U.S. and alliance interests, and it goes directly to the heart of political relationships within the recipient country. Military assistance, therefore, should properly be a short-term instrument. It ought to be considered as an emergency measure calculated to help a loyal ally defend its territory from external attack. It may also strengthen the government

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against internal pressures, but if this occurs at the cost of civil liberties the resulting damage to the health of democracy must be weighed against that particular regime's importance as a pillar in the alliance. Military assistance is the component of the aid package most likely to have the most immediate effect on domestic conflict. It is therefore the component which should be turned on or off most readily as conditions change.

A common criticism of the separation of aid allocation into military and economic components is that the policy can be rendered ineffective by the ability of the recipient government to divert funds from one category to another upon receipt of the foreign assistance, thus frustrating the donor's efforts to guide spending along desired channels. While possible in some instances, diversion is impossible if the recipient government has not already planned the particular investment or project (thus freeing funds which could be diverted to other, less acceptable activity such as physical oppression) or, even more restrictively, if the recipient is asked by the donor government to provide matching funds for the selected project. Thus, the "diversion argument" against separation of military and economic aid components is, at the least, an exaggeration of the flexibility available to the recipient government's decisionmakers.

Moreover, if one considers too seriously the threat that a government will simply obtain military aid elsewhere if the United States fails to supply it, the flexibility of aid as a policy instrument is severely curtailed. Because the recipient government faces other policy constraints (such as ideological preference and security limitations) and because of the financial cost to, and political reluctance of, other potential donors to get involved in high-risk situations along the U.S. periphery, alternate aid supplies are probably not very feasible.

In sum, if one locks military and economic assistance together, too much or too little assistance of one type can hinder the practical effectiveness of the other. *The principal point* is perhaps clearer when stated positively: by separating the aid components, U.S. foreign policy has a far richer fund of available options.

(2) If U.S. assistance policy is to offset the empirical reality that aid catalyzes rather than constrains instability, then the dynamics of domestic political unrest must be understood much better. A basic observation here is that conflict follows cycles. If a large dose of assistance is provided at the wrong time, nascent dis-

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equilibrium may be exacerbated. Thus, if the purpose of aid is to make it easier for the recipient government to make reforms which contribute to its long-term legitimacy, the time to provide that assistance, particularly the economic variety, is at the trough of the conflict cycle, not at its peak. At the trough of the cycle, the recipient government has an opportunity to use foreign aid properly, with a minimum of internal distraction and pressure. Once major instability is on the upswing, however, *any* aid received is likely to be diverted into efforts to suppress opposition groups, and such efforts actually strengthen the opposition which the assistance was designed to discourage. A parallel index of the capacity of a nation to absorb capital productively should be its capacity to employ military aid in such a way as to reduce, or at least not to accelerate, instability. The timing of aid allocation may be critical to the appropriate use of the aid, and in this the donor and the recipient both have obligations.

These observations lead to the conclusion that one can increase the likelihood that foreign aid will achieve the desired results by employing the proper mix of economic and military aid at various points of the conflict cycle, assuming that one has access to an empirical measure of that cycle for the appropriate region. Economic aid must be infused in a period of low-level instability, while short-term military aid may have to replace economic aid at a point of higher instability.

(3) Selectivity with respect to aid targets is a key to breaking the link between aid and instability. Insofar as choice is possible, it is scarcely sufficient to bolster "democracies" and refrain from reinforcing "oppressive dictatorships." If a dictatorship (whether military or civilian) is capable of social reforms leading to more income equality, a higher general standard of living and greater literacy, it should receive assistance. Likewise, a democracy which fails to govern effectively, which displays no sensitivity to the requirements of social and economic progress, and which possesses only a veneer of pluralism, is a poor candidate for aid. Military aid ought to be given, other things being equal, as a reward for increasing pluralism and social progress (such as the elimination of press censorship, the toleration of a genuine opposition party, or the initiation of meaningful land reform), regardless of how "democratic" or "authoritarian" a government may be. Unless political regimes are considered dynamic entities, aid being disbursed in such a fashion as to stimu-

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late positive change instead of merely to suppress subversion, the aid/instability link will not disappear.

It is not surprising that there is no positive correlation between democracy and receipt of foreign aid when aid has not been consciously distributed in order to induce increased pluralism and social progress.[12] Nor is it surprising — when one realizes that because of the timing of increased assistance, much of its value is dissipated in the overt struggle with subversion — that aid and instability are positively correlated. Separation of the components of the aid package, study of the nature of the conflict cycle, and selectivity in aid disbursement — all must be undertaken if we are to transform the present, disconcerting reality of U.S. foreign aid to Central America and the Caribbean.

If foreign assistance is to achieve its full and appropriate political impact, the findings reported in this study suggest the need for a number of changes in U.S. aid administration and procedure. Foreign aid does not "cause" political instability, but it does catalyze conflict processes in the unstable polity. The evidence that the political objectives of U.S. aid allocation are less than adequately met is troubling. Neither the validity of the U.S. leadership position within the Western Hemisphere nor the mutual benefits flowing out of foreign assistance, however, should be subject to doubt. No other government is likely to assume as large a burden of external support, or to expand its assistance responsibilities as markedly in the near future, as is the United States. The potential utility of both economic and military aid, appropriately timed and allocated, as a prime means of strengthening alliance relationships and of spurring socioeconomic growth continues to be recognized. What is needed is an innovation in procedures which will maximize the positive benefits of external assistance while minimizing the possible undesirable side effects.

[12] Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," ORBIS, Winter 1965; also see Wolf's *United States Policy and the Third World* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) and R. H. Fitzgibbon's, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," in J. V. Gillespie and B. A. Nesvold, eds. *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1970).

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THE THRILL OF VICTORY AND THE AGONY OF DEFEAT: SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

by Andrew Strenk

Much has been written recently on the subject of sport as social history. Very little, though, especially in English, has been written on sport and the conduct of international relations.[1] In this paper, I shall examine six areas in which sport plays an international political role: (1) diplomatic recognition; (2) protest; (3) propaganda; (4) prestige; (5) cooperation; and (6) conflict. Sport can have domestic political uses, as well, but these will be touched on only briefly. As will become evident, the several political and diplomatic uses of sport sometimes overlap, sometimes conflict.

Diplomatic Recognition

One of the more important uses of sport internationally is as a tool of diplomatic recognition or nonrecognition. Technological developments, more leisure time, better transportation, the intervention of governmental and commercial institutions in sports, and a greater awareness of sports through improved media communication — all these have led not only to an increase in the number of athletes but to an upsurge in the number and size of competitions, both national and international. Certain governments have realized that they can use the identification of an athlete with his state to affect their relations with other nations. Modern communications insure that large segments of the world's population will be aware of the occurrence, or nonoccurrence, of competitions between cer-

[1] See J. E. Nixon, "The Use of Sports as an Instrument of National Policy" (unpublished paper, Stanford University, 1965); David Kanin, "The Role of Sport in International Relations" (Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1976); Stephen Wright, "Are the Olympics Games? The Relationship of Politics and Sports," *Millennium*, Spring 1977, pp. 30-44; Karl Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), *passim*.

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tain states. In short, international athletic contests have become a form of public diplomacy.[2]

Today, when one state chooses to engage in athletic competition with another, that contact is seen as tacit recognition of the state and its government. Conversely, refusal to compete with a given country in international sports is seen as diplomatic nonrecognition.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) has been more successful than any other country in using sport to gain recognition. In 1950, only eleven states recognized the GDR — all of which were located in the communist world. By 1969, the states maintaining relations with the GDR numbered only thirteen. Two years later, however, fourteen more states had established relations with East Berlin, to be followed in the next few years by the rest of the international community. Among those who campaigned very effectively for international recognition of the GDR were East Germany's "diplomats in track suits."

Immediately after the formation of the East German state, a national soccer team, billed as a Saxon all-star team, played a match against Hungary. Since the GDR was not a member of the International Soccer Federation (FIFA), the Hungarians took the field as a labor-union team. The match demonstrated that the GDR was a political entity capable of conducting independent sporting relations with other countries. This was the opening move in the long campaign to break down the barriers isolating the GDR from the Western world. Under the Hallstein Doctrine, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) committed itself to a policy of claiming the role of successor to the Third Reich and, in the hope of attaining reunification at some distant date, attempted to isolate the GDR diplomatically. In the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the international sports federations, the FRG was able to claim the seats once held by prewar Germany. The GDR found itself excluded from international sports events unless it compromised and agreed that the FRG would represent East Germans as well as West Germans.

But the East Germans did not submit to the pressure. They realized that if the GDR could gain representation in the international sports bodies, then a strong start would have been made toward obtaining diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state. The GDR challenged the FRG's right to represent West Berlin's athletes or include them on national teams, and a counterboycott of West

[2] David Kanin, "The Role of Sport in the International System," paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Feb. 25-29, 1976, p. 1.

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Berlin teams and sports events forced the FRG to agree to GDR membership in the international federations. Opponents were carefully selected, and East German athletes traveled anywhere they could represent the GDR. The FRG, supported by many other countries, refused to recognize the GDR's right to compete under its own insignia. Consequently, the GDR became embroiled in a long battle with NATO countries (over visas) and with the various international and national sports federations (over protocol problems). Between 1957 and 1967, the GDR was refused visas on thirty-five different occasions by thirteen nations (not including the FRG). In the same period, twelve GDR teams left international competitions because the organizers would not display the East German flag or play their national hymn. Sometimes the awards ceremony was canceled, as at the 1960 world speed-skating championships; at other times, matches were interrupted, as in 1962 when police broke up a soccer match in West Germany between BC Bochum Hordel (FRG) and Lokomotiv Engelsdorf (GDR), after the East Germans appeared with GDR emblems instead of club insignia.[3]

Undaunted by setbacks, the GDR constructed facilities, trained coaches, directed doctors and scientists to help with sports programs, established training centers, instituted talent-search and development programs, and offered rewards for sporting success. In 1970, one estimate calculated that the GDR spent 1.4 billion marks annually (about 2 per cent of GNP) on sports.[4] The investment paid off — East Germany became so good in so many sports that it became hard to ignore them or to avoid competing against them. By 1976, the GDR had won 225 Olympic medals, 950 medals in world championships, and 901 medals in European championships. Seventy-nine international federations had recognized the GDR, and more than 117 East Germans held positions in those organizations. The GDR had hosted 39 European and 25 world championship events.[5] Each competition, each medal, each world record was striking a blow toward full recognition of the GDR. In 1955, the International Olympic Committee granted East Germany provisional recognition; and in 1956, 1960 and 1964, the two Germanies formed

[3] Helmut Schreiber, "Die Koerperkultur in der DDR, 1945-1973" (*Diplomarbeit*, Johannes Gutenberg Universitaet, Mainz, 1973), p. 200ff.; *Memorandum zur Flaggen und Hymnen Frage unter dem besonderen Aspekt der DDR an den Olympischen Spielen Muenchen 1972* (Frankfurt: Deutscher Sport Bund, n.d.), pp. 6-7.

[4] "Bei Uns ist es immer Olympia," *Der Spiegel*, August 14, 1972.

[5] Guenther Heinze, "Der DDR Sport—ein anerkannter und geachteter Partner im internationalen Sportleben," *Theorie und Praxis der Koerperkultur*, October 1973, p. 874; Martin Kramer, German Sports and Gymnastics Union press chief, letter to the author, dated December 3, 1976.

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a combined team. In 1965, the IOC granted the East Germans the right to send a separate team to Mexico (1968); there, the two Germanies competed under a common flag and hymn. By 1972, the GDR finally was able to compete under its own emblems, and between 1971 and 1975, ninety states rendered diplomatic recognition to the GDR.

Sports diplomacy is a two-edged sword. The GDR, struggling on one front for recognition, was not averse to using boycott and pressure tactics against its ideological opponents. East Germany refused to recognize West Berlin as part of West Germany. The East Germans argued that West Berlin was a separate state and, therefore, West Berliners could not compete on West German national teams. Nor could the FRG hold international championship events in West Berlin. West Berliners traveling with FRG teams behind the *"Iron Curtain" often were refused visas, and East European teams* boycotted championships held in West Berlin. Federation Cup tennis matches, for example, were boycotted by the Poles and Czechoslovakians. In 1967, Soviet gymnasts refused to compete in West Berlin and, more recently, in the 1976 world speed-skating championships.

The drive to establish West Berlin as an independent entity resulted in the hoisting of the West Berlin flag at international events. When this happened at the 1973 *Ostseewoche* sailing regatta, the West Germans, including four West Berliners, departed the competition. Despite the 1971 Four Power Agreement, the use of sport to achieve diplomatic objectives continues.

Such diplomatic conflicts within the sporting world are not new. Olympic Games early in this century were troubled by conflicts over the status of delegations from Finland and Bohemia, since both were parts of larger empires (Russia and Austria-Hungary, respectively). In the 1930s, Japan campaigned to gain international recognition for Manchukuo in the IOC and in the Far Eastern Olympic Association. Unsuccessful in the former attempt, the Japanese re-formed the latter after the Chinese walked out of a conference to discuss Manchukuo's acceptance. The Oriental Olympic Association, with Manchukuo as a member, was the result.

The use of sports as a means of withholding recognition has been increasing. Israel has been faced with this problem for some time. In 1959, for example, the Lebanese basketball team refused to play an Israeli team at the World Student Games, held in Italy. At the 1974 Asian Games (in Teheran), Israel was ousted from the Asian Soccer Association because a majority of its members

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refused to recognize the Israeli state. Pakistan, North Korea and the People's Republic of China declined to compete in any event which Israeli athletes had entered. And in 1976, the Asian Games Federation asked Israel not to compete in the 1978 games, since security could not be guaranteed.

The Republic of China has faced similar problems. At the 1959 World Basketball Championship in Santiago, Chile, the Soviets declined to play the ROC team, arguing that no such country existed. The USSR recognized only the People's Republic of China, which one year earlier had ended all sports contact with the IOC and the international federations because of their "unlawfully extended recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan."[6] Until the Republic of China was expelled from the international sports bodies, the PRC would not take part in any competition where the "other" China was present. It took more than twenty years for this strategy to bear fruit, but finally, in 1974, the Asian Games Federation expelled the Republic of China by a 38-13 vote (5 abstentions). At the 1976 Montreal Olympics, Canada refused to grant visas to the Nationalist Chinese team, becoming the first host nation ever to deny a country entrance to the Games.

International sport is one of the strongest, most direct, cheapest and least dangerous foreign policy weapons a nation can use to set the tone of relations. When combined with good press coverage, athletic exchanges can be quite effective in signaling a change in the diplomatic atmosphere. Such a case was the "Ping-Pong diplomacy" engaged in by the United States and the People's Republic during 1971, when a series of table tennis matches broke a decades-long silence between the two countries. Subsequently, American swimmers (1973) and track stars (1975) toured China. Sponsored by the U.S. State Department, these trips were designed to show that Washington was rethinking its policy toward the PRC and was interested in improving relations. The recent "basketball diplomacy" with Cuba has served the same purpose.

Protest

The use of sport as a means of "protest" often involves diplomatic recognition and the hope of a propaganda victory. Here, however, the protest is directed more at the particular government currently in charge of affairs rather than at the state's right to exist

[6] Jonathan Kolatch, *Sports, Politicians and Ideology* (New York: Jonathan David, 1972), p. 184.

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as an independent entity. Sometimes protests have gotten out of control and led to conflict.

Many protests are nonsystemic; that is, they are not conscious acts of governmental policy. Such protests often aim at gaining publicity for a particular cause. The "black power" protests by Tommie Smith and John Carlos at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City are examples. The fact that television relays such protests around the world in a few seconds magnifies their impact. Another type of nonsystemic protest, which may involve entire teams, is the defection of athletes. The act of defection is in one way or another almost always a protest against prevailing social or political conditions in the defector's country. In 1956, for example, fifty-five Hungarian athletes, coaches and team leaders defected at the Olympic Games. The GDR has been plagued with defections since its existence, despite restrictive measures and the financial-social disadvantages of leaving a state-supported athletic system. Thus, in 1976, the skier Klaus Tuscherer defected at Innsbruck, and junior soccer team members Juergen Pahl and Norbert Nachweih defected at a tournament in Turkey.

More often, though, protest will take other forms. In 1969, for example, the West German delegation to the European track championships in Athens boycotted all their races in order to protest the disqualification of Juergen May due to East German pressure. At the Montreal Olympics, a Lebanese team, hastily assembled from students studying abroad, protested against their government by unfurling a banner demanding peace, freedom and unity for their country. Another mass protest without official approval was that of the Czechoslovakians after the 1968 Soviet occupation. In that year, Czech cyclists boycotted the Friedensfahrt cycling tour, an annual event sponsored since the late 1940s by the newspapers *Neues Deutschland, Trybuna Ludu* and *Rude Pravo*. In the section of the course running through the CSSR, cyclists found their route strewn with nails, stones and other obstacles placed by the local population.[7]

On the other hand, protests often have government approval. In 1956, six nations withdrew from the Olympic Games in protest against international political events: Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon were protesting the Suez invasion, while Spain, Holland and Switzerland were protesting the invasion of Hungary. Since the fall of the Allende government, the Soviet Union has boycotted Chilean teams. In 1974, the Soviet soccer team refused to play a qualifying

[7] Willi Knecht, "Der CSSR Sport. Reflexionen einer hinderten Reform," *Deutschland Archiv*, August 1969, p. 882.

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match with Chile for the World Cup in soccer, and in 1976, the Soviets boycotted their scheduled Davis Cup contest with Chile.

The use of boycotts to protest conditions of which one does not approve has become quite popular. A boycott of the 1936 Olympics was threatened by several groups opposed to Nazi policies, especially from within the USA, but the threat was not carried out.[8] In the 1960s, however, as controversy over South African and Rhodesian racial policies grew, protest (usually boycott) as a diplomatic tool became more frequent. Thus, the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, founded in 1962, ran a successful campaign resulting in the banning of South Africa from the 1964 Olympics. When IOC President Avery Brundage decided in 1968 to readmit South Africa, 50 countries threatened to boycott the Mexico Olympics. Finally, in 1970, continued pressure resulted in the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic movement. Protests by African nations led to similar actions in non-Olympic sports, and today the International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF) is the only major international federation that allows South Africa to compete. Protesting apartheid, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Hungary, India and Mexico have all refused to play South Africa in various Davis Cup and Federation Cup tennis matches during 1969-1976.[9] Although sports in Rhodesia are multiracial, that country has suffered a similar fate. Sport has offered the black African states a way of protesting against a situation where a white minority government controls the destinies of the black majority.

In 1976, the black African boycott was extended to New Zealand, owing to its stated intention to continue sporting competitions with South Africa. When New Zealand failed to reverse its policy and insisted on competing at Montreal, the black African countries, supported by some Arab countries and Guyana, withdrew. After the Games, wherever New Zealand fielded its teams, the Africans withdrew. In 1977, the boycott was extended to all countries still maintaining athletic ties with South Africa.

Propaganda

Another important use of sports in the international system is as a vehicle of propaganda. Because a given sporting event,

[8] See Arnd Krueger, *Die Olympischen Spiele 1936 und die Weltmeinung. Ihre aussenpolitische Bedeutung unter besonderer Berueckksichtigung der USA* (Berlin: Bartels & Wernitz, 1972) and Karl Heinz Jahnke, *Gegen den Missbrauch der olympischen Idee 1936* (Frankfurt: Roederberg, 1972).

[9] See Richard Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975) and Peter Hain, *Don't Play with Apartheid* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971).

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in and of itself, has little political content, spectators and governments are free to draw any conclusions they wish from the results of a competition. In international events, athletes represent the state, not themselves. Among athletic competitors, moreover, little cooperation is possible. Therefore, meets between political adversaries offer a ready-made forum for demonstrating the physical prowess of a particular sociopolitical system. From the victory of an individual or a national team, it is but a short step to the ideology and system behind that victory.[10]

The organized use of sports to disseminate propaganda on an international level began with Mussolini, but it was developed into a high art by the German National Socialists. The Nazis used the 1936 Olympic Games, already scheduled to be held in Berlin before Hitler came to power, in order to increase the Nazi state's world prestige and to present the image of a friendly, sports-loving and progressive nation. An elaborate spectacle was staged. The goal: to demonstrate how modern, efficient and organized Germany had become under the Nazis; that Germany had fully recovered from the effects of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles; that inflation and unemployment were no longer a problem; and that discrimination against the Jews was not so bad as the world press had portrayed.

Special periodicals in fourteen languages were published. Journalists were wined and dined at endless receptions and parties. The excavations at Olympia were resumed after several decades of inactivity. To time, judge, photograph, record and broadcast the Games, the most modern technology available was employed. Foreigners received discounts on travel fares and hotels. The city of Berlin was cleaned up and painted, Olympic flags, emblems and decorations were to be seen everywhere. Demonstrations by the SS and the SA were banned; anti-Jewish publications were removed from the newsstands; and anti-Jewish slogans were removed or painted over. Known troublemakers and criminals were locked up. An Olympic torch race was introduced to add more color to the opening ceremonies, and teams of runners carried the Olympic flame from Greece to Germany. As State Secretary Funk, an assistant to Propaganda Minister Goebbels, boasted, the Nazis saw the Games as "a propaganda opportunity which has never before in the history of the world been equaled." [11] As a result, the press reported to the world that life in Germany was not so bad after all. The Summer

[10] Kanin, pp. 6-7.
[11] Louis Gitter, "Death Takes a Holiday," *The Nation*, August 11, 1936, p. 124.

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Olympics provided Hitler with a convenient means of diverting world public opinion from such recent moves as Germany's occupation of the Rhineland. The Nazis built up a reservoir of goodwill which did not dissipate for several months.

The Soviets and, to a lesser extent, most East European countries carried on this tradition, using sports to advertise their own political system. The Soviet minister of sports, who sat on the Council of Ministers, was responsible for all sports programs, and the All Union Committee of Physical Culture and Sport was a full-fledged government organization staffed by party members. When Stalin's World Youth Games failed to become the rival to the Olympics that he had wished, Moscow embarked on an ambitious sports-development program which in only a few years was producing world champions in almost every sport. Victories and world records were held up as proof that the socialist workers' paradise was superior to the decadent, capitalist nations of the West. At the same time, the Soviets stressed that American black athletes were being discriminated against by white team officials in international competitions, while less fortunate blacks were sent off to fight imperialist wars of aggression.[12] After many years of preparation and the expenditure of several million roubles, along with a few false starts, the Soviets entered the international sports scene at Helsinki in 1952. There they won twenty-three gold medals and scored as many points as the favored United States:

> Such and many similar tremendous achievements were recorded by the athletes of the Soviet Union. Therefore it is understandable that wherever Soviet sportsmen appeared in Helsinki, they aroused public interest. Everyone wanted to know what kind of people are these, who achieved such magnificent results, and how they were able to obtain such victories? These Olympic participants, the winners of gold, silver and bronze medals, the conquerors of world and Olympic records, are sons and daughters of the socialist fatherland, the great Soviet Union, which gives to all talented and industrious people the chance to develop and pursue their skills and knowledge. The Soviet Union creates the prerequisites for this success.[13]

Thus did the socialist countries exploit their sports success.

Their Cold War opponents, the Americans, while lacking a centralized, governmental sports organization with a special section for propaganda, tended to see sports as an ideological battleground every bit as much as the Soviets. Americans had to win because they were free; if they lost in sports, other countries might

[12] *Der Sieg der sowjetischen Sportler in Helsinki—Ein Sieg der sozialistischen Gesellschaftsordnung* (Dresden: Tribuene, 1952), p. 17.
[13] *Ibid.*

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conclude they were weak in other areas too. As Olympic decathalon champion Bob Mathias put it:

> There were many more pressures on American athletes [in 1952] because of the Russians than in 1948. They were, in a sense, the real enemy. You just loved to beat them. You just had to beat them. It wasn't like beating some friendly country like Australia. This feeling was so strong down through the entire team, even [among] members in sports where the Russians didn't excel.[14]

A few years later, after the second USA-USSR track meet, Eddie Southern reflected, "You would really rather die than lose [to the Russians]." Southern's teammate Bob Soth observed, "I wasn't running to get a point or two, I was running to beat the Russians." [15]

American politicians encouraged this attitude. Vice-President Humphrey, speaking in 1966, said, for example, "What the Soviets are doing is a challenge. We are going to be humiliated as a great nation unless we buckle down to the task of giving our young people a chance to compete." [16] And many Americans today would still agree with General MacArthur:

> "Athletic America" is a telling phrase. It is talismanic. It suggests health and happiness. It arouses national pride and kindles anew the national spirit. In its fruition it means a more sturdy, a more self-reliant, a more self-helping people. It means, therefore, a firmer foundation for our free institutions. . . . Nothing has been more characteristic of the genius of the American people than their genius for athletics. Nothing is more synonymous of our national success than is our national success in athletics.[17]

Prestige

Athletic competition also plays an important role in the search for national prestige in the world of nations. The international use of sport to acquire prestige has much in common with its use as a vehicle of propaganda. In the former case, however, one is more concerned with presenting a favorable image of one's country as a potential trade partner or tourist spot than with advertising or attacking a particular sociopolitical system. Again, because of the merged identity of an athlete and his state, a relatively unknown country can draw worldwide attention when one of its sportsmen wins a major international event—attention which can be used to

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[14] William Johnson, *All That Glitters Is Not Gold: The Olympic Games* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), p. 221.

[15] Tex Maude, "Victory with a Smile," *Sports Illustrated*, July 27, 1959, p. 24.

[16] "Humphrey Asks Greater Sports Effort," *New York Times*, May 23, 1966.

[17] Douglas MacArthur, "Athletic America," in *A Soldier Speaks* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 27.

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promote the attractions of that country. Indeed, many countries have combined the cabinet positions of tourism and sports into one office.

In recent times, the victories of Kip Keino (1,500-meter run, 1968; 3,000-meter steeplechase, 1972), Naftali Temu (10,000 meters, 1968), Amos Biwott (3,000-meter steeplechase, 1968), and the Kenyan 1,600-meter relay team (1972) thrust Kenya into the international limelight. Likewise, the victory of Tunisia's Mahomaded Gammoudi in the 5,000 meters (1968) brought instant attention to his country. The marathon wins of Abele Bikila (1960 and 1964) and Malmo Wolde (1968) created not only admiration for their exploits, but interest in their Ethiopian homeland; and the gold medals won by John Akii Bua of Uganda (1972), Hasley Crawford of Trinidad (1976) and the Jamaicans George Rhoden (1952) and Don Quarrie (1976) did more to attract world attention to their countries than any government agency or tourist office could have done.

For the Japanese, the hosting of the 1964 Olympics was an opportunity to show the world that Japan was a modern, democratic and peaceful country and that the legacy of World War II was buried. The runner who carried the Olympic Flame into the stadium in 1964 was Yoshenori Sakai, selected because he was a "young person who embodies the driving force of Japan's future." [18] Moreover, he had been born in Hiroshima on the same day the atomic bomb destroyed that city. Japan did not rely on dramatic gestures alone. The Japanese invested $1.5 billion in facilities for the Games. Included among these were a high-speed rail line between Tokyo and Osaka, eight freeways, nine miles of new subway lines, and an $18-million telecommunications center. These outlays were intended not only to make the visit of tourists to the Games more enjoyable and comfortable, but to serve in future years, as well.

Other examples abound. Egypt established a number of events — rowing races at Luxor, the Arabian Horse Show — with public relations in mind. Austria has benefited greatly as a winter-sports vacation area thanks to all the free publicity generated by two Winter Olympics held at Innsbruck. At Grenoble, the French built a new city hall, post office, school, hospital, police station, airport, congress hall, cultural center and miles of new roads. This $200-million investment by the French was aimed at attracting tourists long after the Olympics were over. For the 1972 Summer Olympics, the city of Munich constructed a huge airport and a subway system, in addition to the usual sports complexes.

[18] "Japanese Throwing Off Cloak of Isolation," *New York Times*, October 11, 1964.

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Having invested large sums of money to host international sports events, and having staked their reputations on the successful outcome of these events, countries have sometimes tried to hide such problems as labor strikes, work stoppages, construction delays, terrorism, health conditions and domestic unrest from the rest of the world. Postponement or cancellation would cause a loss of prestige. Thus, in 1968, the Mexican government took extreme measures to control and quiet student unrest prior to the Olympics.

Cooperation

Some observers have seen sports as a means of furthering international understanding and peace. Indeed, the assumption that increased contact leads to more cooperation is at the heart of most international sporting events. Many believe it. Melvin Lasky of the *New York Times* certainly did:

> Nothing less than great sporting rivalries, which enlisted overwhelming emotions and impassioned enthusiasms, could serve to reinforce the new needed structure of the 20th century world peace. . . . Patriots were still needed, not to fight battles at dawn, but for matches under arclights at night — the historic mutation. High powered sports could be the replacement for power politics.[19]

Sports, then, are seen as a form of conflict resolution, an outlet for aggressive impulses, a diversion of man's inherent violent tendencies into peaceful and socially acceptable areas. Konrad Lorenz's *On Aggression,* Goodhart and Chataway's *War Without Weapons* and Aldous Huxley's *Ends and Means* all advance this argument.

The notion is popular with functionalists. By exposing different nationalities and races to each other, so the theory goes, myths and preconceptions will disappear; solidarity and cooperation will replace fear and distrust. Thus, organized sports can serve as a common language to bring people together, resulting in better understanding. Furthermore, interaction among hundreds of individuals will form a network of transnational, cross-cultural links. Loyalty to the nation-state will diminish as loyalty to supranational institutions grows. The chance of misunderstanding, and hence conflict, will decrease. Thus, in the 1973 Amateur Athletic Act of the American AAU, one can read: "International competition between amateur athletes contributes to international peace and understanding." [20] In an earlier time, one of the motives behind Baron Pierre de

[19] Lasky, "One Nation, Divisible," *New York Times Magazine,* September 22, 1974.
[20] See Luc Suenens, "The Alienation and Identity of Man," in Ommo *et al., Sports in the Modern World: Chances and Problems* (New York: Springer, 1973), p. 7; John

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Coubertin's plan for reviving the Olympics was to further world peace. Athletic contests, he proclaimed, would become the "free trade" of the future: "Let us export oarsmen, runners, fencers." [21] Moreover:

> *Should this institution prosper . . . it may be a potent if indirect factor in* securing universal peace. Wars break out because nations misunderstand each other. We shall not have peace until the prejudices which now separate the different races shall have been outlived. To attain this end, what better means than to bring the youth of countries periodically together for amicable trials of muscular strength and agility? The Olympic Games with the Ancients controlled athletics and promoted peace. Is it not visionary to look to them for similar benefactions in the future? [22]

The IOC was not the only organization that became imbued with this philosophy. The U.S. State Department adopted the same concept.[23] Since 1952, State has sent well over a hundred teams and several hundred coaches abroad in various exchange programs in an effort to bring people together and promote international understanding.

This optimistic point of view is to be found in almost every country. After a series of U.S.-Soviet basketball games in Moscow, the Soviet journalist A. Razgan reported: "Whatever the outcome of the Soviet-American games, they will serve to establish stronger, friendly ties betwen the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States of America." [24] The athletes themselves usually agree with this. As Igor Ter-Ovanesyan said in 1962, "this Russian-American competition embodied in itself with particular force and expression the Olympic idea of friendship and honest struggle. We found ourselves equally able to be ferocious on the running track and friendly in everyday life." [25] The American swimming champion Don Schollander described his experiences in a similar vein: "There

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Gloom, "Functionalism in World Society," in Paul Taylor, ed., *Functionalism, Theory and Practice in International Relations,* (London: University of London Press, 1976), p. 93ff; Alan Reich, "Sports—Gateway to International Understanding," *Congressional Record,* June 19, 1973; James Rosenau, "The Coming Transformation of America: Resistant or Accommodative?," *World Studies,* Spring 1974, p. 7ff.

[21] International Olympic Committee, *Olympism* (Lausanne, Switzerland: International Olympic Committee, n.d.), p. 6.

[22] Baron Pierre de Coubertin, "The First Olympics," *Century,* November 1896, p. 53.

[23] See Reich, *passim,* and Robert Jones, "Sports and Diplomacy," Department of State Memorandum, March 5, 1975.

[24] Ragzan, "American Basketball Teams Tour Moscow," Translations of the Soviet Press, Embassy of the USSR in Washington, Press Department Release no. 306, May 23, 1958.

[25] Ter-Ovanesyan, "A Soviet Champion Tells His Story," *Sports Illustrated,* August 6, 1962, p. 16.

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is something which goes beyond competition. A genuine spirit develops and I think that it is really worthwhile." [26]

Conflict

Whether or not sport has the potential to bring people together and prompt cooperation, whether or not sports serve as an outlet for aggressive tendencies, there is always a real possibility — wherever spectators are present and governments are involved — that ideological and political tensions will surface and, in turn, create or exacerbate conflict.[27] After all, athletic competition is, by definition, conflict. Sporting events, whether between individuals or teams, are zero-sum games: one side wins, the other loses.

Chauvinism has always existed, but with increasing governmental support of athletics, the vested interest of the state has grown proportionately. Victory over an opponent becomes cause for national rejoicing, and in such an atmosphere, demonstrations by spectators can get out of control and lead to various degrees of violence. "War without weapons" was how English long-distance runner Chris Chataway described sports, and Henry Morton (author of *Soviet Sport*) considered the modern Olympics to be "bloodless international warfare." Athletes have become modern-day gladiators battling for various ideologies. In many countries, sports stars have joined nuclear missiles and tanks on the list of important national-budget items. As governments have invested increasingly in sports facilities, dormitories, high-altitude training centers, medical care and testing centers, drug research, coaching academies, insurance, subsidies, bonuses, talent-search programs, age-group programs, equipment, and administrative staff, so have the cost and pressure of winning increased. And, since more nations are competing, the risks are higher.

Technological innovations in equipment and facilities and the development of more sophisticated scientific and medical techniques have meant that athletes are approaching the limits of man's biological tolerance. New techniques promise more success, but they are also more dangerous and, from the point of view of the spectator, more spectacular. "Blood doping," steroids, drugs, hypnotism, and electrical stimulation of muscle tissue are all becoming

[26] Interview with the author, July 19, 1976.

[27] See Guenther Lueschen, "Cooperation, Association and Contest," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1970, p. 21ff; Frederick Hatfield, "Ethnocentrism and Conflict in Olympic Competition: Parallels and Trends," *Journal of Sport and Leisure*, Fall 1976, p. 32 ff; and Z. Krawczyk *et al.*, "The Dialectics of Transformation in Modern Sport," in Grupe *et al.*, p. 55.

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commoner. The result of all this is heightened frustration, which increases the chances that conflict will occur.[28] Athletes are frustrated by their own physical limitations. Politicians are frustrated when their investment does not produce the desired result. Spectators are frustrated when, conditioned to expect victory, none is forthcoming. Problems over rules and regulations create another area of potential conflict.

Few governments seek to cause international conflict, especially violence, via sport. However, the attempt to use sport to achieve various political ends, as described above, can lead to events which get out of control and result in international conflict, including violence. Thus, in 1962, when Indonesian President Sukarno refused to admit Israel and the Republic of China to the Fourth Asian Games, India, fearful of IOC sanctions, questioned the procedure. Indonesia took offense and broke off trade relations with India. Then thousands of rioters destroyed the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. President Nehru accused Chinese communists in Indonesia of stirring up anti-Indian feelings; the IOC banned Indonesia from the 1964 Olympics; and the Arab League threatened to withdraw if Indonesia was not readmitted. So, what was originally a simple sporting event quickly became entangled in a complex thicket of international politics.

Another example is provided by the 1969 "soccer war" between Honduras and El Salvador. Although deep-seated political and economic disputes lay behind the conflict, the catalyst was a series of soccer games held to determine which state would qualify for the World Cup finals. The qualifying games brought a long-standing feud to a head. Each of the three games was followed by rioting. Fans of the home team attacked the players of the visiting team, and people were killed. Honduras won the series; El Salvador protested. Military forces were mobilized, border violations in disputed territories followed, and soon a war was in progress.

The actions of individual athletes can also cause international tension in unpredictable ways. At the 1971 Pan American Games, for example, a group of Canadian athletes stealing flags enlisted the aid of several Americans. As they were in the process of taking a Cuban flag, several Cubans happened by. They summoned more Cubans from a nearby building, and a small scuffle soon developed into a large melee. Several athletes were injured, including the American gymnast James Culhane, who had to be rescued from the Cubans by the U.S. water polo team. During the same com-

[28] Hatfield, pp. 34-36.

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petition, several Cubans attempted to defect. The stadium where the track-and-field events took place gradually grew to resemble a battlefield. Some Cubans tried to flee into "no man's land" at the center of the stadium; other Cubans endeavored to hold them back; Americans and Canadians intervened. One of those prevented from defecting, Domingo Gómez, later leaped off the roof of his dormitory to his death, another committed suicide in the village hospital.

That violence is becoming a part of the international sports scene could be seen at the Montreal Olympics, where there were more soldiers and police than athletes. More than 16,000 men were mobilized in Canada's largest military operation since World War II. At the 1971 Pan American Games, 8,000 men were used to guard the athletes' village and the competition sites from terrorists and enraged students. With its barbed wire, machine-gun-toting soldiers, military patrols and guardhouses, the village looked more like a concentration camp than a place for sportsmen. Searches for weapons and increasingly more complicated security and identification systems have become necessary. The words of *New York Times* columnist Richard Shepard are worth pondering: "There is nothing that comes close to sports in the seizure of men's souls, in the fanning of fanaticism, in the proliferation of tedium. . . . the evidence of the 20th century offers no correlation between the expansion of sports and the death of war." [29]

Research Possibilities

We have examined some of the areas in which sports have become intertwined with politics in the international arena: diplomatic recognition, protest, propaganda, prestige, cooperation and conflict. International sports reflect many of the trends, tensions and problems in the larger world system. In addition, the striving for excellence and performance inherent in international sports creates additional tensions. Increasingly, nations are funneling larger amounts of their finite resources toward financing national sports programs in support of various political goals.

The United States is at a crossroads — it must either begin diverting significant resources into its international sporting programs, such as Olympic participation, or resign itself to the category of "also-ran, has-been." As much as purists bemoan the fact, it is ever more evident that sports and politics cannot be separated. The

[29] Richard Shepard, "Time to End Sports, Opiate of the Masses," *New York Times*, November 17, 1974.

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voluntary, privately subsidized, inefficient, decentralized, unorganized and uncoordinated nature of most sports in this country has led to a situation where many Americans no longer have a sporting chance in international competition. The roles that sports play are imperfectly understood.

This paper has been an initial attempt to classify the international roles played by sport. There are numerous areas that need to be studied, among them the following: the power structures and decisionmaking processes within and among the international sports federations, the International Olympic Committee, and the national Olympic committees; the role of the IOC president; the structures of sports programs in various countries; the role of new groups such as the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa and the UNESCO-sponsored International Council on Sports and Physical Education; the impact of sports institutions on governmental policies; the work of the European sports conferences; and the impact of the ideologies behind international sports exchanges, governmental involvement in sports, and commercial investment in international sports events.

For those interested in theories of international organization, international law, transnationalism, linkage politics, functionalism, conflict resolution, decisionmaking, organizational behavior and bureaucratic processes, the field of "sports politics" offers a wealth of material for case studies that can provide empirical data. Given the prestige of such events as the Olympics, the Davis Cup and the World Cup in soccer, and the importance that countries such as the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and, closer to home, Cuba have placed on sport, a deeper understanding of the structures, processes and ideologies involved would prove useful not only to the organizations and governments involved, but also to the fields of international relations, political science, and cultural and diplomatic history.

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reviews

Sozializm kak yavlenie mirovoi istorii [Socialism as a Phenomenon of World History]. By Igor R. Shafarevich. Paris: YMCA Press, 1977. 390 pp. Fr 63.00.

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The highly respected pure-mathematician Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich has departed from his arcane specialty to write a most remarkable study. Shafarevich is well known for his work in algebraic geometry, transformations and number theory, and several of his mathematical books have been translated into English. Shafarevich, often associated with Andrei Sakharov, is also one of the senior dissidents in the USSR.

One cannot begin to list the multitude of Western authors who have tried to explain the revolution that swept Russia in 1917, or the subsequent revolutions in many other nations. Within the Soviet Union, such writers, if they produce other than official hackwork, are silenced or confined to *samizdat*. The work under review, in fact, appeared in an earlier *samizdat* version. To Western historians and sociologists, the events themselves have a degree of remoteness; to an inhabitant of the USSR, they are immediate, personal and overwhelming. Indeed, what so distinguishes the work of Solzhenitsyn is its characteristic of presenting Bolshevism as a force which the Western reader can discern with all the human senses. Shafarevich, on the other hand, remains at all times the trained abstract thinker, whose method is to isolate essentials, to make every relevant comparison, to keep things in proportion, to work out consequences cautiously and tentatively. Emotional appeals are carefully avoided. The intensity of Shafarevich's experience shows only in the vast extent of the material he surveys. Just on rare occasions is there a minimal dose of very dry wit. His work is purely one of analysis, where emphasis is on concepts, their origins and interrelationships. There is very little discussion of socialist practice — no proposals for action; no appeals of any kind. To this extent, the work

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can be described as apolitical. It is inevitable, however, that persons of some political orientations will find themselves in strong sympathy and that others will not.

In Shafarevich's view, the ancient civilizations of Sumeria, Egypt, China and the Inca Empire all fall under the rubric of socialism. Added to these are the modern versions of socialism: national socialism, fascism and communism (Marxist socialism). The literature reviewed covers antiquity, the Middle Ages and modern times, the bibliography ranging from Plato to Jerry Rubin.

The book contains three main sections: "Chiliastic Socialism," "Government Socialism" and "Analysis." In the first of these sections, Shafarevich discusses socialist doctrines that explicitly promise a millennium. Beginning with Plato's *Republic,* in which the role of religion was somewhat ambiguous, the author goes on to medieval heresies, in which religion was central and where, for the first time, sizable groups were driven by a socialist dogma. Waldenses, Albigenses, Catharists, Brethren of the Free Spirit, Taborites, Anabaptists and their influence in continental Europe, as well as Lollards, Ranters, Diggers and Levellers in England are discussed. There follow biographical sketches of three typical leaders — Dolcino, Münzer (Muncerus) and Bockelson (Johann van Leiden) — and accounts of More's *Utopia,* Campanella's *Civitas Soli,* Winstanley's *Law of Liberty,* and several of the early French socialist novels are also provided. Discussing the Age of Enlightenment, Shafarevich elaborates on Jean Meslier's *Testament,* Morelly, and that remarkable precursor of existentialism, Dom L. M. Deschamps' *La vérité ou le vrai système.* The examination of various dogmas ends with the Directory, the Conspiracy of Equals, Babeuf and Buonarotti.

"Government Socialism," after a discussion of the Inca Empire and the Jesuit government of Paraguay, examines as examples of bureaucratic socialist systems the durable civilizations of Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt and ancient China. Such a wide perspective does not have the character of a survey and makes no claim to completeness. Rather, each case is selected to illustrate some specific development. Modern so-called socialist regimes of the West are omitted from Shafarevich's discourse because they are well known and because their realization of the socialist ideal is much less complete. Nor is there any discussion of modern communist practice — no Gulag Archipelago: Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are discussed only in regard to their ideas.

Shafarevich believes that socialism can be reduced to four fundamentals: (1) suppression of private property; (2) suppression

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of the family; (3) suppression of established religion; and (4) attainment of equity through suppression of social hierarchies. These are to be found in various forms and to different degrees in all socialist dogmas. Socialist theory may appear to be riddled with contradictions; yet, the identical contradictory ideas reappear throughout history, almost certainly independently of one another. This suggests the existence of a subconscious urge.

To understand this unformulated drive, Shafarevich develops a broad historical perspective. Stable socialist systems controlled by monstrous bureaucracies developed independently of one another in, for instance, China, Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Inca territory. So far as we know, there was little or no guiding theory. This point of view had been earlier developed *in extenso* by Heichelheim, Wittfogel and others. Then — roughly between 800 B.C. and 200 B.C. — there arose a "pivotal age" (Karl Jaspers' *Achsenzeit*) when individuality was permitted to express itself, giving rise to Greek civilization and, finally, to Christianity. The socialism of Plato; the medieval heresies; the utopias; Meslier, Deschamps and more recent philosophers — all are viewed as a reaction against the age of individuality, a rebellion against the personal freedom of the *Achsenzeit,* an unconscious urge to return humanity to the tyrannical socialism of antiquity. Socialism is thus fundamentally reactionary.

This argument, based on comparisons of many civilizations and philosophies, cannot be explained more fully here. Two striking resemblances, however, are certainly deserving of mention. Many institutions of the Inca Empire so closely resemble More's *Utopia* that when the French economist Baudin presented his study of the Incas before the Académie des Sciences, the question was raised whether More could have been inspired by the pre-Columbian civilization. (This is impossible as *Utopia* appeared three years before the discovery of Peru.) In another instance, we find the program of the *Communist Manifesto* duplicated in every detail in Aristophanes' bawdy comedy *Ecclesiazuzae*.

The recurring socialist dogma is complemented by the recurring "socialist leader." At first there is the small band of apparently totally inept men who squabble and cheat among themselves — the "three and a half nihilists unable to organize serious disorders in a minor provincial town" of Dostoyevsky's *The Possessed*. They swindle one another, call one another zoological and scatological names, and indulge in mystification (for example, Marx and Engels' pseudonymous "capitalist" reviews of *Das Kapital*). Then suddenly there is a transformation. The idea starts to spread. The

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inept and scurrying conspirator, brimming with inexhaustible energy, writes innumerable pamphlets, becomes a resounding public speaker and a tireless organizer, and he is recognized as a leader of men. But, should events turn against him, he undergoes a complete collapse and becomes an even more abject figure than at the start. This unconscious drive gives no support in adversity. When confessions of former Bolsheviks during the Stalinist purges were first reported, the West watched in disbelief — there was something unnatural. Psychologists and jurists said, "Neither the guilty nor the innocent act this way." This behavior is now ascribed to third-degree methods; however, abject confessions of this sort are *not* usually forced out of real enemies of communism, but are typical of Bolsheviks. Shafarevich points to the remarkable resemblance between the behavior of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Radek and others, on the one hand, and the "confession" of Bakunin and the recantations of Münzer and Bockelson, on the other. In all cases, there is a groveling apostasy and total breakdown of the will. The dogma is incapable of providing moral support.

The success of Marxism is attributed to the fact that it answered two basic questions of socialist dogma: Who are to be the "Chosen People" that will carry out the revolution? and Who is to be the final authority? Marxism's answer to the first question is: the proletariat. To the second, science. Neither answer is valid today. The proletariat is no longer revolutionary, and science has lost its authority, if indeed it ever possessed much in economics and sociology. Marxism's scientific pretensions receive thorough and scathing attention, something historians and political theorists have often eschewed. Several quotations from Marx and Engels exhibit their wonderful ineptitude in elementary mathematics and are the subject of one of Shafarevich's rare outbursts of irony. Marx and Engels had little conception of what science is, but, at the time they wrote, science was held in high esteem by the public. Thus, it was necessary to give their arguments a scientific appearance.

Shafarevich disagrees with the notion, originated apparently by Berdiaev and Kautsky, that Bolshevism is a special development produced by the interaction of Marxism with Russia's retarded history (a view still favored by the Eurocommunists of our day). Shafarevich also discusses at length the idea — expounded first by S. Bulgakov and, more recently, by W. Gurian — that socialism is a religion. To Shafarevich, this idea is incomplete as an explanation, and he draws an analogy between forms of human society and association among animals. Lorenz and other ethologists divide ani-

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mal "societies" into those in which there is no recognition of individuals (e.g., among herrings) and those in which individual recognition is essential (e.g., among greylag geese). The former, implying equivalence among all individuals, corresponds to the durable bureaucratic socialism of antiquity; the latter corresponds to *Achsenzeit* civilizations. There would then be an analogy between territoriality in animals and private property in man. In essence, the fundamental (but largely unconscious) principle that generates all socialist dogmas is simply suppression of individuality, ideally realized not in mere equality, but in actual identity. It is an urge to return mankind to the tyrannical monolithic socialisms of antiquity. Shafarevich further proposes that this is a subconscious form of an innate "death wish," although he is careful to say that he borrows the Freudian phrase for convenience, without subscribing to Freud's theories (which he considers unscientific).

Shafarevich's conclusions are tentative ones. Some of them may indeed find a justification in the writings of Marcuse and others of the New Left. The great value of this work lies not in its mysticism, but rather in the general conceptual framework it provides for surveying a vast amount of material and in its numerous detailed comparisons.

It may be asked: Is the fact that Shafarevich is a mathematician in any way relevant? Having carefully studied a great deal of historical and sociological literature, has he not thereby become a historian-sociologist? Yes and no. Of course, the concepts dealt with can, of necessity, have only blurred definitions, and rigorous logic does not apply; of this, Shafarevich is well aware, and he writes as a comparative historian. But his mathematical habits of thought persist, as evidenced by the general neatness of his argumentation. Above all, it shows in the exemplary conciseness which makes such an undertaking possible at all.

This is a very important work. Untold hurdles must have been overcome during its preparation in the Soviet Union, where much of the necessary literature was not openly available. Further difficulties must have been surmounted before its publication in Paris by YMCA Press, publication which represents a considerable act of courage for an author still living in the USSR. Besides a French translation, which has already appeared, Editions du Seuil is preparing Spanish, Italian and Portuguese translations. Moreover, an English translation (Harper & Row) is expected to appear in early 1979.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Project 87

Grants and Fellowships

PROJECT 87, a study of the U.S. Constitution sponsored by the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association, announces that applications are currently being accepted for (a) Research Grants and (b) Residential Fellowships at the Brookings Institution.

HISTORIANS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS, students of philosophy and the law, and practitioners of other social sciences are invited to apply for support of research in one or more of the following areas: (1) critical analyses of the political theory of the American constitutional tradition; (2) investigations of particular turning points or threads in constitutional evolution; (3) examinations of political behavior as conditioned by constitutional forms and rules; and (4) inquiries into the reputation and impact of the Constitution as a model for other states, as well as arguments for constitutional reform and revision.

Research Grants at sites around the country will be available in two categories:

(1) For amounts less than $5,000—to cover the costs of research and secretarial assistance, photocopying and travel.

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The application deadline is October 1, 1978. The starting date and duration of the grant will be negotiable; applicants will be invited to state their preferences.

Fellowships at Brookings will enable qualified persons to devote full-time consideration to constitutional studies for a stated period (normally ranging from three months to a full year). Applications for fellows-in-residence are due October 1, 1978. The period of residency in Washington may begin as early as January 1, 1979. Applicants will be invited to state their preference as to starting date and duration of the fellowship. Normally, compensation will match the fellow's salary and benefits for the year preceding the fellowship.

APPLICANTS for grants and fellowships will be asked to state the nature and significance of the work they intend to do during the period for which support is requested, as well as their plans for disseminating the results. Two letters of reference, assessing the significance of the work proposed and the applicant's fitness to do it, will be required.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, including instructions for applicants, contact: Donald Allen Robinson, Project Director, Project 87, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20036.

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

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